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Editorial
This, the Autumn 2010 edition of the Australian Army Journal coincides with Anzac Day. Anzac Day is of deep emotional significance to the Australian nation, with many going so far as to deem that it represents the birth of our 
authentic national identity, rather than a commemoration of our war dead.
The Australian Army is fortunate to be so strongly identified with a day of such 
central importance to the Australian people. On this day it is appropriate for every 
Australian soldier to pause and reflect on the enormous respect that they enjoy in 
the community. We are custodians of an important aspect of our nation’s heritage. 
Every Australian soldier is imbued with awareness of this through the elements of 
the ‘I’m an Australian Soldier’ initiative, which explicitly acknowledges our debt to 
those who have gone before us.
This is especially evident in the resurgence in popular observance of Anzac 
Day rituals, particularly the Dawn Service. Over the past decade, as the popular 
observance of Anzac Day has grown, the Australian Army has also been engaged at 
a very high tempo in theatres as diverse as Bougainville, Timor-Leste, the Solomon 
Islands, Iraq and Afghanistan. Together these trends have enhanced the reputation 
and public standing of the Australian Army.
This obvious public appreciation of the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families 
has been inspiring to every Australian soldier. It is in stark contrast to the unfair 
public odium directed at the Army as well as soldiers and their families during the 
Vietnam War.
As gratifying as such popular recognition of the sacrifice of our service personnel 
is, for serving soldiers there is an even more important private aspect to Anzac Day. 
A large number of our mates are currently deployed on operations against deter-
mined and lethal enemies. Others have returned from active service or are in the 
process of preparing to deploy. A significant portion of the Army has experienced 
the grim reality of war in recent years, including the death and wounding of mates. 
This serves to lend Anzac Day a reflective, rather than a celebratory quality to those 
in uniform.
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In that spirit we publish ‘An Anzac Reflection’ by Brigadier Nick Jans, who 
revives his memories of service in Vietnam. Most readers will recognise in his 
portrait of the soldiers with whom he served the same qualities of courage, profes-
sionalism and resourcefulness that many consider characteristic of the modern 
Australian Digger.
In this edition we continue our focus on current operations in Afghanistan. In 
particular, Lieutenant Colonel Jon Hawkins examines two other insurgencies—
in Aden and Oman—for possible lessons applicable to our current operations. 
And Major Ian Langford makes an excellent contribution to our understanding 
of the Afghanistan theatre with his consideration of Australian Special Forces 
operations there.
Of similar interest is a provocative and thoughtful article by Major Cate Carter 
inspired by her operational experience in Timor-Leste. It is now firmly established 
conventional wisdom that in era of so-called ‘war amongst the people’ that every 
soldier must supplement his or her conventional combat skills with language and 
cultural proficiency. Major Carter’s article is a highly original examination of the 
challenges in achieving this.
Nonetheless, close combat remains the inescapable characteristic of warfare and 
the article by Major James Davis makes a compelling case for Army to maintain its 
focus on this fundamental determinant of success. Colonel Chris Field expands on 
the challenges facing the Infantry in adapting to the dynamic operational environ-
ment, although his article is relevant to all arms.
This edition of the Journal features a number of very innovative articles about 
concept development, which are indicative of the vibrant climate of innovation 
within the Australian Army. We continue to be encouraged by the steady flow of 
unsolicited manuscripts that are being submitted to the Journal. The future of the 
Australian Army Journal looks to be secure.
We commend this edition of the Australian Army Journal to our readers.
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Current Operations
Assessing Afghanistan 
against Aden and Oman
A euphemism for capitulation 
or the seeds of success?
Lieutenant Colonel Jon Hawkins
Abstract
Is Australia prepared to support the possibility of a negotiated solution to the current Afghan 
situation? A negotiated solution must be from a position of strength, and not as a last resort 
or from a position of fear. With the Soviet–Afghan war as a backdrop, the insurgencies in 
Oman and Aden provide the basis for debate on the merits of negotiation as a means to 
resolve insurgencies. Many of the Afghan population support dialogue with the Taliban. This 
underscores President Karzai’s desire to bring moderate Taliban into the political arena in 
order to progress the reconciliation process.
Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.
John F Kennedy 1
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Introduction
Insurgencies are more than solely military actions. This has been demonstrated 
by numerous belligerents in past centuries, and more recently by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan where they are utilising many influence strategies to achieve their 
end-state. The Taliban believe that they are winning, or that they only need to not 
lose in order to win. In recent propaganda released by the Taliban, they stated that 
‘the West has the clocks…but the Taliban have the time’. 2 Counterinsurgency is 
primarily about winning and keeping the ‘hearts and minds’ of the in-theatre popu-
lation and, equally importantly in the modern era, the domestic population of the 
coalition forces supporting counterinsurgency operations in distant war zones.
This article aims to create debate on the possibility of a negotiated solution to the 
current Afghan situation. It strives to point out that any negotiated solution must be 
achieved from a position of strength, and not as a last resort or from a position of 
fear in order to save political face with Western electorates. George Schultz articu-
lated the essence of the requirement when he stated, ‘Negotiations are a euphemism 
for capitulation if the shadow of power is not cast across the bargaining table.’ 3
Often the root cause of an insurgency can be identified early and isolated from 
the insurgent’s narrative, or ideology, leaving the insurgency dislocated from popular 
support. The sooner this can be achieved the faster the insurgency can be neutralised 
through negotiation and, if necessary, 
physical destruction. NATO and Australian 
Army doctrine defines counterinsurgency 
as ‘Those military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological and civic actions 
taken to defeat an insurgency.’ 4
It must be noted though, that despite the 
idea of physical and psychological isolation 
of an insurgency from the population, an 
exclusively military response has historically 
been unsuccessful. In several cases this has 
only exacerbated the problem and brought more of the population to view the insur-
gent’s narrative as the only road. 5 Likewise, various examples from history, including 
Northern Ireland, Kenya and Malaya, demonstrate that, despite the use of military 
power, having a dialogue with the insurgents is similarly important. One of the most 
comprehensive polls recently conducted in Afghanistan showed that a considerable 
portion of the population supported negotiations with the Taliban, indeed, a sizeable 
segment of those polled also supported a Karzai and Taliban coalition government. 6
In Australian Army counterinsurgency doctrine there is no mention of recon-
ciliation or negotiations being required for success. To examine these concepts and 
In Australian Army 
counterinsurgency doctrine 
there is no mention of 
reconciliation or negotiations 
being required for success.
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pose the question of where negotiations may be used to assist in the present Afghan 
counterinsurgency, two counterinsurgency wars of the last century will be examined. 
First though, an examination of the Soviet–Afghan conflict is necessary, as it provides 
perspective for the present campaign.
The Soviet–Afghan Era
Afghanistan has been embroiled in war for centuries. The Great Game was played 
out between the British Empire and the Russian Empire in the mid to late 1800s, and 
since then both domestic and external participants have been the catalyst for further 
conflict and instability. 8 Much has been written on the Soviet–Afghan conflict and 
drawing out several significant points highlights that some of the Soviet philosophies 
in dealing with the Mujahedin have become established in the current methodology 
of dealing with the Taliban.
The Mujahedin, like the present belligerents, consisted of many disparate groups 
and, according to O’Neil’s lexicon, could be labelled as traditionalist insurgents, with 
some overlap to egalitarians and preservationists. 9 In reality, the insurgency was 
more an instinctive campaign against international involvement than any notion of 
nationalism. The insurgents, or the Mujahedin, received support from many Western 
and Middle Eastern countries and were provided sanctuary in Pakistan; however, 
there were as many Tajiks, Uzbeks, Baluch and Hazarans involved as Pashtuns, 
which contrasts with the present conflict. The current insurgency is almost exclu-
sively centred on Pashtunistan and its tribes. The support provided by the United 
States and others afforded the Mujahedin a level of sophistication in weaponry and 
communications equipment beyond the Soviets, but they lacked a critical mass to 
overwhelm the Soviets throughout the country. 10
Table 1. Negotiate with the Taliban 7
Should the Afghan Government deal with the Taliban?
Negotiations Coalition Government
Strongly support 36 25
Somewhat support 38 29
Somewhat oppose 9 14
Strongly oppose 9 19
Depends/Don’t know 8 13
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The Soviets, in a similar position to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, could not enter Pakistan. They relied heavily on the Afghan 
Government security apparatus to conduct offensive action, as particularly towards the 
end of the conflict, Soviet public support waned. Additionally, Soviet bombing of villages 
alienated Afghans and ground tactical successes were accompanied by withdrawals to 
safe areas. These tactics dealt operational and strategic blows to the Soviet campaign to 
dominate the land. Disunity within the Afghan Government also played into the hands 
of the Mujahedin. Furthermore, the Soviets attempted to close the Pakistan border and, 
like today, were unsuccessful. An incomplete understanding of the insurgents and their 
narrative caused some of the Soviets to question their own legitimacy. 11
Towards the end of the war, when the outcome was looking uncertain, the Soviets 
implemented a strategy of reconciliation with the various belligerents, but it was too 
little, too late. 12 Another dominant issue was that the Afghan population saw the 
Karmal and Najibullal regimes as being too closely aligned with the Soviets: does the 
Afghan population view Kabul’s relationship with the United States as analogous with 
the Soviet era?
Capturing Soviet mistakes and comparing them against today’s campaign 
highlights several points: a lack of understanding of the Pashtun society, or limited 
social network analysis; too many Soviet troops confined to garrison duties and a 
heavy reliance on Afghan troops for combat duties; and the ever present sanctuary 
afforded by the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Several of these issues 
have a common theme in counterinsurgency conflicts of the past century, especially 
the post colonial conflicts of the Second World War.
Following the Allied victory over the Axis powers in the European and Pacific 
theatres, several small secessionist wars broke out. To provide a suitable backdrop 
for analysis, two campaigns have been selected where tribal Islamic elements pitted 
themselves against Western forces. The insurgency in Aden in the mid 1960s highlights 
several areas where Afghanistan’s current situation has parallels; but first, the successful 
counterinsurgency in Oman, also during the late 1960s, presents opportunities for 
debate on the merits of negotiation as a strategy with the Taliban.
Dhofar War (Oman)
The campaign in Dhofar has had little coverage, but its example as a successful coun-
terinsurgency requires its mention here. Primarily, the counterinsurgency was fought 
by Omani, Iranian and British troops from 1962 to 1975. Up to and during the initial 
stages of the insurgency, which was predominately conducted with the insurgents 
receiving tacit support from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the Sultan of Oman had main-
tained a diffident approach to the nation’s development. 13 This was particularly the case 
in Dhofar, a protectorate of Oman, where oppression of the population for the benefit 
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of the Omani hierarchy was the norm. As a result the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) 
was formed. In 1970, a successful coup by the Sultan’s son allowed for an immediate 
change in government policy. This brought about substantial changes in the type of 
campaign that was conducted against the insurgents, known as the Adoo. A combined 
civil and military chain of command was 
created and many of the Adoo’s grievances 
were rectified immediately.
Reconciliation through amnesty and 
protection of villages was negotiated with 
the Adoo, who surrendered, and irregular 
company sized units of Firquats (former 
Adoo members) were formed to operate 
with British Special Air Service (SAS) 
liaison officers. 14 Furthermore, British 
Army Training Teams (BATT) were created, and embedded into the expanded and 
re-equipped Sultan’s regular Armed Forces, at twenty-two advisors per battalion. 
British soldiers in the BATT required cultural adjustment as the local tribe, the 
Dhofari, had a very direct communication style. 15 Distribution of small handheld 
transistor radios in the DLF sanctuaries allowed for the government’s messages to be 
disseminated easily. Interestingly, Tony Jeapes, the SAS commander in Dhofar, claimed 
that the Ministry of Defence’s plan called for five fundamental parts:
•	 An	intelligence	cell
•	 An	information	team
•	 A	medical	officer	supported	by	SAS	medics
•	 A	veterinary	officer
•	 When	possible,	the	raising	of	Dhofari	soldiers	to	fight	for	the	Sultan. 16
These five fundamentals were the focus of a spirited but well-coordinated military 
campaign that avoided indiscriminate actions or reprisals. The medical part was to 
provide aid to the 50,000 people living in the Dhofar Mountains and the veterinary 
part to improve farm stock, including the provision of fresh water. Finally, the 
information team or the psychological operations element persuaded the rebels 
through reconciliation and negotiation to change sides, which garnered significant 
intelligence and targeting value, most of which was non-kinetic.
The modification to the military and civil procedures allowed for improved 
targeting of the Adoo’s lines of communication and support base in Dhofar. Aggressive 
patrolling supported by air power in the Adoo’s sanctuaries coupled with a ‘hearts 
and minds’ approach of establishing medical and veterinary clinics, schools, roads 
and fresh wells all eroded the DLF claims that the Sultan was merely using Dhofar 
for resources. Finally, as a result of these successes, the DLF was unable to maintain a 
coherent narrative with the public, which saw support reduce in a vicious spiral.
… the psychological operations 
element persuaded the rebels 
through reconciliation and 
negotiation to change sides …
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Insights from the Oman Counterinsurgency
The Dhofar War offers several insights to the conduct of a successful counter-
insurgency, particularly from a military and political perspective. The DLF had 
some justifiable complaints, and the replacement of the Sultan in 1970 addressed 
many of these grievances. The Taliban’s grievances need to be fully understood and, 
if legitimate, measures are required to address them. Interestingly, according to a 
Canadian research group, a sizable portion of the South-Eastern Afghan population 
(14 per cent) still strongly supports the Taliban ideology, so some of the Taliban 
grievances may have merit, which might well be grounds for an initial approach to 
commence negotiations. 17
Civil infrastructure improvements in Dhofar contributed significantly to the 
defeat of the insurgency, which addressed the population’s grievances and dislocated 
the Adoo from the population. In Afghanistan, electricity, roads, wells and schools 
are but a few requests that the Afghan people present. Reconstruction is underway, 
but potentially not at the level required to keep the people supporting the national 
government. Also, the Taliban regularly attempt to destroy any infrastructure that 
is erected to maintain the current status quo, such as mobile phone towers. 18
The civil and military diarchy was essential for the counterinsurgency to be 
successful. The Afghan national government’s intent, executed through the provin-
cial governors, and the Afghan Security Forces, aided by ISAF, must be seen to have 
political primacy. For this to occur, a legitimate government at the national level that 
is seen to hold sway at the provincial levels, is crucial.
Reconciliation through amnesty for the Adoo fighters and protection for their 
villages on surrender was a key factor in the establishment of the Firquats, which 
allowed for the sanctuary and support bases to be eroded. Furthermore, it allowed 
intelligence development to accelerate and long-term post-insurgency planning to 
be established. This suggests that Taliban amnesty 
measures need to be more aggressive. Resettlement 
programs and security for villages is still an issue, as 
insufficient Afghan Security Forces exist to achieve this. 
Until security is possible for villages, malleable Taliban 
are not going to change sides as staunch Taliban control 
the countryside at night through the dissemination of 
night letters and other forms of psychological warfare. 
Furthermore, the capacity for the Afghan national 
army and police to absorb former Taliban will be difficult, and it may be better to 
establish irregular fighting units managed by Special Forces, similar to the Firquats, 
who would then allow for more discriminate targeting of the staunch Taliban in 
their sanctuaries.
Taliban amnesty 
measures need to 
be more aggressive.
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Aggressive foot and vehicle patrolling, supported by air power and, to a lesser 
extent, sea power, eroded the Adoo’s sanctuaries and lines of communication. 
In Afghanistan, the same philosophy applies in the border regions along the 
Durand Line and the mountainous regions in Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces. 
Unremitting pressure against the Taliban hardliners in their sanctuaries is necessary, 
so as to disrupt their freedom of movement. This disruption will be needed prior to 
any real progress being made in negotiations with the more moderate and malleable 
Taliban. In Oman, the successes of the counterinsurgency, through military action, 
reconciliation and negotiation, eventually led the DLF to lose sight of its objectives 
and, when mixed messages started to emanate from the insurgency leadership, 
public and regional support bases evaporated. This philosophy could also be applied 
to the Taliban, where a schism could be developed between the hardliners and the 
moderates. Bringing the moderates to the negotiating table as a cohesive group will 
be difficult unless they see real benefits for themselves and their community.
In tandem with the Oman insurgency, another disturbance was developing on 
the South Arabian Peninsula, known as the Aden Emergency. This conflict has many 
pointers for the South-Eastern Afghan insurgency and they apply primarily at the 
political level.
Aden emergency
The Aden Emergency, although an unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaign, offers 
several insights for the current contest. Aden had been a British Protectorate since 
1845 and was used as a staging post for naval vessels travelling between India and 
Britain. However, by the mid twentieth century, particularly with India gaining 
independence in 1947, Aden as a seaport was no longer as important to the British. 
Furthermore, Arab nationalism was growing in the region. By 1963 anti-British 
insurgents with varying political objectives began to coalesce into three larger, rival 
organisations. Firstly, and the eventual dominant group, was the Egyptian backed 
and resourced National Liberation Front (NLF); and secondly, the Front for the 
Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) were the main belligerents. These 
two groups fought each other as well as the British. 19 Thirdly, a smaller organisation, 
the South Arabian League, was made up of mainly the middleclass and intelligentsia, 
but it succumbed to more radical elements and ceased to exist past 1966. 20
The insurgency in Aden was initially fought in the mountains of the Radfan 
and eventually in the alleys and streets of the Crater. At the time it was a particu-
larly brutal campaign where insurgents conducted beheadings and other forms of 
psychological warfare. However, claims made by Amnesty International, against the 
British Forces, of widespread torture and inappropriate interrogations also surfaced, 
allowing the legitimacy of the counterinsurgency campaign to be questioned. 21
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Intelligence collection played a crucial part in the campaign for both sides: the 
NLF conducted such a successful counterintelligence operation on the British that 
nearly all Aden Police Special Branch agents were assassinated. 22 Furthermore, the 
Aden Police was compromised with infiltrators from the NLF, which caused British 
Army and Police units to regularly search Aden Police vehicles. This eventually 
spiralled into a mutiny as the ‘face’ of the locally employed Aden Police commanders 
became tarnished. 23 In essence, once the 
Aden Police lost control of the Crater area, 
the security forces never fully recovered the 
initiative. From this point the insurgency 
shifted into an armed urban battle where 
sections of the general public were involved 
in overt insurrection.
British Army special units were tasked 
with developing intelligence and this was 
often not melded with the overall campaign 
plan. Regular units were not informed of 
intelligence collection or special units’ tasking which resulted in a lack of cohesion or 
poor unity of purpose. 24 National level collection techniques, such as that provided 
by the Information Research Department, continued to provide intelligence, but 
this was more at the political and strategic level, rather than the type needed to 
solve the urban insurgency in the Crater. 25 The general public, not wanting to be 
involved with British rule of law, did not respond to ‘hearts and minds’ tactics and 
were involved, in passive and active means, in the fight against the British. 26
Potentially, the most crucial issue that caused havoc in Aden was the 1962 decla-
ration by the British Government of a withdrawal date. This led the locals to believe 
that the British were not fully committed to Aden’s government. 27 No long-term 
planning was instituted by the British and this resulted in the local administration’s 
officials ignoring the British, but maintaining one eye on the future. Significant 
political manoeuvring occurred where future alliances were formed and the popula-
tion felt they were being monitored by the insurgents. This was confirmed when 
the NLF and the FLOSY conducted assassinations of the majority of their future 
political rivals. 28
Insights from the Aden Emergency
The Aden Emergency offers several insights, particularly from military and 
political perspectives, which have application in the Afghan theatre. The loss of 
the less radical South Arabian League removed the government’s ability to have a 
rational dialogue or negotiation with the disaffected among the South Arabian popu-
lation. Additionally, long-term political commitment and post-insurgency planning 
… the insurgency shifted 
into an armed urban battle 
where sections of the 
general public were involved 
in overt insurrection.
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was not possible. In Afghanistan, moderate or less radical disaffected elements of the 
population require nurturing so as to increase the segment of the population capable 
of rational dialogue and negotiations. These activities may include interaction with 
the religious Mullahs and the less committed Taliban elements.
British heavy handedness in dealing with captured insurgents eroded international 
support and legitimacy. Any further torture of insurgents in Afghanistan will erode 
the ISAF legitimacy in the eyes of the Red Cross and Amnesty International. Popular 
support locally and abroad will also suffer, as it did during the Abu Ghraib incident. 29
The elimination of most of the Police Special Branch informants created an intel-
ligence vacuum. Human intelligence takes careful preparation and, in particular, 
takes time to establish. In several months the NLF and the FLOSY achieved complete 
domination of the urban areas by the dismember-
ment of the police intelligence agent network. 
Intelligence development, through the use of turned 
Taliban, would greatly assist in targeting.
The declaration by the British Government of 
a withdrawal date was instrumental in dissipating 
any unity of purpose, post-insurgency planning 
and intelligence. It sent a very negative message 
to the Aden public that caused support for the 
British Administration and the South Arabian 
Government to become futile, as the population perceived that the NLF and the 
FLOSY would eventually take control. This perception became reality only a matter 
of days after the British departed; many officials were murdered and others had 
to flee the country. The Afghanistan population hold very similar views. They feel 
that the Coalition does not have a long-term view and that they will eventually 
have to deal with the Taliban. Much of the population are maintaining a ‘wait and 
see’ approach, as an Environics poll of South-Eastern Afghans suggests (where the 
nationally held view and the Kandahar locals’ views are recorded). 30
Strategic defeat through 
a series of tactical 
victories may well be 
the consequence.
Table 2. Likely Outcome of the Conflict 31
Who will prevail in the current conflict?
National Kandahar
Afghan Government, with foreign assistance 40 45
Taliban, once foreign troops leave 19 16
Too early to say/Don’t know 40 38
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Any announcement by a Western government of a proposed pullout date, as 
some NATO contributing nations have done, only reinforces the notion the popula-
tion holds: that the Western Coalition is not committed to defeating the Taliban. 
A military solution is only part of the answer. Negotiations are also required in 
Afghanistan, but they must be approached from a position of military and political 
strength and not as an alternative to defeat.
Air power had a decisive effect in the rural and mountainous areas of South 
Arabia. Close air support was provided by a combination of Army Forward Air 
Controllers and Royal Air Force pilots. During the campaign these two groups 
worked extremely well and many insurgents were destroyed through this means. 32 
Afghanistan has demonstrated that air power in counterinsurgency operations is 
just as important as in major combat operations. 
However, it must be used discerningly, as media 
polling suggests that a third of insurgents joined 
out of revenge for a loved one killed as a result of 
coalition air strikes. 33
Finally, the British Government attempted 
negotiations with NLF and FLOSY on numerous 
occasions. However, the insurgent organisations 
believed that they had the upper hand and refused 
to cooperate. Indeed, these negotiations were not attempted until the twilight of 
the campaign, suggesting a level of desperation on behalf of the British, which 
compounded the insurgents’ awareness of imminent success. 34 This notion has some 
resonance in Afghanistan. Negotiations need to be conducted from a position of 
strength, rather than when the insurgents sense that their cause has the upper hand 
and the end is in sight.
Oman and Aden as learning opportunities for 
Afghanistan
The Oman and Aden conflicts represent insurgency cases where negotiation played 
an instrumental role in the outcome of the campaigns. In the Aden scenario, nego-
tiations were attempted too late into the campaign and failed to get traction due 
to the insurgents sensing an approaching victory. Whereas in Oman, negotiations 
commenced early and many of the Adoo were turned as they sensed that their 
chances of success were limited. It is possible to draw several enduring concepts 
from the cases so as to shape the Afghan campaign plan.
Host Nation Lead. The establishment of a political civilian head to promote 
the civil power and not the military was achieved in Oman. Indeed, the 
Omani insurgents were politically and morally isolated through the conduct of 
Negotiations need to 
be conducted from a 
position of strength …
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reconciliation and negotiations and the settling of grievances. This is not occurring 
in Afghanistan. The lead nations do not support the Afghani desire for a negotiated 
strategy; indeed, the United States, Britain and Canada have stated they will not 
negotiate with the Taliban. 35
Intelligence Development. In Oman, through reconciliation and negotiation 
with moderate insurgents, intelligence became available. This allowed the authorities 
to get inside the psyche of the insurgent, and afforded the Sultan’s Forces not only 
intelligence but additional security forces, albeit not fully employable across the 
spectrum of operations. Furthermore, it demonstrated good faith that surrendering 
was not a death warrant. In Afghanistan, turned Taliban units could be established 
and, similar to Oman, placed under a Special Forces mentoring type arrangement.
Insurgent Isolation. By isolating insurgents from their physical and moral 
sanctuary, including righting real and perceived grievances, the Sultan’s forces 
dominated the narrative. Negotiation with less entrenched insurgents, deep opera-
tions and addressing grievances, achieved insurgent isolation in Oman. This required 
large numbers of troops in Oman; in fact, the troop numbers far outstretched the 
insurgents’ numbers by factors of up to twenty. 36
Offensive Action. Neutralising the insurgent through negotiation or destruction 
are the two options available. When negotiations fail to disengage radicals from the 
insurgency, then persistent individuals will 
need to be destroyed. This should be done as 
a last resort, as offensive action will trigger the 
Pashtunwali revenge tenet, and as many 
Taliban as possible should be reconciled.
Maintaining an eye on the Soviet experi-
ences in Afghanistan, plus drawing on the 
Oman and Aden campaigns, allows insights 
into the potential for a negotiated strategy 
in Afghanistan. A campaign plan that 
incorporates political and civil policy, such 
as negotiation and reconciliation, equally with military tenets will have a good 
chance of success. Indeed, the weighting will tend towards the political and civil 
lines of operations as the campaign plan progresses and the need for a military 
response diminishes.
Conclusion
The overall strategy for the successful defeat of the insurgency in Southern and 
Eastern Afghanistan will require a coordinated approach. Indeed, a sole military 
solution does not exist and it will call for an international and whole-of-government 
A campaign plan that 
incorporates political and 
civil policy … equally with 
military tenets will have a 
good chance of success.
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methodology. On an international level, the Coalition powers must be steadfast in 
their support of the National Government of Afghanistan. There must be a single 
purpose and all Coalition members must be aligned and display a commitment 
towards that purpose. However, intractable support, especially of illegitimate 
decisions and actions, will be counterproductive and display to the international 
community that a sense of arrogance, or desperation, is developing in the campaign. 
The present regime in Kabul, under President Karzai, only controls the urban 
centres. To boost legitimacy, particularly with rural and regional Afghans, it is 
necessary for the successful conduct of negotiations. In a survey of South-Eastern 
Afghanistan, 74 per cent of the population supported Afghan national government 
negotiations with the Taliban. 37
It is likely that negotiations coupled with a surgical military response will be the 
only way to solve the present impasse. This will cause offense to some, especially 
those who have suffered as a result of the conflict; however, not every member of 
the Taliban can be incarcerated or killed, especially those lower level Taliban fighters 
who are involved through economic necessity. 38 In fact, President Karzai has already 
hinted at a possible dialogue with the Taliban when he stated,
For the security and prosperity of the Afghan people, in order to be freed from 
al-Qaeda and terrorists and their inhuman actions, we are ready for any type of 
discussion and negotiations. 39
The current actors in Afghanistan, such as the United States and its allies, the 
Afghan Government, non-government organisations, the Afghan people, and 
the insurgents and their sponsors will require more dialogue. This discourse may 
require enemies to come together, discuss points of deadlock and, most impor-
tantly, for Pashtuns to subjugate their penchant for revenge under their tribal code, 
Pashtunwali. This is not suggesting that past transgressions be ignored or that due 
legal process be neglected in order to display to a media-sophisticated Western 
public that headway is being made in the Afghan conflict. More so it is to bring the 
delegates together, to hold discussions and map out a common framework from 
which a future Afghanistan can be steered on the right course. Nonetheless, it is also 
important to remain mindful that ‘Negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation’ 
if not conducted from a position of strength.
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Current Operations
Australian Special 
Forces in Afghanistan
Supporting Australia in the ‘Long War’
Major Ian Langford
Abstract
An enduring element of Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan is the Special Operations 
Task Group (known as TF66). This force is specifically trained for counter-terrorism and 
counterinsurgency operations, both of which have been conducted as part of the effort in 
Afghanistan. The effectiveness of these operations has to date been significant. This has been 
due to the direct and indirect Lines of Operation, which have been developed into a series 
of operating methodologies throughout the rotations that have occurred since 2005. TF66 
provides the capability to incapacitate the insurgent leadership group, keep them off balance, 
and ultimately to defeat their plans.
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The Australian Special Forces component is comparatively large and 
extremely capable. It concentrates on anti-leadership (sic) operations in 
the area where most of the population lives and where most of the Taliban 
activity occurs. (In addition), the Special Forces conduct operations which 
assist the other components of the Task Force and the Afghan troops. 
Their disruptive effect is reportedly huge.
– Major General Jim Molan (Retd) 1
Introduction 2
An enduring element of Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan has been the Special Operations Task Group (known as TF66). 3 The roles and tasks of TF66 derive from Australian Government intent, the campaign objectives 
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the requirements of the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA). TF66 is a force that 
is specifically trained for counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations, both 
of which have been conducted as part of the overall effort in Afghanistan against 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
The effectiveness of these operations has to date been significant. 4 This has been 
due in large part to the direct and indirect Lines of Operation, which have been 
developed into a series of operating methodologies throughout the many rotations 
that have occurred since 2005. The aim of this article is to discuss TF66 operations 
and the Task Force’s effectiveness in the fight in Afghanistan.
ISAF Strategy
The combined efforts of both ISAF and its predecessor (during Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM) have largely eliminated many of the insurgent sanctuaries 
that existed in Afghanistan prior to 2001. 5 In the past few years, however, ISAF 
has suffered from one of the most fundamental strategic errors when conducting 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations: insufficient resources to accomplish its 
overly ambitious goals. After eight years of anti-insurgent operations, ISAF has 
experienced a strategic ‘drift’ and has failed to convince native Afghans that it is 
safe to commit themselves to believe in the authenticity of the GoIRA. 6 This is in 
part due to a ‘too-heavy’ focus by the Coalition on anti al-Qaeda counter-terrorism 
operations, as opposed to a counterinsurgency strategy focusing on anti-insurgency 
operations. There has been too much effort on kinetic destruction of insurgent 
groups, rather than an effort to ‘out-govern’ the Taliban Shadow Government 
and offer a legitimate government that can provide essential security and services 
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for all Afghans. No longer can a massing of ISAF military force be relied upon 
to secure solutions to what is an inherently political conflict between Afghans, as 
any foreign physical presence will be regarded as a military occupation. The latest 
surge of forces committed to ISAF from the United States echoes this point, and is 
deliberately limited to a ‘middle option’ of 30,000, rather than the original 80,000 
initially requested. 7
Afghanistan’s problems are further complicated by the nature of the insurgency, 
with several of the key insurgent groups (al-Qaeda, the Taliban, various narco-
trafficking gangs, and criminal elements) colluding and morphing into a ‘Taliban-
esqe’ organisation, based in remote and inaccessible locations throughout the region. 
This threat now presents a real and growing 
emergent problem not only to Afghanistan, 
but also potentially to the central-Asian 
region itself.
After more than thirty years of war, as 
well as the almost complete destruction 
of human and physical infrastructure, the 
people of Afghanistan no longer have the 
capacity to produce anything other than 
the most modest incremental improve-
ments to their democratic institutions and 
basic services to their communities. These circumstances have forced ISAF and 
supporting governments such as the Australian Government to realistically adjust 
their campaign objectives into the following tangible goals: preventing Afghanistan 
from again providing sanctuary to insurgent groups, prevent the collapse of the 
GoIRA, and legitimise the GoIRA through the provision of basic essential services. 8 
These are now key objectives rather than ISAF’s more lofty aims such as the defeat 
of the insurgency and the delivery of Western-style democracy and freedom. 
In a recent speech unveiling the new United States strategy in supporting ISAF, 
President Obama said the regional objective was (now) to ‘disrupt, dismantle and 
defeat al-Qa’ida’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in relation to the Taliban, it was 
merely to deny them government in Afghanistan. 9 There was little talk of victory 
or democracy.
Creating any permanent state apparatus, such as the Afghan National Security 
Force (ANSF), will require a long-term commitment measured in perhaps decades 
rather than years. In the meantime, the Australian Government (who has limited 
its primary focus to Oruzgan Province), in partnership with the GoIRA and ISAF 
are forced somewhat to respond to the more immediate challenges: maintaining 
pressure on insurgent and terrorist networks throughout the region (in order to 
provide security to mentoring and reconstruction efforts), as well as preventing 
There has been too much 
effort on kinetic destruction 
of insurgent groups, rather 
than an effort to ‘out-govern’ 
the Taliban…
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the overall insurgency from overwhelming the GoIRA. TF66’s deployment into 
Afghanistan occurred to overcome some of these immediate challenges.
TF66 Lines of Operation
TF66 is deliberately located within Oruzgan Province to work in support of and in 
collaboration with Regional Command-South (RC-S) and Task Force Uruzgan 
(TF-U), which includes elements of the Australian manned Mentoring Task Force. 
One of the unique qualities of Special Forces is an ability to have a ‘reach’ that spans 
from the local tribal level to the national GoIRA, while remaining integrated to the 
overall ISAF campaign and its continuing efforts to transition ANSF from a fledgling 
force to a capable military outfit. 10 This ‘reach’ is 
critical to the overall civil-military COIN integra-
tion effort that will ultimately harness and synergise 
the security, governance, development and strategic 
communications concept.
ISAF, in the immediate sense, seeks to defeat the 
insurgency via the provision of essential services 
and training to GoIRA and elements within the 
government (such as the ANSF) to win the support 
and loyalty of the people of Afghanistan. In many 
ways, this is the focus of the TF-U and, by implication, the Mentoring Task Force. 
TF66 supports these operations through missions designed along four Lines of 
Operation: conduct counterinsurgency operations, enhance the force protection of 
ISAF forces, conduct counter-leadership operations, and assist with the training and 
mentoring of the ANSF. 11 These mission sets are generally conducted via an indirect 
approach, and a direct approach.
COIN Operations and the Training and Mentoring of 
ANSF – An Indirect Approach
Success in COIN results from operating systems and practices that integrate and 
synchronise political, security, economic and informational components that will 
reinforce government legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing the effects and 
influence of the enemy insurgent. 12 The classic ‘clear, hold, and build’ strategy used 
in Iraq is a formula for success in Afghanistan, yet there are currently insufficient 
ANSF and police available to effectively implement this approach. In an attempt 
to remedy this, TF66 seeks to support RC-S and TF-U efforts to generate ANSF 
such as the 4th KANDAK Brigade, currently in partnership with the Mentoring 
Task Force. 13
The classic ‘clear, hold, 
and build’ strategy used 
in Iraq is a formula for 
success in Afghanistan
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COIN operations are not a new mission for Special Forces. Unconventional 
warfare, civil affairs, psychological operations, and foreign internal defence are all 
traditional activities of Australian Special Forces. A critical aspect in Afghanistan, 
however, is the emergent need for a broader integration and synchronisation of 
counter-terrorism and COIN efforts to ensure unity of purpose and effect. Special 
operations and conventional operations—whether counter-terrorist or COIN 
in nature—must be coordinated rather than simply de-conflicted. TF66, in its 
conception and planning of all operations, seeks to achieve this integration as an 
absolute priority.
TF66 currently conducts COIN through the integration and cooperation of 
partners such as ANSF, GoIRA, local tribal and religious leaders, other coalition 
Special Forces, and other ISAF force elements. Partnering ‘by, with, and through’ 
ANSF in particular has enabled enduring partnerships between TF66 and ANSF 
elements that have resulted in several successful joint operations.
Successful COIN throughout Oruzgan Province requires a variety of means, both 
military and military-enabled, many of which are held in the TF66 mission set. 14 
The key capability in this environment is the ability to conduct intelligence-led 
precision operations at the tactical level that can generate operational effect 
(campaign and theatre) and, in certain instances, strategic effect If, for example, a 
high level insurgent commander 
from Helmand Province was targ-
etable in Oruzgan Province, TF66 
could remove him from the 
operating environment. These 
precision operations can range from 
a carefully timed and targeted infor-
mation operation (such as a village 
medical or veterinary clinic), to a 
key leader engagement in a remote 
non-permissive area, to a high threat 
operation against a key insurgent leader. At the less demanding end of the scale, 
TF66 continues to provide a flexible and responsive presence, influence and situa-
tional awareness capability in locations (‘ungoverned spaces’) out of reach of GoIRA 
or conventional ISAF forces. Further to this, Special Forces’ aptitude for working 
with indigenous forces and local populations is key to wresting popular support 
away from the insurgency and the building capacity within ANSF. In time, TF66 
seeks to set the conditions for conventional force partnerships with the ANSF and 
the local population. The persistent presence that these forces can provide can 
generate lasting positive effects and further allow Special Forces to gain influence 
deeper into the province.
The persistent presence that these 
forces can provide can generate 
lasting positive effects and further 
allow Special Forces to gain 
influence deeper into the province.
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Enhancing Force Protection of ISAF – A Direct Approach
As part of its mission set, TF66 is specifically focused on enhancing the force protec-
tion of ISAF forces. These tasks include, but are not limited to: elimination and denial 
of insurgent sanctuaries within Oruzgan Province; the disruption and defeat of the 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) network; the prevention of the Taliban Shadow 
Government from returning to Oruzgan in significant volume; the gaining of situ-
ational awareness through deep presence patrolling and intelligence development; 
the conduct of enemy anti-propaganda operations (by, with and through GoIRA 
and tribal networks); and escorting, partnering and hand-off of areas such as Chora 
township and parts of the Mirabad river valley to other ISAF conventional forces, 
who then in turn conduct and coordinate reconstruction and presence patrols 
alongside their ANSF partners, the 4th KANDAK Brigade.
TF66 operations in this regard contribute directly to the mentoring and security 
efforts within the Mentoring Task Force and, more broadly, TF-U. TF66 attempt 
to ensure that their operations are synchronised with the main and supporting 
efforts of both RC-S and TF-U, and are ‘nested’ within the ISAF campaign plan; 
this should ensure that these efforts are contributing directly to theatre level 
campaign objectives. 15
Counter-Leadership Operations – A Direct Approach
Probably the most direct approach to the removal of the insurgent capability from 
RC-S is through the conduct of TF66 counter-leadership operations. While this is 
the lesser priority operation for the Task Force, it is nevertheless the most effective 
mechanism in removing a particular type of threat from the operating environment.
Amongst the leadership element of the insurgency, there exist a minority number 
of hard-core irreconcilable ideologues that seek nothing other than total subjuga-
tion of the Afghan people and the destruction of ISAF and all Western influences 
from Afghanistan. 16 They often form elements of the Taliban Shadow Government, 
operating against GoIRA as well as recruiting vulnerable Afghans to their cause 
through the promise of money, drugs, weapons or prestige. This group is the most 
potent and dangerous element of the insurgency, incapable of compromise, and 
sees nothing other than total victory as acceptable. This is the group that ISAF and 
GoIRA must target in the event of their refusal to be reconciled. TF66 performs 
this function, conducting ‘counter-leadership operations’ specifically in support of 
COIN objectives and to remove the influence of irreconcilable insurgents from the 
operating environment, which in turn directly generates operating space to enable 
ISAF to conduct indirect COIN operations. To date, the effectiveness of these opera-
tions has had a devastating and dramatic impact on insurgent leadership throughout 
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Oruzgan Province. This has limited the insurgent’s ability to coordinate operations 
locally, as well as had an impact on their ability to recruit local fighters to their cause. 
Ultimately, these operations have separated the insurgent from the local population, 
a key element of COIN in defeating the insurgent’s ability to shape and control 
political power—the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. 17
An operating methodology used in counter-leadership and other direct action 
operations is the targeting cycle known as ‘F3EA’, or Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, (and) 
Analyse. 18 F3EA uses elements of both kinetic and non-kinetic capability within 
TF66, such as persistent intelligence collection, that can allow Special Forces teams 
to adapt to the situation and the environment as required. This generates tempo and 
decision speed that exceeds that of the insurgent. This intelligence has on many 
occasions enabled the insurgent to be ‘found 
and fixed’ in his location, regardless of appear-
ance, clothing, operating methods, or rate of 
effort. Any change to the insurgent is observed 
and the Special Forces team has the ability to 
seamlessly adapt to it.
On an anticipated intelligence cue, the 
Special Forces team can then ‘finish’ the target, 
either surgically via precision effects (if in an 
area of high civilian population), through mass 
effect (if located in a base area with other insur-
gents), or by forcing the insurgent to surrender 
if he so wishes. The Special Forces team remains capable for a range of kinetic and 
non-kinetic targeting options, making them able to scale their response in a way that 
is adaptive to the insurgent and environment. This becomes especially important as 
the nature of the operation changes; for example, insurgent targets become fewer and 
the focus of the operation shifts towards the support of the population.
The Special Forces team then ‘exploits and analyses’ the target to gain an insight 
into the insurgent’s operating systems, allowing for further weaknesses to be located. 
This in turn cues additional TF66 and other ISAF intelligence assets to shape their 
operations against this discovered weakness, and so the process begins again.
F3EA employs all the true qualitative elements of a Special Operations Task 
Group—design, planning, adaptation and action—and allows for near autonomous, 
rapid decision cycles to develop future operations that are not contingent on higher 
headquarter decision cycles or strategic intelligence feeds. F3EA is enhanced and 
integrated through the establishment of a Fusion and Targeting Cell, and has proven 
itself operationally in Afghanistan since 2005—examples demonstrating its effective-
ness have been the targeting of high and medium level irreconcilable insurgents 
operating in southern Afghanistan. 19
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Operating Relationships
In order to operate, TF66 actively cultivates and values its interactions amongst the 
key stakeholders in Oruzgan Province. What is truly ‘special’ about Special Forces 
is the ability to work through and alongside other stakeholders in the pursuit of 
mutually beneficial solutions to complex problems. The complexity of the current 
operating environment demands that TF66 personnel are masters at not only 
warfighting, but also cultural knowledge. These ‘3D operators’ take a multi-dimen-
sional world view of all actions and seek to understand the human perspective when 
planning and executing operations. Appropriate mechanisms that mesh TF66 opera-
tions within the ISAF campaign are therefore 
developed, as well as the diplomatic and 
governance efforts of our partners, including 
the GoIRA. Much effort is devoted to 
ensuring that TF66 plans are ‘nested’ and that 
operational priorities are understood by all 
force elements.
The most important relationship for TF66 
in Afghanistan is with the Afghan people 
themselves. First and foremost, TF66 opera-
tions concentrate on and emphasise that the 
use of force should be a last resort and any 
application must not be counterproductive to the wants and needs of the Afghan 
people, or compromise the ISAF campaign overall. Population support is key to 
accessing the insurgent; any action that upsets the ANSF, GoIRA, local villagers, or 
tribal or religious elders is not conducive to mission success. It is this overwhelming 
priority that drives the planning and conduct of all TF66 missions.
Additionally, while much of the focus on operations can tend to weight itself 
towards direct COIN activities, more emphasis must be placed on developing the 
ANSF. Responsibility of all activities and events must eventually be transferred fully to 
the Afghans. This is the exit strategy for ISAF—an enabled ANSF that can provide the 
GoIRA with the stability it needs to deliver essential services to the Afghan people.
The second relationship priority for TF66 is with other ISAF elements, most partic-
ularly, RC-S and TF-U. All operations must be ‘nested’ whether direct or indirect. The 
use of liaison officers as well as collaboration during planning and operations ensure 
a unity of effort for all ISAF forces and reinforce attempts by TF66 to either ‘support’ 
or be ‘supported’ by their ISAF, GoIRA or ANSF colleagues. Moreover, Australia’s 
enduring commitment to ISAF gives it influence in the range and type of operations 
conducted throughout southern Afghanistan. 20 TF66’s access to intelligence and 
coalition collection assets, as well as its reputation throughout ISAF, has established 
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a level of support that has the capacity to amplify its tactical effects across the entire 
theatre through the export of lessons and the migration of skills and knowledge to all 
stakeholders. This is a regular feature of the operational ‘lessons learnt’ process. 21
Measures of Effectiveness/Measures of Success
Since 2005, TF66 operations have achieved significant outcomes throughout Oruzgan 
Province. Some Measures of Effectiveness include the conduct of hundreds of long-
range patrols in the deep northern spaces of the Province, the facilitation of hundreds 
of Afghan community engagements (that have forged long lasting relationships both 
with TF66 and other RC-S forces), the successful removal of insurgent group 
commanders from the area of operations, 
and the introduction of ANSF to hostile and 
contested areas within the Province (which 
in turn re-establishes the GoIRA in these 
areas and enhances their legitimacy).
In terms of Measures of Success, TF66 
operations since 2005 have been decisive 
in opening up the Mirabad valley to TF-U 
operations, which in turn have gone on 
to establish permanent bases there. This 
greatly increases TF-U access to the local villagers and enables organisations such 
as the Mentoring Task Force to build upon this work and consolidate ISAF control. 
Additionally, TF66 decisive combat operations through the Baluchi Pass in 2006, as 
well as the denial of Chora Pass and Chora valley to the local Taliban throughout 
the period 2005–08, have enabled the permanent presence of TF-U forces, who have 
seized this opportunity to make contact with the local people and introduced GoIRA 
and the ANSF to a populace who for several years were under the direct control 
and influence of the Taliban Shadow Government. Additional successes have been 
achieved in the disruption and interdiction of the insurgent IED network, as well as 
the facilitation of significant reconstruction operations, including the placement of 
an electrical turbine in Helmand Province in 2008. 22
Conclusion
Success in Afghanistan requires that ISAF seize the initiative from the insurgent and 
re-establish the political legitimacy of the GoIRA. This requires the use of ‘smarter’ 
campaign objectives, facilitated via a COIN strategy that employs direct and indirect 
Lines of Operation that gives ownership of the insurgency problem to the Afghan 
people. The objectives of ISAF, the Australian Government and GoIRA seem clear, 
Since 2005, TF66 operations 
have achieved significant 
outcomes throughout 
Oruzgan Province.
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although they are not well articulated: create an Afghanistan from which global 
terrorist groups are displaced; assist GoIRA in becoming an apparatus that can 
provide enough security to its people and borders and can facilitate the conduct of 
reconstruction operations; and give the GoIRA a degree of legitimacy amongst its 
people that can generate faith in the government from all Afghan people. In order 
for this to occur, ISAF must be sufficiently resourced or risk remaining caught in the 
‘strategic drift’ that has got it to this point, eight years after the fall of the Taliban.
The Special Forces from TF66 is an important component to Australian 
Government efforts in Afghanistan (along with the Mentoring Task Force). The 
balance between counter-terrorism and COIN is an essential consideration in the 
formulation of all operational concepts that support the broader ISAF objectives. TF66 
has over time, successfully integrated this balance between direct and indirect Lines 
of Operation by seeking to integrate ANSF and GoIRA in line with the overall aim of 
one day handing off all responsibilities to the Afghans.
Australian Special Forces provide the capability to incapacitate the insurgent leader-
ship group, keep them off balance, and ultimately to defeat their plan. Insurgents in 
Afghanistan have witnessed firsthand what TF66 Special Forces can do. To them, the 
prospect of a high-performance counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency force in part-
nership with ANSF, able to operate anywhere with speed, agility and lethality, displaying 
resolve and unity, is highly unwelcome. The insurgent lacks the capacity to counter its 
strikes. Australian Special Forces hit the insurgents hard and often. This is precisely how 
TF66 can build and support the road map towards victory in the Long War.
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Concepts
Five Challenges for 
Future Infantry
Thinking about Adaptation and Change
Colonel Chris Field
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to highlight five challenges for Future Infantry in order to 
stimulate thinking about Future Infantry’s requirement to adapt and change. While this 
paper is Infantry focused, the challenges outlined will resonate with many people in the 
wider Army, and are of likely interest to people from Joint, whole-of-government, coalition, 
contractor and non-government organisations who expect to operate with Army in 
the future.
In the twenty-first century, Future Infantry—fighting in complex human, physical and informational battlespaces, operating in a combined arms, joint, whole-of-government context incorporating coalition, contractor and non-government 
organisation partners—will execute Infantry’s role:
To seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture them, to seize and hold ground, 
and repel attack, by day or by night, regardless of season, weather, or terrain. 1
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While the role of Infantry is enduring, constantly changing operating envi-
ronments suggest the time has come for Future Infantry to re-examine how it 
operates in order to inform Army’s modernisation requirements. The purpose of 
this article is to highlight five challenges for Future Infantry in order to stimulate 
thinking about Future Infantry’s requirement to adapt and change. These chal-
lenges are:
1. Incorporating continuous learning
2. Operating across the fives lines of operation in accordance with Adaptive 
Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept
3. Balancing the fighting force
4. Employing LAND 400 – Combined Arms Fighting System
5. Employing JOINT PROJECT 2048 – Enhanced Amphibious Capability.
While this article is focused on the Infantry, the challenges outlined will resonate 
with many people in the wider Army, and are of likely interest to people from joint, 
whole-of-government, coalition, contractor and non-government organisations 
who expect to operate with Army in the future.
Future Infantry Challenge 1: Incorporating 
Continuous Learning
Successful organisations are able to adapt to changes in their environments in a 
timely manner—this requires effective learning. For most people, effective learning 
is continuous and involves a dynamic combination of education, training and the 
understanding of lessons. For Future Infantry to become an effective, adaptive and 
learning organisation, the following attributes may be useful: accept honest 
mistakes, support the free flow of 
knowledge between people at all levels, 
mentor subordinates, and reward 
people who foster learning and 
cultural change.
To ensure success in increas-
ingly complex battlespaces, Future 
Infantry must seek to frame problems, 
understand learning gaps and develop 
methods and tools to retain, develop 
and share knowledge in changing 
circumstances. Examples of resource and knowledge sharing systems available to 
the Future Infantry, which may assist adaptation and change, include: enhancing 
leader and instructor skills; formal and informal after action reviews; timely, agile 
and relevant doctrine; and forums, blogs and/or wikis.
For most people, effective 
learning is continuous and 
involves a dynamic combination 
of education, training and the 
understanding of lessons.
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Future Infantry Challenge 2: Operating across the 
Fives Lines of Operation
Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, released by the Chief 
of Army on 16 September 2009, is centred on the formation of the Land Force 
components of which might include, as well as ADF services, government and non-
government agencies and Australian Civilian Corps. 2 The document
…defines the actions taken by the Land Force as part of the military contribution to a 
Joint and Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts and advancing Australia’s 
national interests. 3
Fundamental to Adaptive Campaigning are five interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing lines of operation: Joint Land Combat, Population Protection, 
Information Actions, Population Support, and Indigenous Capacity Building.
In accordance with Infantry’s role, Joint Land Combat is the primary responsi-
bility of Future Infantry. For the last decade, in Australia, our region and beyond, 
the Infantry have also employed Population Protection to protect people from 
immediate danger, and Population Support to establish an environment that allows 
people to carry out their normal lives with family, work and education.
For the last decade and throughout the Infantry’s history, the Infantry have relied 
upon smart, empowered soldiers and leaders, supported by robust training and 
professional mastery, to support the Land Force’s Information Actions, often while 
in contact with adaptive, agile and lethal 
enemies. Well orchestrated Information 
Actions ensure that the Land Force’s 
message, or dominant narrative, is effec-
tively portrayed and understood by all 
people within Land Force’s battlespace.
Experienced Infantry personnel know 
that the Land Force’s message must be 
honest and consistent. While the Land 
Force can tailor messages for different 
people and different audiences, Future 
Infantry must understand that it is difficult to send any messages that will be 
understood in the same way by the many audiences that may hear it. 4 For example, 
the message for the enemy differs from the message for coalition partners, and may 
be different again for the people who actually live in Future Infantry’s battlespace. 
Unless these messages are honest and consistent, the Land Force risks causing effects 
in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations, or 
adversely affect friendly forces; this is colourfully dubbed ‘information fratricide’ 
Future Infantry’s need to adapt 
and change will be conducted 
in direct competition with 
equally adaptive, agile and 
lethal enemies.
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by the Information Office. 5 The failure to create consistent messages across inten-
tional and non-intentional recipient groups may lead to conflict-laden messages. 6 
Frequently, information fratricide ‘results in credibility loss [and] contrary 
messaging’. 7
Future Infantry, as demonstrated by current Infantry operations, must have 
the ability to support and empower Indigenous Capacity Building within complex 
future battlespaces. Future Infantry support to indigenous or local people through 
training, mentoring, guiding and partnering, in combination with the four other 
Adaptive Campaigning lines of operation, will help to ensure that indigenous force 
elements can become self-assured, self-sustaining, self-learning and ultimately 
self-sufficient.
In summary, Adaptive Campaigning’s five interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing lines of operation present Future Infantry with both challenges and 
opportunities. The starkness of these challenges and opportunities are self-evident 
to experienced Infantry personnel, who understand that Future Infantry’s need to 
adapt and change will be conducted in direct competition with equally adaptive, 
agile and lethal enemies.
Future Infantry Challenge 3: Balancing the Fighting 
Force
Infantry personnel will understand that Infantry’s operational tempo is high, and 
has been high since 1999. This high operational tempo has placed some strain 
on Infantry’s training models. In the last decade, the Infantry have faced the 
following challenges:
1. Maintaining a multitude of Infantry skills including: Special Forces, commandos, 
light infantry, airborne, mechanised and motorised
2. Allowing soldiers enough time to achieve excellence as riflemen, prior to 
promotion to lance corporal, and beyond
3. Maintaining Support Company skills in reconnaissance, sniping, direct fire 
support weapons, mortars, assault pioneers and communications
4. Conducting foundation warfighting training and education in the face of unique 
current operational requirements.
Arguably, these challenges may be exacerbated by Infantry’s lack of balance. 
Infantry maintains a number of specialised battalions, companies, platoons, sections 
and individual Infantry personnel. Often such specialised organisations and people 
are not easily deployable and rotatable which, in an era of persistent conflict, presents 
a challenge for an army engaged in multiple force rotations in disparate operational 
environments. Is the Infantry trying to develop and maintain too many specialist 
skills? As the battlespace becomes more complex should Future Infantry remain a 
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‘multi-specialist’ force, or should it aim to become more balanced in order to achieve 
excellence in fewer skills?
Given these challenges in Infantry’s balance and maintenance of skills, what 
issues should Future Infantry address? The following are some questions for possible 
Future Infantry adaptation and change:
1. How will Future Infantry demarcate the difference between Special Forces and 
other Infantry?
2. What is the Future Infantry relationship with the Future Cavalry and Future 
Armour? How does Future Infantry generate combined arms teams that are 
modular and interoperable Future Cavalry and Future Armour?
3. What is the future of Support Company? Does Future Infantry need all of the 
‘traditional’ Support Company skills, or can other corps fulfil those skills in 
support of the Future Infantry?
4. What combat team level intelligence and opera-
tions capabilities does Future Infantry require?
5. Is the current Infantry platoon structure appro-
priate for future operations? Do Future Infantry 
platoons need the ability to coordinate joint fires, 
see beyond ‘the next hill or village’, and conduct 
dynamic breaching in complex environments? 
What other capabilities do Future Infantry 
platoons need?
Future Infantry Challenge 4: Employing LAND 400 – 
Combined Arms Fighting System
Defence White Paper – Force 2030 (White Paper 2009) states that Army would, in 
future years, ‘acquire a new fleet of around 1,100 deployable protected vehicles’. 8 
This project, which in the Defence Capability Plan 2009 is designated as LAND 
400, 9 has been named by Army as LAND 400 – Combined Arms Fighting System 
(L400-CAFS).
L400-CAFS has the potential to change Army, and change Future Infantry. The 
following are some questions for possible Future Infantry adaptation and change in 
the context of L400-CAFS:
1. Will L400-CAFS see a merging of current mechanised and motorised infantry 
skills into a single, enhanced, networked, mounted close combat infantry 
capability?
2. What does L400-CAFS mean for Future Infantry’s employment as part of the 
broader combined arms team? How does L400-CAFS affect Future Infantry’s 
interoperability with Future Cavalry and Future Armour?
Is the Infantry trying 
to develop and 
maintain too many 
specialist skills?
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3. Will Future Infantry fight from and/or with L400-CAFS and its associated combat 
systems? 10
4. Does Future Infantry require L400-CAFS to carry an Infantry Section? Should 
Future Infantry crew L400-CAFS?
5. To what extent should L400-CAFS be interoperable with allies/coalition 
partners?
Future Infantry Challenge 5: Employing JOINT PROJECT 
2048 – Enhanced Amphibious Capability
The 2009 White Paper states that Defence would, in future years, receive an enhanced 
amphibious capability. 11 This project, which is noted in the Defence Capability Plan 
2009 as JOINT PROJECT 2048 (JP 2048), includes: two new Landing Helicopter 
Dock (LHD) amphibious ships with ship-to-shore connectors; a large strategic 
sealift ship; and six new heavy landing craft. 12
Like L400-CAFS, JP 2048 has the potential to change not only Army, but the 
entire Australian Defence Force. The following are some questions for possible 
Future Infantry adaptation and change in the context of JP 2048:
1. What is Future Infantry’s position on amphibious specialised brigades or 
battalions?
2. Noting current challenges in maintaining Infantry skills, will JP 2048 require 
specialist roles for Future Infantry to enable 
amphibious operations?
3. What amphibious training will be required 
for Future Infantry? Does the ADF need an 
amphibious training centre of excellence? 13
4. Employing JP 2048, how will Future Infantry 
achieve: ship-to-objective manoeuvre, distrib-
uted operations; and sea-based logistics? 14
5. To what extent should JP 2048 be interoper-
able with L400-CAFS?
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to note five challenges for the Future Infantry 
in order to stimulate thinking about Future Infantry’s requirement to adapt and 
change. These challenges are:
1. Incorporating continuous learning
2. Operating across the fives lines of operation in accordance with Adaptive 
Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept
JP 2048 has the potential 
to change not only Army, 
but the entire Australian 
Defence Force.
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3. Balancing the fighting force
4. Employing LAND 400 – Combined Arms Fighting System
5. Employing JOINT PROJECT 2048 – Enhanced Amphibious Capability.
This article has proposed, in the context of adaptation and change, many 
questions for Future Infantry. Importantly, these questions are only a beginning. 
They may not be the right questions. They may not be complete questions. Or they 
may be questions that Future Infantry will address without significant learning and/
or intellectual effort. Alternatively, perhaps Infantry may seek to explore comprehen-
sive thinking on these questions and challenges in order to inform the development 
of Future Infantry.
There is no doubt that Future Infantry—fighting in complex human, physical and 
informational battlespaces, operating in a combined arms, Joint, whole-of-govern-
ment context incorporating coalition, contractor and non-government organisations 
partners against adaptive, agile and lethal enemies—will need to adapt and change.
Whatever rank or position held, the breadth, depth and range of this adaptation 
and change for Future Infantry is now firmly in the hands of Infantry personnel.
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Looking For The 
Hedgehog Idea
Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan
Abstract
This article examines the limitations of traditional strategic approaches to the resolution of 
contemporary conflicts. It proposes control as the unifying idea for military action.
Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The 
difficulties accumulate…
– Clausewitz
Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay The Hedgehog and the Fox 1 was an examination of the work of Leo Tolstoy that rested on an observation from the ancient Greek poet Archilocus that ‘the fox knows many things but the hedgehog knows one 
big thing’. 2 From this platform, Berlin argued that:
there exists a great chasm between those… who relate everything to a single central 
vision,…—a single, universal, organising principle—and… those who pursue many ends, 
often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way.  3
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Berlin likened the former category to hedgehogs and the latter to foxes. 4 This 
simple idea has been taken up by a multitude of writers for a multitude of reasons 
and there is a need for some caution. In fact, immediately, Berlin himself warns: 
‘of course, like all over-simple classifications of this type, the dichotomy becomes, 
if pressed, artificial, scholastic and ultimately absurd’. 5 In the context in which he 
used these characterisations, Berlin was looking only to illuminate the distinctions 
between hedgehogs, whose adherence to a single organising principle made their 
actions and thoughts centripetal, and the more centrifugal foxes. Importantly, in 
Berlin’s mind, hedgehogs were not stupid or limited, they were simply focused. 6
War is a complex undertaking and armed forces are complex organisations 
comprising many autonomous entities subject to the vagaries of a myriad of 
pressures, most of which are beyond their control. In order to provide a measure 
of cohesion to the preparation and conduct of war, a degree of focus is needed: a 
hedgehog idea. Failure to find this idea threatens what Berlin warned about: the 
pursuit of ‘many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, 
only in some de facto way’. 7 As we stumble through the maze of contemporary 
conflict and find ourselves dealing with wicked problems, design thinking, 
complex adaptive systems, anthropology, sociology, community policing, develop-
ment aid, and the provision of reticulated water and sewerage to remote localities 
in the developing world—as well as combat 
against a highly motivated and ruthless 
enemy—the need for a unifying hedgehog 
idea is greater than ever.
Clausewitz was a hedgehog and believed 
that war was the domain of hedgehogs. 
Despite recognising the vast complexity 
and uncontrollable dynamism of war and 
accepting the dominance of politics in the 
interplay between them and tactics, Clausewitz settled on a simple, central, 
unifying idea for the conduct of wars: ‘the destruction of the enemy is what 
matters most’. 8 Interestingly, here he is grappling with the same question that 
caused Berlin to write the essay mentioned above: ‘what power is it that moves the 
destinies of peoples’. 9 Clausewitz understood and discussed the power of moral 
factors in the execution and conclusion of wars but accepted the limitations of 
the application of military force as a means to change people’s minds. Therefore, 
to him, the best that was possible was the destruction of the enemy’s powers of 
resistance carried out in a way that convinced the enemy’s people that submis-
sion was their best option. 10 This was the single, big, hedgehog idea that shaped 
military theory from the time of Napoleon until very recently. This is reflected in 
the doctrine, organisation and equipment of the militaries of the world—or at least 
Clausewitz was a hedgehog 
and believed that war was 
the domain of hedgehogs.
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those that were prepared for industrial age warfare. The idea is now discredited, 
or at best incomplete as a unifying idea for the contemporary development and 
application of military force.
The aim of this article is to investigate whether there is still ‘a single universal 
organising principle’—a hedgehog idea—that underpins contemporary warfare, as 
annihilation underpinned that of the industrial age.
Strategic Approaches
From the time of Napoleon until the end of the Cold War, the basis of Western 
military theory and practice was dominated by Clausewitz’s hedgehog focus on the 
annihilation of the enemy. Whatever their provenance or objectives, wars were 
resolved through successful battles which, singly or in combination, destroyed the 
enemy’s military capacity and laid the enemy nation prostrate at your feet. 11 This 
was not simplistic, or even an over simplification, but simply a recognition of the 
limitations of the utility of force. It also enjoyed the 
dual advantages of being both easy to understand 
and, in the social and political contexts in which it 
arose, of working with reasonable reliability.
Wars arise when frustrations with the distribution 
of political power become intolerable. Wars are fought 
to redistribute that political power. Political power 
rests on the consent of the people. Therefore, warfare 
attempts to manipulate the consent of the people. 
Physical force cannot directly influence an abstract 
concept like consent (except by its abnegation) and so it needs to act through an 
intermediary. In Clausewitz’s view, manipulation was best done by destroying the 
web of mutual obligations that join the individual with the state by demonstrably 
removing the state’s ability to meet its end of the bargain. The individual citizens, 
motivated by the pressures described by Hobbes in Leviathan, 12 are then forced to 
arrive at a new social arrangement—one that represents a re-distribution of political 
power in favour of the victor. The beauty of Clausewitz’s hedgehog vision was that 
it described how political objectives could be translated into tactical actions—that 
is, whatever the objective of the war, the tactical choices were largely restricted to 
where and how best to kill the enemy army. These were the good old days.
Because it seeks the physical manipulation of an abstract quality, strategy is 
always conjectural. In essence, all strategies are based on hypothetical stimulus-
response pairings to be applied in an incompletely understood socioeconomic 
model. As a result, strategies can only be validated by praxis. In the case of anni-
hilation, there can be no certainty that a population that is placed at the mercy 
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of an enemy army will admit that it is, in fact, beaten. The 2003 ‘Shock and Awe’ 
campaign in Iraq is a good example. In this campaign, the enemy state and its army 
were quickly annihilated, but the Iraqi people were left largely untouched by the 
war. In addition, the connections between many Iraqis and the Saddam-state were 
different from those anticipated by Clausewitz and, for them, the annihilation of 
the state was empowering rather than prostrating. As a result, the chosen strategy 
(annihilation) failed to sufficiently manipulate their consent to support a transition 
to the democratic rule initially envisaged by the West.
Existing in parallel with the idea of annihilation, and only temporarily obscured 
by the shadow of Napoleon, is a set of complementary ideas, collected into so-called 
strategies of exhaustion. Strategies of exhaustion typically seek to manipulate the 
consent of populations by acting directly on the people. Until the last few years, this 
usually involved the laying on of Sherman’s ‘hard hand of war’ to impose such pain 
that the population sought to alleviate it by re-ordering political arrangements. 13 
This thinking connects the chevauchee of the 100 Years War with Sherman’s march 
to the sea, the bombing of British, German and Japanese cities during the Second 
World War, and counter-value nuclear targeting 
in the Cold War. Like annihilation, exhaustion 
enables the more or less direct translation of 
political intent into tactical action.
The Second World War strategic bombing 
campaign against German cities was an attempt 
to directly manipulate the consent of the people 
by imposing on them such pain that they would 
feel compelled to withdraw their support for the 
Nazi regime. It failed for a number of reasons. 
First, shared hardships tend (and tended) to cause communities to coalesce rather 
than shatter, and so the experience of being bombed apparently reinforced the 
cohesion of the German people and through that, reinforced the Nazi messages 
surrounding the singularity of the volk. Second, the coercive authority of the Nazi 
state was substantial and, viewed in hindsight, it was not clear how a people under 
pressure from all sides could organise themselves to withdraw their consent. 14 
Third, the necessary British and US alliance with the USSR played to the atavistic 
German fear of the Slavic east and made the war an existential matter for both 
the German people and the Nazi regime—again reinforcing rather than destroying 
cohesion. Fourth, the Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender meant that no 
bargain could be struck short of complete submission—which in view of the Russian 
involvement—could be seen as an acceptance of the threat of the genetic eradication 
of the German people. The result of these factors was that the exhaustion sought 
by the strategic bombing campaign of German cities didn’t work during the war. 
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However, when the Allies’ annihilating military campaign was eventually successful, 
and the Nazi regime removed, the impact of the strategic bombing campaign was 
felt in the ready submission of the people. By and large there was no insurgency or 
resistance movement and people were ready to move on with reconstruction.
Within the broad church of strategies of exhaustion there exists an even more 
speculative, yet enormously influential, chapel dedicated to the cult of denial. This 
strategic school has ancient and honourable antecedents: Athens’ Periclean strategy 
during the Peloponnesian War and Rome’s Fabian strategy in the face of the 
Carthaginian invasion of Italy being two examples. In both these cases, faced with 
a more powerful enemy conducting strategic offensives, the defenders declined to 
join battle with the aggressors and sought to vanquish them merely by avoiding 
defeat—the idea being that eventually they would tire of the game and go home. 
This worked for the Romans, who were able 
to maintain political cohesion in the face of 
the Carthaginian onslaught, but not for the 
Athenians, who eventually found themselves 
emotionally compelled to adopt a more 
active strategy.
Strategies of denial are clearly very 
indirect, seeking to manipulate the consent 
of the enemy population simply by denying 
them strategic success while ceding them 
more or less unconstrained tactical success. This indirectness makes denial even 
more highly speculative than the other strategic schools. The uncertainties created 
by long cause-effect chains, the time necessary for discouragement to take root and 
eventually become dominant, and the uncertainties attendant on predicting the 
behaviour of humans, all make denial so uncertain that is it typically a strategy of 
last resort. Because it is therefore a strategy of the weak, it is generally how insur-
gents win—when they win. In Vietnam, for example, the United States lost heart and 
went home rather than being militarily defeated although, in that case, exhaustion 
through denial was not a strategy that North Vietnam settled on until all other 
options had failed, the war was over, and the histories were being written. 15
These traditional strategic approaches remain important today. Al-Qaeda attacks 
in our Western homelands were and are intended to propagandise the Ummah and 
to exhaust our willingness to resist their attempt to establish political control over the 
Middle East; while in Afghanistan, the Taliban is attempting simply to exhaust us. 
Annihilation was the West’s chosen approach in all of our twentieth century wars 
(although invariably as part of a larger collective) and, if the recent Australian Defence 
White Paper is right, we may even have the need for annihilation again. Denial remains 
the most problematic of the traditional approaches. Although Australia effectively 
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embraced a strategy of denial (of continental Australia) in the 1980s, it was never 
tested. Today the implications, particularly for trade and the economy, of implementing 
a strategy of denial might make it hard to define victory for a market state like 
Australia. In Australia’s circumstances, it might provide the basis for a useful deterrent 
strategy because it relies on an initial mis-
appreciation by the aggressor and a subsequent 
ability by both sides to make decisions that are 
severely bounded by rationality. However, it is 
not a strategy which degrades gracefully—it will 
either work as a deterrent or it will, most likely, 
not work at all. As a result, since Plans A, B and 
C are probably best left on the shelf for the time 
being, we need to find a Plan D.
The Expansion of War
To date, nothing has replaced annihilation as the single universal organising 
principle for militaries. Instead we are faced with a multitude of contending proposi-
tions and theories that purport to describe what wars will be like in the future, how 
they should be waged and how victory might be defined. There are many reasons 
for this, though none startling or new:
•	 There	is	a	sense	that	the	modern	world	is	so	dynamic	that	everything	that	existed	
before is merely burdensome legacy, which engenders a corresponding urgency 
in the search for novelty.
•	 In	the	last	one	hundred	years,	warfare	has	continued	to	expand,	but	the	rate	
of expansion has accelerated. Since the conceptual initiation of the ‘nation-in-
arms’ a little over two hundred years ago, we have seen the industrial revolution 
and the enhanced economic organisation of states producing lavishly equipped 
and supported mass armies that enabled them to seek the annihilation of their 
enemies. In the last one hundred years the same roots have allowed warfare to 
break the bonds of the surface of the land and sea and expand into the air, space, 
sub-surface and cyber domains.
•	 Warfare	has	been	democratised.	Instead	of	being	an	affair	limited	to	the	chosen	
representatives of states, active warfare now involves anyone who feels sufficiently 
motivated to pitch in. At the same time, the ‘intrusion’ of both professional repre-
sentatives of media organisations and individual cell phone amateurs into the 
tactical battle has enabled people everywhere around the globe to take a position 
on the consequences of combat and on the means employed. The immediacy of 
these issues constantly threatens to overshadow the typically more abstract and 
remote questions about why we are fighting and what we are fighting for—even 
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the strategic premise on which the conflict began. As a result, the importance of 
the informational domain, propaganda, has grown exponentially.
•	 The	modern	state	is	losing	its	hold	over	its	people.	Although	war	continues	to	be	
exclusively for or about states, the relationship between the state and its people is 
changing. 16 In the advanced market states of the West, the state exists to provide 
opportunities to its citizens. 17 It does this by nurturing the market, privatising 
many of its functions, encouraging the growth of multi-national corporations, and 
through international cooperation. By definition, this form of state has a very 
limited ability to conscript its people to ‘its’, 
as opposed to ‘their’, interests. The result of 
this is that popular support for any war is 
even more uncertain than in previous ages 
and that warfare therefore needs to be more 
intensively managed to connect the tactical 
with the political. The corollary is of course 
that, more than ever before, the home front 
of market states promises to be the decisive 
theatre from an enemy perspective.
General Sir Rupert Smith used the term ‘war among the people’ to describe the 
result of the continued expansion and democratisation of war. His proposition is that 
the utility of military force has declined in the face of
the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields—all the people, 
anywhere—are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere, with 
civilians around, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, 
objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force. 18
This was also the basic proposition underpinning the 2003 Army concept Complex 
Warfighting, which has been further elaborated in Adaptive Campaigning.
The problem thus created is a substantial one: none of the strategic approaches 
discussed above was intended, or is well suited to, the problem of resolving wars 
fought among people; hence, our existing unifying ideas are unhinged. In his book, 
Smith refers to this, explaining that when he was the NATO commander in Bosnia 
‘we had no strategies’; that is, not that there was an absence of a specific strategy 
(although that was also true) but that there was no clear idea of how military force 
could be used to achieve the aspirations of the mission.
Part of the problem is that we have heightened aspirations for war. We have come 
a long way since Horace’s exhortation that it was sweet and fitting for a man to die 
for his country. The notion of individual negation is an absurdity in a market state 
that exists to create opportunity for individuals. As a result, in modern war, the death 
of a soldier is accepted as an unquestioned national tragedy. Furthermore, the West 
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no longer views war as a wholly legitimate means of advancing the interests of a state 
or group of states. Even if the United Nations grants formal legitimacy, there exists 
the underlying view that not only is it a last resort but it is not really a resort at all. 
For example, in reviewing Smith’s book, The Guardian wrote:
… it seems tautologous to say that there is something wrong with war. Morally wrong, 
of course, but also wrong in the sense that the function of this dangerous, expensive and 
ethically dubious institution has become increasingly unclear in the past half century. 19
It is interesting that, at least according to The Guardian, the notion that war is 
morally wrong is a given, whatever its causes, aims or outcomes. Next to this, its 
failure to deliver desirable outcomes reliably is merely a practical difficulty. Even if 
we accept The Guardian’s view as unconsidered 
and faintly risible, we should also accept that the 
underlying sentiment exists and that in the view 
of a substantial portion of our population, war is 
morally, at least, tainted.
If the reader has come this far with us, then 
we invite that in combination, these two factors 
mean that the basic mechanism of warfare, 
combat, is discredited. The moral taint reduces 
the tolerance that the community, local and inter-
national, has for the death and destruction that is an inevitable corollary of combat 
and constrains the choice of available means—the current trend of demonising air 
power being one example. The community is equally reluctant either to see its sons 
die or to employ the weapons that minimise the chances of this occurring. The 
inability to resolve this dilemma means that instead of being the principal means 
to an end, combat is reduced to being an undesirable externality of warfare. This is 
the basic message underpinning Adaptive Campaigning and its principal divergence 
from Complex Warfighting.
In response to these pressures: the need to more directly influence the percep-
tions of populations, acceptance of the limitations of the utility of force; and a 
general disenchantment with combat, the militaries of the world have been looking 
for a new organising principle that might replace annihilation. Because this period 
has coincided with a resurgence in counterinsurgency, and because the ‘perceptions 
of the population’ and ‘hearts and minds’ are apparent synonyms, this search began 
from a position of adherence to Templar’s dictum from Malaya that the answer lies 
‘not in pouring more troops into the jungle’. 20
From this, one comes to the conclusion that there is no military solution to an 
insurgency and, from there, that direct military action is essentially regressive. As a 
result, one might conclude that the core business and that for which the military is 
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trained, organised and equipped is no longer seen as terribly useful. In its stead ‘we’ 
have committed ourselves to a new order: strategies of inducement.
Strategies of Inducement
Strategies of inducement rest on the proposition that ‘we’ can win the competition 
for the consent of a population by providing to ‘them’ things that are better than the 
things that the enemy is able to give them. The actual execution of such strategies 
involves capacities that are beyond the expertise and resources of most militaries, 
configured as before for annihilation. Therefore, other agencies, both government 
and otherwise, need to be enlisted into direct participation in the competition. To 
ensure the strategy is to offer the ‘right things’, it is necessary to consider and address 
the entirety of the conflict environment: political, cultural, social and military. To 
coordinate the actions of variously independent organisations within such a complex 
endeavour, a ‘dominant narrative’ is established as part of the strategy to provide the 
basic rationale and objectives for intervention and connect the actions of independent 
agencies with the political proposition being made to the target population. These 
are the elements of what has become known as ‘a comprehensive approach’: whole-
of-government and multipartite effort, a 
focus on the causes of conflict rather than 
its symptoms, and the dominance of a 
political narrative. They are all implicit in a 
strategy of inducement.
Strategies of inducement have many 
positive attributes. They make it possible to 
engage the instruments of national power 
directly to the resolution of a conflict 
rather than indirectly through a primarily 
military effort. Goodwill is often expressed not merely to benefit its recipients but 
also to satisfy the needs of its practitioners and, because they are seeking to do 
good, these strategies buttress popular support for an intervention. Because of the 
effort to build good governance, law and order, democracy and a market economy 
trading in acceptable commodities, over time, the target population experiences a 
better standard of living and becomes more like us. The implicit assumption is that 
they are less likely to present a threat in the future. Perhaps most importantly, in the 
confluence of influences described above, there are few apparent alternatives.
Like all strategies, however, inducement remains highly speculative. There is a 
presumption that what we offer is more attractive than what the enemy is offering, 
and this necessarily invokes problems of cross-cultural perceptions and mores. 
In many cases, the West finds itself dealing with ethnic, cultural and national 
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identities that may be confronted by attempts at modernisation. For some peoples 
and groups, al-Qaeda and the Taliban being examples, modernisation is seen as 
Westernisation and is both cultural and religious anathema. In these cases, the 
source of conflict may be a response to the unwitting Western cultural intrusion 
accompanying the processes of globalisation. In such cases, the inducements we are 
offering may actually exacerbate resistance rather than undermine it.
Because of the focus of inducement, there is a tendency to see the enemy as 
peripheral to the conflict. This is a very sophisticated view that is not without merit, 
but it must be remembered that war is a dialectical struggle and that the enemy may 
not be content with a peripheral role. Therefore, although the objective being sought 
by the overall strategy might not have an enemy focus, it is likely that at least part of 
the journey will. It should also be expected that the enemy will have a strategy of their 
own. Although we might be committed to inducement, the enemy might have a quite 
different approach—it has usually been thus. What would be the consequences, for 
example, if we embarked on a strategy of inducement (which necessarily involves a 
protracted commitment) while the enemy was 
committed to a strategy of exhaustion and was 
content merely to deny us ‘satisfactory’ 
progress while sustaining a trickle of casual-
ties? Would the rosy glow of goodwill sustain 
us through to a recognisable victory?
Despite these risks, because of their 
strengths, until a conflict arises in which 
there is a compelling need for one of the more 
traditional strategic approaches, strategies of 
inducement are likely to remain at the core of Western approaches to war. This raises 
lower order, but still important, questions for militaries: what is our role in induce-
ment and how should we be organised, equipped and trained for it?
Control: The Hedgehog Idea
One man with a gun can control 100 without one.
– Lenin
There is, at least in the minds of the authors, some confusion over this question at 
present. Because of the military’s formidable, and unique, capacity for planning, 
ability to establish in austere surroundings and capability to cope with violent 
circumstances, there are obvious reasons why they will usually form the first element 
of any commitment to a conflict. Equally, there is a natural desire to begin the main 
work of delivering inducements as quickly as possible. As a result, there is a tendency 
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for militaries to seek to be jacks-of-all-trades: foxes, rather than hedgehogs. The 
consequence of this is a trend to dilution of force structure, doctrine and training in 
preparing for wars and a failure to concentrate effort once deployed.
The core of this trend is the proposition that any organisation is able to prepare 
itself physically and culturally for only a finite array of endeavours and is able to 
implement simultaneously only a subset of those prepared for. Attempts to diffuse 
organisational focus beyond this array threaten organisational fragmentation, 
cultural confusion and the resulting likelihood of failure.
In 1967, Admiral J C Wylie gave us two profound pieces of wisdom when he 
wrote: ‘The aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy’ 21 and ‘the 
ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the 
ultimate power in war. He is control. He determines who wins.’ 22 If we accept Wylie’s 
proposition that the man on the scene with the gun ‘is control’ then to be in control 
that man needs to be ‘ours’ and not the enemy’s.
This idea is worthy of some expansion. Whatever convictions individuals hold 
with respect to the enemy’s political proposition, like the volk in Nazi Germany, if 
they cannot withdraw their consent at a time of their choosing, then it is unlikely 
that a strategy of inducement can work. Ultimately, unless you are confident in the 
ability of your government to enforce its peace, then the man with an AK at your 
door at midnight is your master. It doesn’t matter if you are happy with your elec-
tricity, content with your children’s educational arrangements and satisfied with the 
government’s agenda—you are in thrall to the threat posed to you and your family 
by that man with the gun. His removal resolves the 
competition for control and is the first step towards 
creating the conditions in which a strategy of induce-
ment can be implemented.
This is so glaringly obvious that it appears banal, 
but even something so obvious is not always apparent. 
A number of examples from Iraq are pertinent. The 
Anbar Awakening—which began the process of the 
creation of Sunni militias to oppose al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) and to protect Sunni populations from Shia 
militias—did not arise without help. Having initially gained a toe-hold in Iraq as 
an aspect of the Sunni resistance to US occupation and the rise of a Shia dominated 
government, AQI, essentially foreign, unacceptably extreme and uncomfortably 
fundamentalist for secular nationalist Bedouins, quickly marginalised itself. It 
sustained its position only through fierce internal discipline and the elimination 
of any opposition. Over a period of many months, relentless US Army, Marine 
and Special Forces operations eroded the capability and capacity of AQI to such an 
extent that it was no longer able to maintain its control over the Sunni population. 
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As a result, when the Awakening began in far western Anbar, AQI was unable to 
suppress it. This demonstration of weakness was sufficient encouragement for tribal 
leaders closer to Baghdad to re-assert themselves and follow suit. In this case there 
was a local desire to move away from AQI control, but that desire could only be 
pursued when the local control of gunmen and terrorists was removed by the coun-
terinsurgents. It was only following this destruction of AQI’s control that the delivery 
could proceed of the goods and services that underpin a strategy of inducement.
Only a military can establish control and until it is established, democracy, the 
economy, the rule of law, policing and social progress must wait. The establishment of 
control necessarily has two aspects: one focused on the removal (by annihilation?) of 
the enemy’s ‘man with a gun’, and the other in putting our soldier in that man’s place. 
It also infers establishing sufficient control 
over the day-to-day existence of the popula-
tion that they are in no doubt as to who is in 
charge. In nearly all cases, the hearts of the 
population are beyond our grasp but, if we 
are in charge, it doesn’t matter.
In this model, the national strategy 
would determine the political objectives 
being pursued and the dominant narrative 
to be followed, the campaign plan would lay 
down the broad agenda to be followed, and operational art would be focused on 
initially reducing the influence of the enemy to an acceptable level and subsequently 
preventing a resurgence and establishing control over the population.
Conclusion
In the face of a plethora of writings about complexity and the military system, 
hedgehog ideas remain important if complex organisations are to act purposefully 
and energetically in the face of complicated and dynamic circumstances. The mili-
tary’s preoccupation with commander’s intent and task verbs, the sanctity of the 
mission and the importance of the ‘in order to’ are all manifestations of this idea. 
Previously the hedgehog idea that unified development, training and application 
was annihilation, but it has fallen into disfavour, at least for the time being. Of 
the other traditional strategic approaches, neither provides a good fit to the needs 
of contemporary war—at least to Western market states. Only the relatively new 
strategic approach, inducement, is genuinely available today.
Within a strategy of inducement there is a tendency for military preparations 
and actions to become undesirably diffuse. In the absence of full engagement by the 
nation-state, in preparing for strategies of inducement, militaries risk organisational 
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and cultural fragmentation with a consequent reduced ability to cope with actual, 
rather than theoretical, conflicts. In execution, there is the likelihood of the pursuit 
of ‘many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in 
some de facto way’. 23 The result is typically a lingering conflict in which, at best, 
modest progress invokes the popular proclamation of ‘quagmire’, the acceptance of 
exhaustion, the redefinition of victory, and withdrawal.
It is often easy to forget that for Western states, in any dialectical struggle, if 
you are not winning, you are losing. The key contribution militaries can make to 
strategies of inducement is to establish effective control over the operating environ-
ment. This will require that the enemy’s ability to establish control is reduced to a 
negligible level. Clausewitz is still right and the destruction of the enemy is what 
matters most. Today, as in the time of Clausewitz, the destruction of the enemy—the 
removal of his ability to contest control—is not an end in itself, but it remains an 
essential prerequisite for subsequent actions that may deliver victory.
Once the enemy’s ability to contest control has been removed, locally or generally, 
the establishment of friendly control can set the scene for progress in other aspects 
of the campaign plan. In some cases, controlling a population will require that 
they feel ‘the hard hand of war’. Although we would not wish to revisit Sherman or 
Douhet’s measures, strategists should not shy away from taking control of all aspects 
of the day-to-day existence of a target population. The challenge we would present 
to the reader is to find a successful example of a war among the people that has not 
rested on the establishment of such control.
The beauty of accepting control as the military’s hedgehog idea is that it places the 
notion of annihilation (to which it is closely akin) within a strategic and campaign 
context and subordinates violence to strategy. Importantly it does not see combat as 
an undesirable externality or as a manifestation of failure, but as the core business 
for armies. In short, it helps describe how a blunt instrument like military force 
can help create the circumstances for positive political change. In this it creates a 
conceptual bridge with annihilation, exhaustion and denial.
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Concepts
Autonomic and Sense 
and Respond Logistics
The ‘foxhole to factory to foxhole’ 
continuum of combat service support *
Major Ray Hingst and Greg Gunter
Abstract
As the Australian Defence Force (ADF) embarks on an ambitious re-equipment program 
involving the procurement of multi-billion dollar platforms, enhancement of the logistics 
required to support this technology will also require careful consideration. Autonomic 
Logistics is a system that offers the ADF the opportunity to link the current Military 
Integrated Logistics Information System (MILIS) to real-time platform information through 
the employment of the Sense and Respond Logistics system. This is a proven system that has 
demonstrated its effectiveness within the United States (US) forces and can work equally 
well within the ADF.
* This article has been peer-reviewed.
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‘The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…’
– Sun Tzu
Introduction
The ADF is in the midst of an evolutionary change. Whether it is labelled Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Network Centric Operations or Network Enabled Operations, this change concerns the ability to share information 
seamlessly in order to conduct effective operations into the future. This ability to 
share information is referred to as the ‘network dimension’ and has the facility to:
•	 connect units, platforms and facilities through networking, appropriate doctrine, 
training and organisational processes and structure
•	 collect relevant information using networked assets and distribute it via the 
network
•	 use the information, and the intelligence derived from it, to achieve military 
objectives
•	 protect the network from external interference or technical failure. 1
This article will focus on the two ‘Cs’—connect and collect—and the way the 
ADF can develop these abilities, documented extensively in the ‘NCW Roadmap’. 
The Roadmap envisages an ADF in which:
•	 key	logistic	function	networks	within	the	national	support	area	are	linked	with	
those in theatre and provide connectivity and a collaborative ability with industry 
and coalition partners
•	 commanders	have	end-to-end	visibility	of	the	logistic	system,	allowing	them	to	
rapidly and effectively prioritise the resources required to generate and sustain 
deployed force elements
•	 automated	ordering	and	replenishment	occurs	as	supplies	and	ordnance	are	
consumed by platforms and field units
•	 the	deployed	force	has	minimised	its	vulnerabilites	and	significantly	enhanced	
its mobility through more effective reach back, optimum force presence and 
precision sustainment for the majority of logistics requirements. 2
Yet, based on a review of the NCW Roadmap and the assumption that the 
supported projects will achieve their desired states, the ADF will still only partially 
achieve its goal in the critical area of logistics. This is because of the existence of a 
residual ‘air gap’ at the platform end of the logistics continuum preventing 
commanders from accessing aggregated, real-time logistics data from the ‘foxhole’. 3 
As a consequence, the decision-making ability of the operational commander will 
be less than optimal. Critical support costs will also be higher than necessary. MILIS 
alone is incapable of generating the data required by the commander in the field, 
while Autonomic Logistics was developed primarily to meet the needs of the supply 
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pipeline rather than optimised for the support of operational commanders. Sense 
and Respond Logistics, on the other hand, combines all the required components 
to present the commander with complete visibility of the logistics chain.
This article will define the concepts of 
Autonomic Logistics and Sense and Respond 
Logistics, and provide an overview of their 
use through two civilian applications. The way 
Autonomic Logistics works will be explained 
with reference to a ‘foxhole to factory to foxhole’ 
continuum of combat service support and the 
concept of Autonomic Sustainment currently 
being developed by the United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) will also be examined.
What are Autonomic Logistics and Sense and Respond 
Logistics?
The term ‘autonomic’ refers to the autonomic nervous system within the human 
body which controls involuntary actions such as breathing or heartbeats which 
occur without conscious prompting. 4 Likewise, an Autonomic Logistics system 
is designed to function autonomatically without any form of prompting. 5 The 
Autonomic Logistics system discussed here was first developed by Lockheed Martin 
to support the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The main elements of this system are the 
sensors embedded in the Joint Strike Fighter itself to facilitate prognostics and 
health management.
For ease of comprehension, the concept of prognostics and health management 
can be broken into two definitions. Prognostics is defined as ‘the actual material 
condition assessment which includes predicting and determining the useful life 
and performance life remaining of components by modeling fault progression’. The 
concept of health management involves ‘the capability to make intelligent, informed, 
appropriate decisions about maintenance and logistics actions based on diagnostics/
prognostics information, available resources and operational demand’. 6
Prognostics and health management generate data which connects directly to 
the Autonomic Logistics Information System which, in turn, links the aircraft to the 
Lockheed Martin facility in the United States through the supply chain and inter-
mediate supporting elements. In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter, the Autonomic 
Logistics Information System analyses the data obtained from key components on the 
platform and, where necessary, organises a maintenance event, including the required 
components, technicians, specialist equipment and tools, necessary consumables and 
hangar space. The system may even schedule the fighter’s availability as required.
MILIS alone is incapable 
of generating the 
data required by the 
commander in the field…
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While the Autonomic Logistics Information System optimises the efficiency 
of resource supply, the analogy with the human autonomic system should not 
be ignored. The system functions automatically, but it does not think or reason. 
Deviations required for operational contingencies are not automatically factored 
into the process. This is where the human element, trained to appreciate and respond 
to a range of operational variables, becomes important.
Two examples of current practice illustrate the successful application of the 
Autonomic Logistics Information System in the less complex civilian environment. 
Autonomic Logistics is employed extensively in the Australian mining industry by 
heavy equipment vendors, such as Caterpillar, as an element of condition-based 
maintenance. Sensors embedded in major components of the equipment collect 
data, which is downloaded into an information system every time the vehicle comes 
within range of a receiving device. This works well within the confines of a mining 
site where equipment circulates in a limited area. A more challenging application of 
the Autonomic Logistics Information System occurred with QANTAS’s purchase of 
the Airbus A380. This required a more tailored application of the system, known as 
AIRTRAC: ‘QANTAS Airbus AIRTRAC system provides a link between the airframe 
and a dedicated support facility staffed with specialist engineers available 365 days 
a year.’ 7 Furthermore, ‘the A380’s onboard software monitors every system and 
instantly sends an email to AIRTRAC if any 
anomaly is spotted. The instant the email is 
received, the required part is ordered so it’s ready 
for the arrival of the A380.’ 8
QANTAS’s application of Autonomic Logistics 
through the AIRTRAC system focuses on 
bringing together the various elements required 
for maintenance. This approach represents a 
departure from scheduled maintenance programs, 
which are usually based on calculated intervals. Scheduled maintenance involves 
extensive safety margins intended to prevent failure of the component, but includes, 
of necessity, significant waste of resources through the replacement of items that 
are still within their safe, serviceable life. Conversely, condition-based maintenance 
provides ‘the ability to predict future health status of a system or component, as well 
as providing the ability to anticipate faults, problems, potential failures, and required 
maintenance actions’. 9 The aim of condition-based maintenance is to compare the 
current condition of a component with that required under safety specifications and 
arrange for timely repair or replacement prior to failure.
In the military context, however, additional considerations intervene in the 
scheduling of a maintenance event. Sense and Respond Logistics, defined by the 
Office of Force Transformation as ‘… a transformational network-centric concept 
The system functions 
automatically, but it does 
not think or reason.
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that enables Joint effects-based operations and provides agile support’, involves the 
same system elements as Autonomic Logistics, but also incorporates the ability to 
vary actions based on local operational decisions. 10 Such variations could include 
the repair of equipment by its operators rather than a specialised repairer or, in an 
operational context which may preclude the removal of the machine for repairs, 
its use in a reduced capacity.
Equipment health monitoring systems have been in use for decades. One such 
system was developed by Pratt and Whitney for jet engines used in the F-15 and 
F-16. The engine monitoring system, which consists of both engine diagnostics 
and ground diagnostics units, records the operating conditions as well as any 
anomalies in the performance of the aircraft. Once the aircraft is on the ground, 
the ground diagnostics unit is plugged into the engine diagnostics unit and the 
data is downloaded for analysis. The commercial arm of the company applies its 
engine monitoring system not only to other commercial aircraft engines, but also 
to automobiles. When a car is taken to a workshop to be serviced, technicians 
hook it up to a diagnostic analyser—a machine developed from the engine 
monitoring system—to determine the scope of work required to maintain the 
vehicle adequately. There is usually no 
real-time connectivity between the vehicle 
and the diagnostic system and only data 
detailing what has already occurred can be 
downloaded and processed.
The Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation (DSTO) also uses prognostics 
and health management systems—usually 
referred to as ‘health and usage monitoring 
systems’. Until recently, these applications 
required data to be physically downloaded and transferred for analysis. Both 
the Autonomic Logistics and Sense and Respond Logistics systems take this 
process a step further, also including prognostics. The sensor suite located in 
the platform compares performance data to predetermined standards in order to 
predict the status and longevity of the component. USMC light armored vehicles 
(LAV) connect health and usage monitoring systems to a Sense and Respond 
Logistics system so as to detect component wear and mechanical faults within the 
vehicle. For example, the LAV may transmit data on the condition of the main 
wheel bearing on the right front shaft to the Sense and Respond Logistics system, 
which then calculates that it is likely to fail after twenty hours of further use. Data 
from the vehicle is continuously transmitted and downloaded for analysis of the 
vehicle’s performance (see Figure 1, page 64).
The US Army makes frequent use of Sense and Respond Logistics systems to:
There is usually no 
real-time connectivity 
between the vehicle and the 
diagnostic system…
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… maximise the readiness and logistics effectiveness of the force. S&RL [Sense and 
Respond Logistics] requires a network-centric enterprise and mandates collaboration 
within and across communities of interest. The second goal of S&RL is enabling the 
logisticians to accurately observe, orient, decide and act faster than the supported 
customer. Improving the logistician’s decision cycle enables more accurate and timely 
support to the warfighter. With the integration of tracking, platform autonomics, 
information technologies and flexible business rules, logisticians will be able to 
proactively sustain the dynamic battlefield of the 21st Century. 11
The old concept of ‘Factory to Foxhole’ is now ‘Foxhole to Factory to Foxhole’. 12
Logistics costs
When a new system is acquired, the estimate of its life cycle costs is based on the 
generally accepted premise that the system itself accounts for one third of the cost. 
Logistics and operational costs comprise the other two thirds. The Australian Joint 
Strike Fighter program provides a useful example:
The true cost of owning a modern jet fighter includes 25 or 30 years of maintenance 
support, and pilot and ground crew training, and this is often twice or more the original 
purchase price. The JSF program includes a global logistics sustainment system … That 
doesn’t include the cost of fuel and weapons. 13
The Australian Government opted to purchase 
one hundred Joint Strike Fighters. Applying a per 
aircraft cost of US$50 million, this amounts to a total 
purchase of US$5 billion. Support and operating 
costs equate to US$10 billion for a program cost 
of US$15 billion. Lockheed Martin, supplier of the 
Joint Strike Fighter, estimates a 20 per cent reduction 
in the logistics costs over the life cycle of the aircraft 
due to the application of Autonomic Logistics. This 
equates to a US$2 billion saving for the Australian Joint Strike Fighter program. 14 Of 
course, these costs do not include the investment required to upgrade the platform 
and the purchase of requisite items and infrastructure that will provide a ‘whole of 
life’ use of this aircraft.
If the same concept is applied to the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle 
(ASLAV), the original cost would also include:
•	 acquisition	cost	(US$2	million/unit	257	units):	US$514	million
•	 projected	whole-of-life	logistics	cost:	US$1.028	billion
The Australian 
Government opted to 
purchase one hundred 
Joint Strike Fighters.
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•	 20	per	cent	savings:	US$205.6	million	on	operating	costs	over	the	life	of	the	
ASLAV.
Obviously this comparison does not take into account the fact that the original 
unit cost would have been greater with the addition of sensors, communications 
equipment and upgraded logistics resources. However, it does illustrate that a 
relatively modest increase in unit acquisition cost could lead to significant savings 
in logistics expenditure. The comparison also ignores the fact that the ADF has a 
history of retaining assets for extended periods (as it did the F-111 and M-113AS). 
This implies increased logistics to acquisition cost savings due to the compara-
tively long service life of many Australian platforms. Given the number of new 
equipment acquisitions scheduled in the Army capability development contiuum, 
the embedding of prognostics and health management devices makes sound 
financial sense. 15
End-to-end visibility
In their operational application, Autonomic Logistics and Sense and Respond 
Logistics systems are anchored at the platform level—the ‘foxhole’—while the 
destination at the other end differs according to who ‘owns’ the system (the ‘factory’). 
In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter, the ‘factory’ is Lockheed’s facility in Denver 
in the United States. Lockheed has 
visibility of the entire supply chain via 
the Autonomic Logistics Information 
System, which is an integrated 
component of the Joint Strike Fighter 
program.
The Sense and Respond Logistics 
concepts discussed here are based on 
the USMC application. The USMC’s 
Sense and Respond Logistics system 
supports both the logistics/supply chain and its operational application. Data 
gathered for current level usage is transmitted to the next level in the chain of 
command for aggregation and review:
With information technology, S&RL receives, recognizes and responds to consumption and 
requirement patterns through the use of equipment embedded Intelligent Agents. S&RL 
leverages the capabilities of network-enabled forces to share logistics information, share a 
common perspective of the battle space, and provide early awareness of consumption and 
needs, allow commitment tracking and allow for reconfiguration of the logistics system 
when needed. It will tell the Commander “how much fight is left” in his units. 16
This implies increased logistics to 
acquisition cost savings due to the 
comparatively long service life of 
many Australian platforms.
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Figure 1: Overview of Sense and Respond Logistics. 17
The logistics projects listed in the NCW Roadmap do not appear to achieve the 
optimal goals of the NCW vision because MILIS does not ‘reach forward’ suffi-
ciently to obtain platform-specific data. The ADF NCW implementation plans for 
logistics are based on MILIS (Project JP 2077). While MILIS is an automated 
supply and replenishment system, and is significantly advanced within current 
practices, it does not have real-time access to information on the consumption of 
resources and ordnance as there is an 
‘air gap’ between the system and the 
individual platforms. Although this 
gap is projected to narrow with the 
forecast extension of MILIS to sub-unit 
level, it will not close at the critical 
platform level.
With the connection of Sense 
and Respond Logistics to MILIS, a 
commander could access advice based 
not only on current and previous 
performance, but also the projected health of the assets under his/her control. 
Since all resources would be identified by part number and location, they could 
be redirected immediately to meet higher priority requirements. This means that 
supportability and sustainability decisions could be based on accurate data rather 
than a ‘best guess’ derived from historical patterns.
This means that supportability 
and sustainability decisions 
could be based on accurate data 
rather than a ‘best guess’ derived 
from historical patterns.
Figure 1 illustrates how accummulated and aggregated data provides input to the 
decision-making process at various levels:
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Towards autonomic sustainment
The USMC and the US Army have both embarked on programs intended to lift the 
‘fog of war’. The USMC vision for Sense and Respond Logistics is:
Marine Corps S&RL is an approach that yields adaptive, responsive, demand driven 
support for force capability sustainment. The prime metrics for S&RL are speed and 
effectiveness, relative to commander’s intent, which predicts, anticipates, and coordinates 
actions that provide an operational advantage spanning the full range of military 
operations across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. S&RL gives the 
Operational Commander an increased range of support options that are synchronized 
with the operational effects. The concept is built upon characterizing and anticipating 
support problems, early identification of potential constraints, and rapid response to 
changes in operational tasks and reprioritization. 18
The USMC Sense and Respond Logistics program commenced in July 2008 with 
the fitting of a sensor suite to LAV-25 platforms (see Figure 2). 19 The retrofit of 
the entire LAV fleet was projected to be completed by March 2009 (although the 
timeline has slipped slightly), with plans in place to extend the program to several 
other platforms in service with the USMC. 20
Figure 2. LAV embedded platform sensors.21
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Figure 2 illustrates the value of the information generated to the platform’s 
operator. This was also starkly apparent during the USMC deployment in Iraq 
when the planetary hub reduction gear case in some of the LAVs began to overheat, 
requiring a crew member to dismount and touch the unit to check whether it was 
running hot. 22 The addition of real-time, aggregated logistics data, plus enhanced 
operational situational awareness are natural consequences of the improved connec-
tivity created by Sense and Respond Logistics. Sense and Respond Logistics provide 
decision-makers in the chain of command a more accurate and timely gauge of 
platform condition and the status of critical classes of supply including fuel and 
ammunition, allowing more effective use of the assets at their disposal and the more 
efficient function of the logistics system overall.
In future it may be possible to utilise improved situational awareness, provided 
by a system similar to ‘Blue Force Tracking’ currently employed on operations by 
US forces, to focus logistics support on the elements best placed to receive or most 
in need of resupply. For example, combat teams that have been in contact and 
require replenishment could be differentiated from those that have experienced a 
relatively low tempo of operations. Some progress has been achieved in automati-
cally providing convoy commanders 
alternative routes to avoid enemy 
action or other disruptions to supply 
routes, thereby delivering supplies at a 
reduced risk. 23
Commencing with the LAV25 
project, the USMC is developing and 
extending Sense and Respond Logistics 
into a concept of autonomic sustain-
ment. 24 This offers the potential to 
provide end-to-end visability of the health of platforms, maintenance events, and 
the status of the supply chain. The US Department of Defense believes that the 
incorporation of Sense and Respond Logistics into the current logistics systems is 
possible, and indeed, desirable:
Contrary to popular belief, S&RL can be implemented without replacing most of today’s 
major critical systems. That is, S&RL can be an enhancement to current DoD systems 
since, by design, it adds only a thin layer of functionality over the existing systems. 25
Many of the required component information systems required to provide visibility 
of the supply chain are already included within the scope of Project JP2077. Through 
an extension of MILIS to interface with Sense and Respond Logistics, the ADF has 
the opportunity to achieve a broader span of the logistics continuum from ‘foxhole to 
factory to foxhole’ and fulfill the logistics goals identified in the NCW plan.
In future it may be possible to 
utilise improved situational 
awareness, provided by a system 
similar to ‘Blue Force Tracking’…
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Conclusion
Logistics considerations will become increasingly important as the Army capability 
development continuum progresses. The ambitious acquisition plans projected for 
the ADF, combined with the related necessity to deliver significant cost savings in 
the defence budget through improved efficiency, highlight the need for a logistics 
system that also provides effective, adaptable and flexible combat service support. In 
its projected form, MILIS will not integrate real-time platform level or aggregated 
information derived from a Sense and Respond Logistics system. USMC experi-
ence with the LAV25 has illustrated clearly the benefits of an Autonomic Logistics 
system in providing accurate and reliable logistics information to commanders at 
the tactical and operational levels.
In order to provide a full spectrum of ‘foxhole to factory to foxhole’ logistics for 
the Army and the ADF, MILIS must extend its reach beyond logistics centres to 
connect at the platform level in real time. Modern logistics systems such as Sense 
and Respond Logistics and Autonomic Logistics are now proven concepts in the 
civilian and military environments. The Army has an opportunity to trial, and 
possibly implement, Autonomic Logistics by applying Sense and Respond Logistics 
technology to platforms shared with the USMC, such as the ASLAV, and link this 
to MILIS to create an integrated Autonomic Logistics information system that will 
realise the logistics goals identified in the NCW Roadmap.
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It’s Decision that Still Matters Most
Albert Palazzo and Antony Trentini
Abstract
The complexity of modern warfare makes decision difficult to achieve. Conventional wisdom 
holds that, when fighting insurgents and other asymmetric actors, wars will be long and 
costly struggles that simply pit political wills against each other in a Clausewitzian kind 
of ‘grey clash of … moral masses’. In this article, the authors reject this fatalist view and 
posit that, with the right skill sets, Western commanders may possibly be able to restore 
their ability to achieve decision on the modern battlefield. While the authors admit their 
article does not pose a complete solution to this problem, they maintain that addressing 
this problem is critical, and offer this article as grounds for beginning such debate in the 
Army. To neglect the Army’s inability to achieve decision in ‘wars amongst the people’ is to 
consign Western military forces to the irrelevance that General Rupert Smith feared would 
overtake them.
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Introduction
The most notable feature of contemporary war is stalemate. Despite possessing the greatest technological advantage in the history of warfare, Western armies are unable to achieve decision over warriors little changed 
from those Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) faced in the conquest 
of India. His victories at Srirangapatna and Assaye could not be more different from 
the indecision that characterises Iraq and Afghanistan. Why has Western military 
power now become so ineffective?
The Duke’s greatness derived from his understanding of the character of war 
specific to his age. The stalemates of today stem in large part from the failure of 
Western commanders ‘to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking’. 1 
If the West is to have the means to achieve decision in its wars again, it is essential 
that its commanders be able to understand the true character of each conflict 
correctly. This article outlines one such mechanism designed to afford commanders 
this understanding: the Complex Warfare Branch.
This organisation is designed to help commanders understand and influence 
the human and informational dimensions of the battlespace—areas neglected by 
Western military forces that prefer to focus on the tactical and technological dimen-
sions of war. While the West’s technology and training provides it with the means 
for tactical decision, this is also largely irrelevant in the wars the West faces today. 
It is its enemies who have found the means for true strategic decision—a superior 
understanding of the nature of modern conflict. How else ‘could a mass murderer 
who publicly praised the terrorists of September 11 be winning the hearts and 
minds of anyone? How could a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading 
communications society?’ 2 It is because he understands the character of his war far 
better than the West has been able—or inclined—to.
The Primacy Of Decision
The most important task facing a commander—at any rank—is the need to marshal 
and employ assets in a manner that makes a favourable decision possible. This is the 
fundamental responsibility of command, and all resources must be directed towards 
its attainment. To strive for less is a dereliction of duty.
Decision in the context of a military operation has a particular meaning. A 
government employs military force to achieve certain political objectives which, 
to paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, could not be achieved by other means. 3 While 
Clausewitz wrote in the nineteenth century, his words resonate throughout the 
history of the Western tradition of war. The essence of the utility of military force is 
its role as an instrument of national power. 4
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The particular nature or scope of a nation’s political objectives in deciding to 
employ military force is not important in the context of this article. It is merely 
sufficient to note that a political goal must exist; otherwise there is no legitimate 
rationale for a government’s resort to military force. What is essential for 
commanders, however, is that they align their 
actions in ways that either achieves a decision 
that obtains the government’s objectives imme-
diately or, through a series of intermediate 
steps, lays the foundation for obtaining decision 
in the future.
It must be stressed that decision should not 
be confused with victory. This article deliberately 
uses decision to highlight the difference between 
defeating the enemy and achieving the political 
goals which initially led a government to resort to military force in the first place. 
In an oft repeated anecdote, Colonel Harry G Summers recounts a 1975 conversa-
tion he had with a North Vietnamese colonel. In referring to the recently lost war, 
Summers quipped to his victorious opposite, ‘you know you never defeated us on 
the battlefield’. The North Vietnamese officer rejoined, ‘that may be so … but it is 
also irrelevant’. 5 This exchange highlights the subtle nature of decision. Winning 
battles is certainly better than losing them, but it is a fallacy that victory in the field
 guarantees winning a war—that is to say, obtaining decision. 6 If there is a lesson 
in Summers’ anecdote, it is that the primacy 
of a commander’s focus should be on the 
political objective, not the subservient task 
of winning battles.
Antulio J Echevarria II has also 
considered this point in the context of an 
American way of war. He believes that the 
West in general has evolved principles for 
‘military victory’ rather than what he calls 
‘policy success’. 7 Employing the words of 
General Anthony Zinni, Echevarria sums this up as a preference for ‘killing and 
breaking’ that wins battles but not wars. 8 The consequences of failing to understand 
the distinction between battlefield victory and political decision can be seen in the 
aftermath of the fall of Baghdad in 2003. The premature declaration of ‘mission 
accomplished’ by the US president underscored the focus of the United States on 
battle success rather than the achievement of policy goals, and highlighted the 
ease with which political and military leaders at even the highest levels confuse 
the two.
The essence of the utility 
of military force is its 
role as an instrument of 
national power.
… the West in general 
has evolved principles for 
‘military victory’ rather than 
what he calls ‘policy success’.
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Perceiving Present War
The overwhelming strength and technological edge that the US military 
demonstrated during the 1991 war with Iraq, the overthrowing of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in 2001, and the opening phase of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 promised 
to usher in a new era of decision in war. Yet despite an enormous investment in 
transformative technologies and battle effects this has not proven to be the case. The 
US military has found its seemingly invincible advantages frustrated by opponents 
who have shifted the battlespace into arenas in which the superpower’s dominance 
in firepower, sensor technology and systems integration are of little benefit, if not 
irrelevant. As a result the United States finds itself ensnared in two counterinsur-
gency wars—for which its forces were unprepared—and fighting enemies who have 
eschewed conventional operations for other means. Now it is only an extremely 
foolish, or perhaps suicidal, opponent who would challenge the American military 
on its preferred ground.
The failure of the seeming military advantage of US might to achieve decisive 
and rapid success has pushed the examination of the future character of war to the 
forefront of Western military thinking. The claims for transformative advantage 
and techno-centric clarity that emerged from the post-Cold War US Department 
of Defense still have their adherents, but in the face of battlefield reality in places 
such as Kosovo, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan, other voices have begun to argue 
that war remains in the realm of uncertainty. 9 In recent years military observers, 
analysts and professionals have invested considerable energy in trying to identify 
war’s changing character and to predict its future course. The terms listed in this 
article’s title are by no means comprehensive; others, such as ‘three-block war’, 
‘insurgency and counterinsurgency,’ and ‘asymmetric warfare’ could have been 
offered just as easily. A countervailing school of thought has also joined the fray, 
arguing that the attempt to identify the nature of future war is little more than 
faddism or even worse a misrepresentation of history, and that war in its essential 
nature remains unchanged. 10
While a theoretical debate on the nature of future war does have value, it is also 
a distraction from the reality of contemporary conflict—the difficulty Western 
military organisations have had in achieving decision in their recent and current 
operations. 11 While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan do not conjure up the stere-
otypical image of stalemate—the immobility and slaughter of the Western Front 
during the First World War—the conflicts do have something in common. The 
combatants of the Great War struggled to unlock the stalemate of the trenches in 
order to restore decision to war, an act that took three years of bloody experimenta-
tion. While casualties have never approached the levels of those of the Western 
Front, the members of the US-led Coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan are also 
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mired in a stalemate. Such a situation also applies to the ADF’s recent opera-
tions in its own region. The Australian Army has now been in Timor-Leste for 
a decade and the Solomon Islands for over six years, with no end in sight for 
either deployment.
One of the conundrums to emerge in recent operations by Western military 
organisations is that while their forces have the ability to project impressive power 
anywhere on the globe and then to manoeuvre and sustain their forces in-theatre at 
will, they lack the means to impose a decision that achieves their nation’s political 
goals. Instead, the Western states now appear resigned to long inconclusive interven-
tions that gradually test the resolve of their own civilian populations. In a way 
similar to that of their First World War predecessors, the leaders of contemporary 
Western military organisations find themselves without the means to force their 
enemies to their will. To borrow Rupert Smith’s prognosis, military forces are in 
danger of finding themselves without utility for 
their governments. 12 The issue for the West in 
general, and Australia in particular, is that wars 
without decision can only result in, at best, 
conflict without end, and at worst, defeat.
This article addresses an aspect of the 
inability of overwhelming military force to 
secure decision in contemporary warfare. It will 
not advocate a new concept of war, nor will it 
advance a new label. Rather, it takes a pragmatic 
approach. In doing so it will outline a new capa-
bility for the Australian Army called the Complex Warfare Branch (CWB) that 
promises to provide commanders with the additional tools they need to impose 
a decision upon the enemy. In an era when commentators and military profes-
sionals concede the unavoidability of lengthy operations this article maintains that 
finding the means to shorten conflict, and in doing so restore decision, may be of 
more utility. 13
The CWB is not a field unit, although its members will deploy. Rather it is a 
brain, whose mission is to lift the veil of complexity that obscures the character 
of contemporary conflict in order to provide commanders with the information 
they need to influence the battlespace in ways that will achieve the Australian 
Government’s objective. In brief, the organisation’s task is to understand a conflict’s 
environment. Moreover, the CWB capability has utility across the spectrum of 
military intervention from disaster relief to state-on-state war and is applicable to 
all conflicts no matter their character. It is, therefore, immune to the tendency of 
attempting to predict the future of war and thus avoids the grave risk of getting the 
future wrong.
The combatants of the 
Great War struggled to 
unlock the stalemate of 
the trenches in order to 
restore decision to war …
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Explaining The Human Condition
War has always been among the most complex of human endeavours. Speaking on 
the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War, General Sir Archibald Wavell made 
this case in his renowned series of lectures ‘Generals and Generalship’. Highlighting 
the complexity of war in his era he wrote that a commander:
to-day has now to learn to handle air forces, armoured mechanical vehicles, anti-aircraft 
artillery; he has to consider the use of gas and smoke, offensively and defensively; to 
know enough of wireless to make proper use of it for communication; to understand 
something of the art of camouflage, of the business of propaganda; to keep himself up 
to date in the developments of military engineering; all of this in addition to the more 
normal requirements of his trade. 14
What Wavell acknowledged was that as war’s character changed, uncertainty and 
complexity became more apparent until a new—if temporary—understanding 
emerged. At a point of rapid or deep change, such as during the interwar period, the 
challenge to interpret the new character 
of war and to find the means to achieve 
decision would be even greater. 15
Yet the assertions by contemporary 
commentators on the high degree of 
current complexity are not without 
merit. It is the nature of war to evolve, as 
combatants seek more effective methods 
with which to secure their goals. For 
much of the First World War, for 
example, the combatants struggled to find a solution to the great crisis of decision 
of their age: the need to cross a wide fire-swept zone of annihilation with sufficient 
surviving mass to close with and rout the enemy and thereby bring an end to an 
opponent’s ability to resist the imposition of their will. Military commanders and 
theorists recognised the problem as early as the introduction of the breach-loading 
rifle, but it took decades to find the means to negate the killing zone and restore 
decision. The solution was eventually found in the rediscovery of combined arms 
warfare and the integration of numerous new technologies into the art of war. The 
result was the restoration of mobility in 1918 and the march to victory of the British, 
French and US armies in the war’s final months. German interwar developments in 
mechanisation and armour theory built upon the lessons of 1918, resulting in the 
formidable campaign style that became known as the ‘blitzkrieg’. 16
Today’s war practitioners face another great crisis that hinders their ability to 
obtain decision: the need to find and defeat or neutralise opponents who operate 
What Wavell acknowledged was 
that as war’s character changed, 
uncertainty and complexity 
became more apparent …
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beneath the detection threshold of their own forces, often in cities and amongst the 
local population. This is not a novel situation and there are numerous historical 
examples of combatants facing similar problems in the past. What makes today’s 
problem different, however, and which accounts for the perception of particularly 
opaque complexity, is the gap that presently exists between the West’s understanding 
of the current character of war and that of their opponents. The befuddlement of 
French and British forces in the face of the German mechanised onslaught during 
May 1940 demonstrates that the problems facing contemporary commanders are 
not the first time that military organisations have failed to perceive a change in the 
character of war in time. To the commanders of the present, what makes the task of 
dealing with today’s great crisis appear even more complex than the tasks confronting 
previous generations, is the failure of Western technology to deliver on the promise 
of battlespace transparency. One of the goals of the West’s investment in transforma-
tion technologies was the lifting of the fog of war. While advancements in detection 
have made the sea and air environments more visible, the same cannot be said of 
the land. The inability of sensors to identify an entire Iraqi armoured brigade in 2003 
and the failure of an armada of surveillance devices to locate Taliban and al-Qaeda 
positions during Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan in 2002 are but two 
compelling examples of the enduring nature of the fog of land warfare. This is 
because conflict on the land remains dominated by political, social and cultural 
factors and these are inextricably 
bound-up with geography. The result is 
not the expected clarity of the battlespace 
but what H R McMaster has termed 
‘profound uncertainty’. 17
The way forward in the face of 
this ‘complexity’ is for the Australian 
Army—and the West in general—to 
provide commanders with the tools 
needed to be able to secure decision again. 
The West must adapt to the changing character of war. In the past, the tendency 
in the West has been to seek advantage over an opponent through enhanced tech-
nology. The West must recognise the limitations of this response as it has in the wars 
of the present proven ineffective. It is a fair question to ask just how much more of a 
technological edge does the West require if it is to secure decision against opponents 
who are already manifestly its technological inferiors?
That technology has failed to provide the solution is testament to another aspect 
of war’s enduring nature. War is not a contest between competing technologies. 
Instead, it is a human activity, and technology is merely one of many different kinds 
of enablers, and will always remain so. The conduct of war is guided by human 
One of the goals of the West’s 
investment in transformation 
technologies was the lifting of 
the fog of war.
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traits, desires, beliefs and emotions, and their interaction and competition with 
the values and goals held by an opponent. The nineteenth century French military 
theorist, Ardant du Picq, encapsulated this in his observation that ‘man is the first 
weapon of battle’. His recommendation was to ‘study the soldier in battle, for it is he 
who brings reality to it’. 18 More recently, Brian Holden Reid has written, ‘warfare 
is essentially about human beings, men and women, and not about weapons’. 19 In 
support of these conclusions are two retired US generals who wrote that war is and 
will remain a ‘contest of human wills, not machines’. 20
Further underscoring the importance of the human element in war is that success 
in a military operation generally does not occur until an opponent is persuaded that 
it has lost. Most conflicts do not end with the complete annihilation of the enemy’s 
military forces and civilian population. It is much more common for wars to conclude 
when one side elects to give up, to submit. 21 The Australian Army’s most recent 
version of its operating concept recognises this tendency. Adaptive Campaigning 
describes war as being fundamentally about achieving ‘influence [over] the alle-
giances and behaviours of individuals, groups and societies’. 22 Adaptive Campaigning 
is in alignment with Clausewitz’s thinking on the importance of influence. He wrote 
that ‘war is thus an act of force to compel 
our enemy to do our will’. 23 After the 
passage of nearly two centuries his obser-
vation remains true wherever there is a 
resort to the use of military force.
Moreover, it is often the case that 
what a commander needs to know 
about an opponent is often outside the 
competency of technology to reach. For 
example, an enemy’s level of skill, motiva-
tion and morale are attributes that are not easily measured by a machine. 24 They 
require human assessment. This is because technology cannot, to use the words of 
Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, ‘abolish war’s central essence as the realm 
of uncertainty and of the clash of wills’. 25
Thus if war is considered to be what David J Lonsdale has termed an activity ‘best 
thought of in terms of human interaction’ or what Martin van Creveld has called 
‘an affair of the heart’, it becomes compelling for the Australian Army to possess 
the capability to analyse, decipher and interpret the human condition, and in doing 
so recommend courses of action that will adversely affect the enemy. 26 This will be 
precisely the function of the CWB.
The purpose of the CWB should not be confused with another iteration of 
information warfare. It will not seek to achieve ‘information dominance’ or some 
other fantasy. The battlespace is already awash with too much data. What is needed 
Most conflicts do not end with 
the complete annihilation of 
the enemy’s military forces and 
civilian population.
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is knowledge and understanding. The background, education and training of the 
members of the CWB will enable them to provide their commander with sound 
knowledge, based on understanding and reason—an elusive and much prized 
commodity on the battlefields of any age. The generation of this knowledge is not the 
end-point of the exercise. Rather, commanders would use the knowledge provided 
by the CWB to assemble a ‘sequence of actions that seems likely to change the minds 
of a hostile population’. 27 In this way the CWB would contribute to the commander’s 
ability to maintain his/her focus on the political aim.
A secondary benefit of the CWB is that it will help save the Australian Army from 
a common pitfall that has trapped many military organisations across time: namely, 
the failure to get the future right. The past is replete with societies that have paid the 
price of having prepared for the wrong war. The performance of the French Army in 
1940 and the US military in 2003 are just two recent examples of organisations that 
faced conflicts that differed so greatly from the ones they had anticipated that their 
defeat was the most likely outcome. Had the US Department of Defense’s transforma-
tion program continued to the desired end point, the US arsenal would have been 
without peer. That these capabilities would 
have proven irrelevant to the conflicts the 
United States had to face would have been 
another matter. 28
It is useful for military thinkers to ponder 
the future of war, as they should also study 
its past. What must be avoided, however, is 
the assumption that a military organisation 
can predict the future character of war with 
any degree of certainty. Anticipation with a 
flexibility of mind allows for adjustment, whereas the more precise, detailed and rigid 
a prediction, the higher the risk of getting it wrong. 29 The ideal in planning for future 
war is to aspire to the condition outlined in Michael Howard’s seminal essay, ‘Military 
Science in an Age of Peace’. In discussing doctrine he concluded that it did not matter 
if a military organisation has got it wrong at the commencement of a conflict, for it is 
almost certain that expectations of a given war will be wrong. Instead, what is crucially 
important is to have the capacity to ‘get it right quickly when the moment arrives’. 30
The CWB will thus play a part in providing the Australian Army with the ability 
to adapt rapidly to emerging requirements. Once conflict occurs, its evolution tends 
to accelerate, and weapons or techniques that were once dominant quickly become 
obsolete. What worked for the Germans against the French in 1940 was no longer 
effective against the Russians a few years later. Amongst the CWB’s capabilities 
will be the ability to interpret the unique characteristics of each conflict in which 
the Army is involved. It will provide the context in which others may analyse the 
… what is crucially important 
is to have the capacity to ‘get 
it right quickly when the 
moment arrives’.
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changing character of a conflict. To paraphrase Clausewitz again, the CWB will 
undertake this task through the perspective of the spirit of the age. 31 In this way the 
CWB will contribute towards the force’s goal of creating an Adaptive Army.
The Role Of The Complex Warfare Branch
The CWB’s role in an operation is to provide the land force commander with the 
specialist expertise necessary to navigate the complexities of contemporary opera-
tions. The recently released Adaptive Campaigning suggests that the Australian Army 
has recognised that the character of war has moved on from a dependence on battle-
field victory. It defines the objective of 
the use of military force in terms of 
gaining influence over individuals, 
groups and societies in a way that can 
‘shape the overall environment to facili-
tate peaceful discourse and stabilise the 
situation’. This is to be achieved, 
Adaptive Campaigning continues, in 
accordance with ‘conditions conducive 
to Australia’s national interests’. 32 This 
mandate holds true regardless of whatever label one chooses to place on a conflict, 
be that ‘conventional’, ‘asymmetric’ or ‘hybrid’. Put simply, the commander should be 
influencing the target individual, group or society to do what Australia wants it to 
do, whether this influence is obtained by helping or by killing. It is left to the words 
of a US ‘strategic corporal’ to summarise this argument:
every war is a war of persuasion … [but] persuasion always is culturally sensitive. You cannot 
persuade someone if you do not understand his language, motivations, fears, and desires. 33
Understanding how best to achieve the necessary influence over individuals, groups 
and societies—or even which individuals or groups to influence—is a difficult task 
for any commander, however. Without this understanding, action may prove useless 
at best or counter-productive at worst. After the fall of Baghdad in 2003, for example, 
Coalition errors in interpreting the environment resulted in transforming an episode 
of lawlessness into the insurgency that continues to traumatise Iraq. Identifying who 
to influence, and how, is obviously one of the most important considerations for the 
commander. Making this identification is what the CWB will help achieve.
The CWB is best described as a pool of expertise that the commander can draw 
on to:
•	 help	him/her	make	sense	of	those	individuals,	groups	and	societies	(IGS)	that	
Australia is trying to influence (hereafter referred to as ‘target IGS’);
… the commander should be 
influencing the target individual, 
group or society to do what 
Australia wants it to do …
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•	 subsequently	identify	the	different	methods	and	means	for	manipulation	that	
those target IGS are most susceptible to; and
•	 identify	and	acquire	the	expertise	necessary	to	properly	guide	the	actions	of	
the forces that have been directed to achieve the commander’s plan to influence 
target IGS.
These are the CWB’s three primary missions, hereafter referred to respectively 
as ‘surveying the environment’, ‘identifying controls’ and ‘characterising controls’. 
To illustrate these missions and their purpose, consider the following analogy. 
Imagine that a commander is a stationmaster who has been given the mission of 
‘ensuring that the trains run on time’. To do this, the stationmaster must ensure that 
each train is on the right track at the right time and leaves the station according to 
the schedule. However, in the complex contemporary operating environment, it is 
as if the stationmaster has been put in a switching 
box where there is no light, the levers are all 
labelled in a foreign language, and the stationmas-
ter’s staff have no training in driving a train.
The CWB’s first mission—surveying the 
environment—is like giving the stationmaster 
a light in the switching box. The stationmaster 
can now see the railway plan but understands 
nothing of the switching levers. The CWB’s second 
mission—identifying controls—is akin to putting 
English-language labels on all of the levers. The stationmaster can now see the track 
plan and the levers, and understands what levers to pull to get the trains to where 
they are needed. However, while the commander is now fully cognitively equipped 
to achieve the mission, he or she is still without the people necessary to give action 
to the plan. Putting untrained staff in charge of driving trains now would quickly 
lead to disaster, even if the stationmaster knew what each of them were supposed 
to do. The CWB’s third and final mission—characterising controls—is somewhat 
like hiring a trained engineer for the stationmaster who understands how to drive 
a train and who can direct the stationmaster’s staff in how to do it. With this final 
step, the commander both understands how to achieve the mission and possesses 
the necessary resources to do so.
The Composition Of The Complex Warfare Branch
The CWB will be composed of social scientists—sociologists, anthropologists, 
historians and representatives of other humanist disciplines—that will use their 
professional training to interpret and manipulate the human environment for the 
commander’s benefit. While trained as applied social scientists, these soldiers will 
While trained as 
applied social scientists, 
these soldiers will be 
warriors first …
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be warriors first, no different from members of any of the other specialist trades 
that already exist in the Army. In fact, it is probable that the best course of action 
for the Army is to provide tertiary education and training to its personnel who 
have a social science interest rather than attempting to recruit graduate students 
from universities.
Moreover, the expertise of members of the CWB need not be limited to a single 
discipline, nor should they be seen as just ‘sociologists’, ‘anthropologists’ or ‘histo-
rians’. Rather, the most germane and practical aspects of each of these various ‘stove 
piped’ disciplines should be grouped together into a program of studies known 
collectively as ‘applied social sciences’. This will enable officers so trained to ‘pick 
and choose’ the most appropriate elements of these disciplines while discarding or 
ignoring those that are irrelevant. This will, in turn, help to ensure that the CWB’s 
members are always focused on acquiring only ‘operationalised knowledge’, or 
knowledge that is relevant to solving the warfighter’s problems.
The descriptions of the desired disciplines that follow are not meant to be 
thorough or exhaustive summaries. Rather, they are rough (and admittedly 
imperfect) sketches of those features of each discipline necessary to explain their 
utility to the CWB mission.
Sociology
Sociology is defined by the Macquarie Dictionary as ‘the science or study of the 
origin, development, organisation, and functioning of human society’. 34 It is, loosely 
put, the study of human societies. Trained sociologists are critical to the ‘surveying 
the environment’ mission. Their work provides the commander with an analysis of 
the how and why of influencing the target IGS. 
Accordingly, sociological expertise is probably 
the single most important skill set for the CWB 
as it is the primary discipline for achieving a full 
characterisation of target IGS.
Sociology, however, is far from a unified 
field of study, with its practitioners adhering 
to many different—and often contradictory—
methodologies and theories. In the face of this 
variety a fundamentally empirical approach 
underpins most of the discipline’s work. While a majority of sociologists would 
probably reject a strict, scientific definition of empiricism, they do generally accept 
that sociological research reveals causal relationships in societies that concordant 
policy can subsequently influence with reasonable predictability. This is the sense 
in which this article uses the term ‘empiricism’. Such empirical approaches to 
sociology, used in developing theoretical perspectives of a practical and applicable 
Empiricism is primarily 
concerned with isolating 
causal relationships 
in societies …
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nature, would provide the CWB with its primary means of environmental 
controls characterisation.
A broadly empirical methodology is also of utility to the CWB. Empiricism is 
primarily concerned with isolating causal relationships in societies by manipulating 
an independent variable (for example, a curfew in a troubled neighbourhood) to 
observe the way in which a dependent variable (the attitudes of the neighbourhood 
residents to the group imposing that curfew) reacts. This type of research would 
be particularly valuable in achieving the CWB’s ‘identifying controls’ mission, as 
it would help the commander to determine which measures would produce what 
effects, prior to employing them operationally.
Anthropology
Anthropology is defined as ‘the science that deals with the origin, development 
(physical, intellectual, cultural, moral, etc) and varieties of humanity’. 35 Anthropology 
is commonly divided into four subsets: biological or physical anthropology; social 
or cultural anthropology, archaeology and linguistic anthropology. For the purposes 
of the CWB, the two subsets of most utility are social or cultural anthropology and 
linguistic anthropology.
Social anthropology’s strength is its ability to provide the CWB commander with 
a comparative study of cultures. While sociology would identify the broad outline of 
a target group or society to illustrate how it works, anthropology would contribute 
to the CWB’s mission by characterising a target group or society in the context 
of how it differs from the Australian force’s ‘own’ societal and cultural contexts. 
Identifying these differences would allow other members of the CWB to isolate and 
counter limiting biases in their own work, helping to improve the objectivity, and 
hence utility, of the CWB’s advice to the commander.
That said, given the differences in perspective and methodology between 
anthropologists and sociologists, any examination of causal relationships in society 
conducted by an anthropologist would serve as a useful complement to that 
conducted by a sociologist.
Similarly, linguistic anthropology provides an excellent complement to any 
sociological ‘identifying controls’ work. It is essentially the study of how target 
IGS understand and express their own identities and relationships through their 
language, and how they use it. This provides the commander with a very powerful 
tool for gaining a more complete understanding of what they are being told by target 
IGS. There is, after all, often much more information to be gleaned from an instance 
of speech than simply what has been said.
Again, as with the vigorous debate within different branches of sociology, anthro-
pologists are divided on the practical application of anthropology. Some argue that it 
is doomed to failure, as seen in the controversial US ‘human terrain project’. 36 At the 
page 84 • Volume VII, Number 1 • Australian Army Journal
 Concepts • Albert Palazzo and Antony Trentini
risk of oversimplifying a very complex debate, these sceptics argue that anthropolo-
gists can never escape their own cultural context sufficiently to produce reliably 
objective observations and conclusions about another culture. Without objective 
data, it follows that any conclusions drawn will be equally devoid of objectivity and 
therefore no conclusions with useful predictive capability can be derived.
While this is obviously of concern, one must remember that commanders must 
expect to operate in an environment of extreme uncertainty—they should, after all, be 
the masters of Clausewitz’s friction and chance. It is true that no Australian commander 
can be certain that the CWB’s advice is 100 per cent objective and an accurate repre-
sentation of the battlespace, but the same can be said of any advice or information the 
commander receives from any source. This is 
why one of the most important responsibilities 
of command is to make sense of incomplete or 
even contradictory information.
The absence of ‘total’ information is not an 
excuse for inaction by commanders, because, 
though their information may be imperfect, 
it may still be better than that of the enemy. 
Practical experience with ‘applied anthro-
pology’ in Iraq and Afghanistan bears out 
this point, showing that despite the questions 
surrounding the objectivity of anthropology, it still has an extremely valuable role to 
play. For example, one US brigade commander stated that his unit fought 60 per cent 
fewer actions when social scientists arrived, allowing his force to focus on delivering 
improvements to local services and training their Afghan counterparts—the very 
work his superiors believed would lead to decision. 37 Such insights are not isolated to 
US forces, further proving the utility of the discipline in military operations. 38
History
A qualified historian provides commanders with the ability to examine the past in 
a way that informs their actions in the present and their plans for the future. While 
military officers can and should read military history, only a soldier who has studied 
history in its breadth, depth and context will be able to serve in the CWB. 39
Historians would provide the other staff of the CWB with a factual foundation—
and historical context—on which to base their own work. Equally as important, 
historians can identify the advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action 
taken by those in the past who have dealt with problems similar to those facing 
Australian forces today.
Similarly to social and linguistic anthropologists, historians would not usually 
contribute directly to any of the CWB’s three missions. Instead, they would provide 
… one of the most 
important responsibilities 
of command is to make 
sense of incomplete or even 
contradictory information.
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invaluable enabling products for sociologists who conduct the ‘surveying the envi-
ronment’ and ‘identifying controls’ missions. Without the historical context and 
factual basis provided by the historian, the sociologist simply could not produce 
plausible work.
That said, the analytical skills of historians should not be dismissed lightly. Their 
assessment of how modern society has assumed the form and function that it has 
today would be of considerable utility as a 
complement to any work done by sociologists 
towards surveying the environment or iden-
tifying controls.
Just as the CWB’s sociologists and anthro-
pologists must maintain an applied focus to 
their work, so too must the CWB’s historians. 
They must examine published works and 
primary sources with an eye to how their 
knowledge may assist a commander in influ-
encing target IGS. While historians must be 
cognisant of their discipline’s limitations, and the many historiographic debates 
underway within it, they must not be concerned primarily with these. Instead, they 
must provide a timely and focused work that covers practical considerations and 
little else.
Strategic Communications
As Adaptive Campaigning points out, and this article argues, influencing target 
IGS is now the primary task of the Army and the ADF—be that influence achieved 
with military force or some other, ‘softer’ national instrument. While military force, 
the provision of aid, economic sanctions and all the other tools of influence are 
divergent in nature, they share one key similarity in execution—their meaning must 
be properly communicated to the target IGS.
Communicating with target IGS in times of war is extremely difficult. The US 
effort to communicate its message to the Afghan people is just one example of the 
challenge Western powers face in this area. While there has been some success, 
former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s outrage at Osama bin 
Laden out communicating the United States illustrates the difficulties inherent to 
this task. 40
When compared to the United States’ failure as a communicator, the odds of 
Australia doing better must appear slight. That need not be the case, however. Melik 
Kaylan argues that the United States’ lack of success stems from its early fumbling 
of the issue, and that it is this failure that has led to the seemingly irreparable 
situation of today. Kaylan believes that it is possible to influence target IGS under 
Without the historical 
context and factual basis 
provided by the historian, 
the sociologist simply could 
not produce plausible work.
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wartime conditions and points out that the United States has succeeded in the past. 
As an example he highlights the Radio Free Europe program and its effectiveness in 
informing the world that the United States and NATO stood for freedom and liberty 
while the Soviet Union stood for oppression—a message that played a not-insignif-
icant role in the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. It is apparent 
then that, when directed by knowledgeable experts, success in strategic communica-
tions is possible. 41 Experts in communication 
are therefore necessary to help communicate 
with target IGS so that the means of influence 
identified by the CWB are used in such a way 
that they achieve their maximum effect. 
Scholars of media and communications 
have the skills and understanding to do just 
this. Media and communication as a distinct 
discipline covers many of the mechanisms 
with which to communicate effectively with 
target IGS: journalism in all its forms, international communications policy and 
public relations. 42 This expertise would allow the commander to translate the 
advice of the CWB into tactics, techniques and procedures that his forces can 
use when ‘outside the wire’ to communicate influence effectively and efficiently to 
target IGS.
Adaptive Campaigning recognises the importance of such specialist support to 
land forces, stating that
All members of the Land Force … must be … regularly briefed on information objectives 
for media coverage … so that—in thousands of daily interactions—their actions support 
the mission by avoiding dissonant actions and seizing fleeting chances to advance 
informational objectives. 43
The media and communications experts within the CWB will provide the foun-
dation of expert advice that enables this to occur.
Other Disciplines
Space limitations here prevent the inclusion of even a brief description of the 
other capabilities that the CWB requires. Therefore, a list will have to suffice. 
However, it should be noted that in all cases the holders of these skill sets must 
perceive themselves as warriors, and their intellectual focus must be on applied 
rather than theoretical outcomes. A list of other capabilities required by the CWB 
would include, but is not limited to, the following:
•	 Public	policy	advisers
•	 Economists
Experts in communication 
are therefore necessary to 
help communicate with 
target IGS …
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•	 Non-clinical	psychologists
•	 Public	policing	specialists
•	 Civil	engineers
•	 Judicial	and	governance	advisers
•	 Contract	and	project	managers
Level Of War
This article considers the mission of the CWB from the perspective of the tactical 
and operational levels of war. Limiting itself to this viewpoint was a result of 
practical considerations alone—the space requirements of this forum and the 
constituency of its primary audience. In its first stage, the CWB would be an Army 
asset, possibly a part of 6 Brigade. For the long term, however, this would be insuf-
ficient because, as Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan have observed, ‘war needs to be 
managed as a whole’. 44
The problems that the members of the CWB will help advise the commander 
about also exist at the strategic level of war. Arguably this would be their most 
important level. Recent operations, particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
provide compelling evidence of the effect of strategic miscues on the evolution of 
those conflicts. One of the best examples of this would be L Paul Bremer’s purge of 
Baathists from the Iraqi Government and his dissolution of the Iraqi Army. Both 
decisions rebounded against US strategic goals and contributed greatly to the growth 
of the Iraqi insurgency.
The CWB’s capabilities have a role to play at all levels of conflict, and it is at the 
strategic level that it may have the greatest effect. It is hoped, therefore, that the 
CWB concept will also be taken up at the ADF’s joint level, where its members will 
interpret the strategic environment for the benefit of planners, commanders and 
government officials.
Conclusion
As Brian Holden Reid has written, command is ‘fundamentally about choices’. It is 
fiendishly difficult for a commander to make the right decision at the right time. 
The CWB will not make that responsibility any lighter, but what it will do is provide 
the commander with a better understanding of the environment in which to make 
these decisions. 45
If a military organisation cannot achieve decision then it has no utility to its 
government. 46 The experience of recent operations suggests that the enablers 
the Australian Army currently possesses are inadequate for the tasks it faces. 
Stalemate—conflict without end—in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan and 
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Timor-Leste are either failures or, at best, likely failures. This is not an acceptable 
outcome to a government’s decision to employ military force. The Army must adapt 
to the evolving challenges it faces, otherwise not only does the future promise defeat, 
it also promises irrelevance.
If Western military organisations are to have once again the means to achieve 
decision they must be able to impose their will on their enemies. In the First World 
War the solution to that period’s great crisis lay in a rediscovery of the combat 
multiplier effect of combined arms warfare with the introduction new weapon 
systems. The source of the complexity of contemporary operations lies in the enemy’s 
ability to hide below the detection threshold, often in urban environments and 
amongst the people. This is the great crisis for today’s practitioners of the art of war. 
Technology will no doubt play a part in its solution; 
it is after all one of the West’s great advantages, but 
such is the fundamental nature of war that tech-
nology can never be the whole solution. If war is 
to be waged amongst the people then Australia 
and the West need the means to achieve a better 
understanding of the people and the environment 
in which their opponents live. This is a humanist-
centric requirement for which the CWB will be 
well placed to meet.
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Adaptive Campaigning
Is it Adaptive Enough?
Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas
Abstract
The recently endorsed and released Adaptive Campaigning had been cited as ‘fundamental 
to achieving the Adaptive Army’. The late Colonel John Boyd, USAF, famed for his work on 
the ‘OODA loop’ also conducted a considerable amount of research on adaptation in times 
of conflict and peace. This article reviews the lessons that Army could learn from his work. 
The article also argues that some elements of his work have been corrupted in Adaptive 
Campaigning, in particular the new ‘Adaption Cycle’ seen as central to the concept. Work 
by Boyd and other theorists on adaptation is then discussed in the context of Adaptive 
Campaigning. The article concludes by highlighting some real tensions in the theory of 
adaptation and the current state of the Army and the Australian Defence Organisation.
Just as the old German manuals had stamped on the examples provided 
‘not a formula’ so Boyd’s ideas cannot be applied in cookie cutter 
fashion… As it is reduction of Boyd’s thinking to ‘Boyd’s simple version 
of the OODA loop’ is already unfortunately well advanced.
– Lexington Green 1
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Introduction
There is a call in military circles, owing to the increasing complexity of conflict, to be continuously adaptive. The shift to what Rupert Smith has classified as ’war among the people’ 2 has driven Western armies to be more 
culturally aware and demanded increased flexibility and breadth in combat leaders. 
Kinetic effects (killing people and smashing things) alone are no longer the raison 
d’etre for the modern counterinsurgent army.
‘Adaptive’ as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary is ‘to make suitable 
for a new use’, or ‘become adjusted to new conditions’. Both definitions for any 
large organisation such as the Army pose challenges beyond simply recognising 
the new. In business, companies that fail to adapt to new market forces will see 
immediate effect on the balance sheet and in the long term will imperil their 
very existence. Defence forces seldom have a chance to benchmark prior to the 
call to task, and rarely will the red ink be seen prior to failure. This makes both 
the importance and difficulty of adapting high. Some have acknowledged that 
military organisations can be extremely adaptive. 3 This has not been consistently 
the case and in some cases, the need to adapt is forced upon us in the cradle of 
conflict itself. 4
In dealing with this new environment, the Australian Army has recently formal-
ised its Future Land Operating Concept – Adaptive Campaigning. 5 It has had a long 
and extensive gestation. With over twenty-two versions raised over the last two 
years, it has seen many revisions. During these revisions, the core tenets have not 
changed. Mission command, five fixed lines of 
operation, the dominant narrative and the 
‘Adaption Cycle’ have remained continuous 
themes throughout. Not one major concept 
appears to have received any significant modifi-
cation over two years of development.
The Chief of Army has placed Adaptive 
Campaigning ‘as fundamental to achieving the 
Adaptive Army’. 6 This is a weighty responsibility 
for a paper that only has fifty-four pages directly 
dealing with the concept. Over one third of these pages articulate the environ-
ment previously defined in the excellent Complex Warfighting concept. 7 Adaptive 
Campaigning is an important document, yet little real debate has appeared on 
the concept.
The purpose of this article is to look at Adaptive Campaigning primarily through 
the lens of the one of the most innovative military thinkers of the late twentieth 
century, Colonel John Boyd. This article will bring other military and business 
Adaptive Campaigning is 
an important document, 
yet little real debate has 
appeared on the concept.
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theories to this discussion, many of which parallel Boyd’s primary theories. It will 
focus on a pivotal element of Adaptive Campaigning, the ‘Adaption Cycle’, and then 
broadly look at Boyd’s theories on adaptation beyond the confines of Adaptive 
Campaigning. I will contend that Adaptive Campaigning as a concept does not go 
far enough to achieve the Chief of Army’s intent.
Colonel John Boyd, USAF
The influence that John Boyd has had on Western military thought and capability 
is significant. Boyd by any standard was a zealot, working long hours and letting no 
one get in his way. While serving as a fighter pilot instructor, he initially focused 
on the development of air-to-air combat tactics and then shifted to the aircraft 
design criteria that affected this. An irascible character, he offended many and only 
survived militarily by overwhelmingly being right more often than wrong.
After a turbulent relationship with the USAF, they and Boyd parted ways in 
1975. 8 He started to expand his interest into conflict in general. The US Army 
and, even more so, the US Marine Corps drew on his work to develop fighting 
concepts that have served them well in the past decade and a half. Boyd’s research 
ranged from Sun Tzu to Richard Dawkins to the quantum work of Werner 
Heisenberg, often taking elements of such work and stitching them back together 
into a new form. This provided an innovative (even adaptive?) process from 
which to draw deductions. His thirty years of feverish, argued and considered 
study does not boil down to one simple 
loop diagram? To many, Boyd’s ideas 
remain incomplete; this is probably how 
he would have wanted it; some are 
contentious, something he no doubt 
would have relished.
In terms of leaving a legacy for future 
apostles, Boyd was a poor messiah. 
He seldom published any papers, and 
those he did are difficult to read. 9 Boyd 
developed sometimes hours-long slide 
presentations, which were continuously updated. He would not develop concise 
versions, even at the request of very senior US defence officials. If you wanted 
Boyd’s thoughts, you got them all. Boyd was also concerned that publication would 
freeze his views, something that was an anathema to him. While all this ensured 
continuous development, it discouraged the wider debate that the greater transmis-
sion of his ideas would have allowed. Fortunately, two recent biographies and Dr 
Frans Osinga’s recent publication of his PhD work on Boyd have rectified this.
While all this ensured 
continuous development, it 
discouraged the wider debate 
that the greater transmission of 
his ideas would have allowed.
page 96 • Volume VII, Number 1 • Australian Army Journal
 Concepts • Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas
The OODA Loop
Boyd derived the OODA loop from the study of air combat in Korea. Theoretically, 
the Soviet designed fighter of the time, the MiG-15, was a superior aircraft, yet 
Allied pilots in the F-86 Sabre were able to achieve a greater level of kills. A US Air 
Force pilot was able to Observe (owing to a higher canopy, giving a better all around 
view), Orient (owing to hydraulic powered flight controls), Decide (better training) 
and Act (a combination of all factors) better and therefore faster than a MiG-15 pilot 
(the OODA loop or Decision Cycle). 10
The benefits to a combatant in using this cycle faster, that is the focus on the 
tempo within this loop, than an adversary is referred to as ‘getting inside his OODA 
loop’. To be able to take action faster renders the adversary disoriented and ultimately 
dislocated from the situation, leading to defeat.
The OODA loop has received widespread discussion and assimilation into 
concept in both defence and business circles. It has also attracted critics, and a 
few moments’ reflection could lead anyone to think of counter arguments to the 
concept, such as:
•	 What	if	an	enemy’s	concept	of	operations	is	accepting	of	a	slow	decision	tempo,	
regardless of what its adversary does (a protracted guerrilla campaign)?
•	 What	if	an	enemy	has	such	mass	that	the	actions	taken,	while	causing	‘localised’	
damage, do not affect his overall plan? Providence can still lie with the big 
battalions.
•	 The	simplified	loop	is	vulnerable	to	deception	operations;	the	drive	for	tempo	
may become a drive to haste.
•	 The	operating	environment	itself	may	prevent	your	force	operating	at	the	tempo	
you desire.
However, the simplified OODA loop has great utility. It is an immensely important 
tool for the basic understanding and planning of operations, particularly at the lower 
tactical level. It provides an excellent tool for teaching and understanding tactics and 
is intrinsic to the Military Appreciation Process (both joint and single service). 11 Yet, 
in no part of Army education does its importance seem emphasised!
The ‘Adaption Cycle’ 12
The current iteration of Adaptive Campaigning states that the ‘Adaption Cycle does 
not replace Colonel John Boyd’s OODA loop… The Adaption Cycle emphasises 
understanding a problem through experience, knowledge and planning’. 13 The 
‘Adaption Cycle’ places ‘Action’ as the first step in a continuous loop moving next to 
‘Sense’, then ‘Decide’ and then ‘Adapt’. Adaptive Campaigning argues that a complex 
adversary/situation cannot be known until it is probed/tested.
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This contrite explanation did not appear in previous editions of Adaptive 
Campaigning. Nor in previous versions was there any acknowledgment given to 
John Boyd’s OODA loop. Unfortunately, this correction does not fix the underlying 
flaws and raises further questions. On which particular form of Boyd’s OODA loop 
is Adaptive Campaigning commenting? How did such an esteemed strategist and air 
combat veteran miss the need for adaptation, mission command and flexibility of 
mind in the conduct of war—things the ‘Adaption Cycle’ apparently considers? 
Additionally, the Army has been formally teaching mission command since the late 
1980s; do we have it so wrong that we 
need further reinforcement through 
the ‘Adaption Cycle’?
I will demonstrate that Boyd missed 
none of this and that we have ‘dumbed 
down’ a lifetime of innovative and 
relevant work. This is not a promising 
start for a key foundation for the future 
Army.
The authors of Adaptive Campaigning 
did not see the OODA loop as capable 
of dealing with complexity nor applicable at higher levels of conflict; hence, the 
derivation of the supplemental ‘Adaption Cycle’. However, when you look at Boyd’s 
last version of the OODA loop, which was formed over the last decade of his life, it 
does deal with complexity. Indeed, dealing with complexity and the need to adapt 
permeates Boyd’s later work.
How did such an esteemed 
strategist and air combat veteran 
miss the need for adaptation, 
mission command and flexibility 
of mind in the conduct of war…
Figure 1. The ‘real’ OODA loop 14
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Osinga calls this the ‘real’ OODA loop. However, it would be better to state that 
it was Boyd’s last version. I find it hard to believe that if he were still alive now, we 
would not be considering another amended diagram. As we can see it is not a closed 
system, and even a cursory examination shows that it demands mission command 
(top line implicit guidance and control). Studies of other slides generated by Boyd 
indicate that he understood the complexity of insurgent/terrorist operations and 
indeed the strategic level of conflict. 15
Figure 2. The essence of moral conflict 16
Boyd and Adaptation
We can see without going into the origins of his analysis that Boyd was placing initia-
tive and adaptability central to victory in conflict. He also recognised something not 
formally acknowledged by the Australian Army: the need for harmony (trust in all 
directions), a factor that has been recognised by other armies in the past apparently 
fighting simpler wars! 17
If we are going to consider adaptation as the keystone for the Australian Army of 
the future, we have more to learn from the master’s voice. Some experts dealing with 
complex systems tend to reject distillation of a problem into simple components—
reductionism. Unfortunately for the military combat leader, other factors force the 
opposite effect. Fear, fatigue and stress all deteriorate higher cognitive functions. 
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Drills and standard procedures mitigate this (set patterns). Reductionism is an 
essential component of success in combat. Adaptive Campaigning states that its 
concept includes the lessons of recent operations and DSTO analysis. It is difficult 
to conceive this lesson not being present.
Some may say this is not that necessary at the operational or strategic level of 
conflict, but these levels have their own time sensitivities and pressures that impair 
decision-making. Boyd placed great 
emphasis on intuitive thinking—the term he 
used is ‘pattern matching’. 18
Before taking discussion of either the 
‘Adaption Cycle’ or the ’real’ OODA loop 
further, there are other legacies from John 
Boyd we need to discover. Osinga summa-
rises them as: 19
Tempo: Boyd places emphasis on the 
speed of decision-making. He also stressed 
the importance of changing speed in order 
to be unpredictable. Additionally, it must be translated into meaningful action; by 
itself, ‘information superiority’ is useless. 20 Tempo is only one area that needs to 
be exploited. Adversary main efforts and deep objectives must also be considered. 
Enemy cohesion cannot be shattered by irregular tempo alone.
Orientation: To Boyd, great decision and magnificent actions counted for 
nothing if the commander was not oriented. Orientation was the essential 
component of the OODA loop. As already stated, Boyd favoured an experiential 
learning base that enabled a leader to adapt to a situation by having a ‘repertoire of 
orientation patterns and the ability to select the correct one’. 21 The ability to re-orient 
(adapt?) is vital, but in conflict, the mechanism had to simple and intuitive.
Organisational Adaptation
Adaptation and the ‘mechanisms’ of adaptation are perhaps key themes Boyd 
emphasised in his later work. 22 He highlighted the need for this flexibility across 
an organisation. Additionally, depending on the level of conflict (Osinga defined 
these levels: tactical, operational, strategic and grand strategic), the nature of how 
the organisation must adapt changes: 23
•	 Tactical/Operation	Level	–	movement,	attacks,	feints,	etc,	disrupt	and	confuse	
the enemy. The ability to adapt is defined in terms of the maintenance of your 
own cohesion and the reduction of the enemy’s.
•	 Strategic	Level	–	the	adaptation	centres	on	adjustment	of	doctrine	and	force	
structures that disorient an enemy’s own orientation and understanding.
Some experts dealing 
with complex systems 
tend to reject distillation 
of a problem into simple 
components—reductionism.
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•	 Grand	Strategic	Level	–	a	complex	array	of	measures	across	all	potential	areas	of	
conflict. Tempo is not as important, but the interplay of multiple lines of conflict 
is. Conflict revolves around the shaping of politics and society. Grand Strategy is 
adapted to the environment of the particular conflict.
Mental and organisational agility
Boyd placed great emphasis on self-organisation at time of conflict. However, like 
the tenants of directive control, Boyd considered mechanisms (orders, restrictions 
and constraints) and feedback (reporting both formal and informal) essential. Boyd 
believed in higher commanders that could ‘trust and coach’ and were prepared to 
‘accept bad news, be open for suggestions, lower level initiatives and critique’. 24 To 
institutionalise these qualities in times of increasing strategic military and political 
oversight should be the challenge—a challenge that is not considered in Adaptive 
Campaigning. Nevertheless, such qualities, if trained for and resourced, will lead to 
a truly innovative military. Osinga defines the characteristic of such an organisation 
(based on Boyd’s own work) as:
Figure 3. Positive and negative indicators of learning organisations 25
Recent work by the Harvard Business School has defined an even simpler list of 
characteristics to describe an ‘adaptive organisation’. 26 These five characteristics are:
•	 Elephants	in	the	room	are	named	(no	issue	is	too	sensitive	to	be	raised	at	an	
official meeting and no questions are off-limits)
•	 Responsibility	for	the	organisation’s	future	is	shared
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•	 Independent	judgment	is	expected.	(personnel	are	able	to	comment	on	issues	
based on abilities, not just responsibility or authority)
•	 Leadership	capacity	is	developed
•	 Reflection	and	continuous	learning	is	institutionalised
The parallels with Figure 3 are obvious and a tribute to Boyd’s thought processes. 
Boyd always focused on military organisations. He also commenced pioneering 
work on the moral aspect of conflict, in 
particular dealing with guerrilla warfare 
(Figure 2); this work focused on the physical 
dislocation and destruction of the enemy, 
but the growing need for a moral framework 
and legitimacy in conflict is also apparent. 
Close associates extended this work into the 
debate about ‘fourth generation warfare’ after 
Boyd’s death. 27
Discussion
Osinga credits Boyd with being the first ‘post modernist’ strategist. That I leave for 
others to judge and debate. A valid criticism is that Boyd unlike some (for example, 
Richard Simpkin 28) did not work holistically, considering organisational, technical 
and well as cultural changes in his analysis. This he left to others. This aside, the 
breadth of Boyd’s work merits greater study and teaching.
Robert Polk in his 2000 critique of Boyd considers his work worthy of greater 
study and cites the need to use the relevant pieces of Boyd’s work in shaping future 
US Army doctrine. 29 Lieutenant Colonel David Fadok, USAF, in his 1997 work 
criticises Boyd for placing too much importance on tempo in conflict. However, he 
still concludes that Boyd’s work is well worth further study by air power theorists 
and strategic planners. 30 The USMC provided the honour guard at John Boyd’s 
funeral in 1997, and as a sign of respect the eagle, globe and anchor were buried 
with him. 31 The Commandant of the USMC stated the he and the corps would miss 
their counsellor terribly. That Boyd’s work could have such widespread influence and 
earned respect from his colleagues confirms the merit of a more rigorous considera-
tion of his work by the Australian Army. If we are going to use Boyd’s work though, 
we must use it in the right context and have a sound initial understanding.
Unlike the authors of Adaptive Campaigning, Boyd built on previous work and 
did not place an unproven concept at the core of any of his work. This does not mean 
that the ‘Adaption Cycle’ is invalid. However, to place it centrally in our key future 
planning document at the expense of either version of the OODA loop does perhaps 
show hubris, regardless of the amount of DSTO analysis.
Boyd placed great emphasis 
on self-organisation at time 
of conflict.
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The importance of Adaptive Campaigning depends on its utility. It must be a 
document grounded in the fundamental and timeless aspects of military theory, as 
well as preparation for the future. It needs to sell itself to the next generation of leaders. 
It must be easy to teach, understand and apply. In its current form, Adaptive 
Campaigning is not. A recent US example of an easily understandable concept is the 
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. While in 
intent some aspects of this document do not suit 
Australia’s situation in terms of structure and 
style, it is worthy of analysis as a document that 
can be easily taught, understood and applied. 32
Adaptive Campaigning seems to claim 
that the Army of the past and present does 
not understand the basic tenants of mission 
command, 33 and it re-educates us with further 
definition. I must have been lucky with my 
commanders, as I served and watched other personnel thrive in the conditions 
Boyd highlighted. Additionally, the Adaptive Campaigning definition of mission 
command remains hierarchical (true mission command places emphasis on lateral 
synchronisation with higher commanders facilitating this) and actually places too 
much freedom of action with the subordinate.
The ‘Adaption Cycle’ and the Probing Action
It is too late to learn the technique of warfare when military operations 
are already in progress, especially when the enemy is an expert at it.
– General Alekse A Brusilov
The first stage of the ‘Adaption Cycle’ is to ‘Act’, and this is where unfortunately the 
entire concept becomes unhinged. The articulation of a need to test or confirm 
the ‘understanding of the battlespace’ immediately surrenders the initiative to an 
adversary. The use of probing action to enable the force to learn surrenders initiative. 
It exposes the force conducting the action to the risk of defeat in detail by an enemy 
that commits early to decisive engagement. Additionally, learning actions could have 
a coincidental damaging effect on future ‘decisive action’. A probing action in the 
wrong place at the wrong time could set a section or an entire community against 
a deployed force.
Such learning actions are also vulnerable to deception. If we are relying for our 
design of battle primarily on the initial contacts, then we again enable a cunning 
adversary to shape us. However, a supporter of the ‘Adaption Cycle’ would say the 
Boyd built on previous 
work and did not place an 
unproven concept at the 
core of any of his work.
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‘sense’ phase would filter this out. This is again problematic without a frame of 
reference or prior orientation.
Against a peer competitor, 34 a land force using the ‘Adaption Cycle’ as its core 
operating concept will surrender the initiative, risk early decisive engagement 
when not prepared for it, and be vulnerable 
to deception. The ‘Adaption Cycle’ para-
doxically means that a deployed land force 
will behave in a rigid manner—it is a 
reactive concept. As both Boyd and General 
Brusilov alluded, we must be professionally 
skilled and culturally/politically aware 
prior to contact. While we cannot be fully 
oriented prior to deployment, we can 
achieve much beforehand.
A Way Ahead
The literature on adaptive organisations in both military and business spheres is 
growing. Authors range from behavioural psychologists to military personnel. 35 
Like Boyd, we face a myriad of viewpoints. What is apparent in the majority of 
literature is that, while military organisations can be extremely adaptive, they are 
not structured to be routinely so. Additionally, at what level do we wish to instil 
this trait—throughout the organisation or just into the leadership base? 36 Even this 
can be complicated; Johnson et al states that ‘adaptive risk-taking’ in individuals 
may actually be a double-edged sword and engender military incompetence in 
battle. 37 To develop a truly adaptive culture, the breadth of the military organisation 
needs to be considered. 38 The insertion of the nine core behaviours (developed 
independently of Adaptive Campaigning) into the document does not remediate 
this conceptual gap.
Recent initiatives in the training of junior leaders in the US Army have focused 
on a training regime that currently serving Australian personnel would find 
familiar. 39 The leadership base that the United States draws from is far more variable 
in experience and time in training. Therefore, this initiative for us is only a point 
of reference, not a way ahead. Additionally one of main architects of the program 
in previous work has cited a far broader range of initiatives; 40 it is unclear if the US 
Army has attempted to take on these larger organisational issues.
There is acknowledgment in combat operations that the military have shown 
incredible flexibility. However, there is significant concern that the hierarchical 
structures and self-replicating personnel management practices of the military stifle 
adaptation. In some cases even the traditional ‘crawl, walk, run’ approach to training 
The ‘Adaption Cycle’ 
paradoxically means that 
a deployed land force will 
behave in a rigid manner—it 
is a reactive concept.
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can constrain adaptability in tactical decision-making and execution. 41 One author 
even cites that adaptive leaders are not enough—you need adaptive teams. 42 This 
harks back to Boyd’s preference for self-synchronisation.
The Chief of Army’s design rules within Adaptive Campaigning highlight some 
important adaptive tenets. However, many are self-evident necessities of any 
competent land force. There is no consideration of how we are to comply with these 
rules, or define where we are currently. No benchmark is discussed. You cannot 
simply have an ‘adaptive’ deployed land force in isolation. It comes from an army 
that itself nurtures and behaves in this way. The ten rules may even be an anathema 
to the principle itself. 43 ‘Be adaptive, but you are to have these structures and char-
acteristics.’ An example of this tension is the drive to sustain five fixed lines of 
operation (rule 4); this is a big ask for an army of 
one division, regardless of the conflict. We may 
place ourselves in a paradox before we start. 
Organisational adaptation at all levels is required, 
not just small unit and individual tactics.
Organisational reform must occur that 
resources and supports land forces in focusing 
on tactical flexibility. Adaptability, like mission 
command, not only needs to be fostered but 
resourced and managed. No Army or Joint documentation defines how rapid 
changes are to be funded or controlled. 44 Innovation and adaptation is expensive, 
because mistakes must be made by definition and wastage will occur; the tension 
with the Strategic Reform Process is obvious. We must resource the changes we see 
as necessary rapidly, in terms of both physical and personnel resources but also that 
most precious resource—time. Not in accordance with the current development rules 
of Army or Australian Defence Organisation, but as each new situation dictates.
The rules themselves may be a response to the certainty the government is 
demanding of the Department of Defence. So, creating an Adaptive Army will 
require the ‘whole-of-government’ support that Adaptive Campaigning lauds, but in 
the other direction. The search for greater and greater certainty in Defence programs 
lies in direct tension to what the Army is seeking. It is a concern that these higher 
organisational aspects of adaptation are not being considered or even acknowledged. 
They must be.
An example of incongruity in the drive to adaptation has already occurred within 
the personnel reporting process. I cite the recently implemented supplemental 
personnel report for O-5 officers and above. Its assessment of that leadership group’s 
support of the Adaptive Army and Strategic Reform Program will not engender 
the behaviour traits we require. 45 Institutionalising Boyd’s or Hiefetz’s adaptive 
organisational characteristics will.
You cannot simply have 
an ‘adaptive’ deployed 
land force in isolation.
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In the application of adaptation, the Army must pick the low hanging fruit. Shifts 
in education and training are some of those low cost and potentially high yield 
first steps. Human resource management practices also have the potential to yield 
more adaptable units and sub-units, 46 and a more balanced and better-trained staff. 
While the Army as a ‘learning organisation’ is highlighted in Adaptive Campaigning, 
the organisational reforms (and the higher command and control changes of the 
Adaptive Army are not reforms) required are not articulated.
Conclusion
No future warfighting concept will be perfect, nor should it be. Adaptive 
Campaigning not only contains significant flaws, it remains, despite numerous 
rewrites, difficult to read. It is also incomplete in defining what is required to make 
the Army truly adaptive. The solid work 
of the late John Boyd has been corrupted 
into an unproven, intuitively risky and 
inflexible ‘Adaption Cycle’.
This is unfortunate because the intent 
behind Adaptive Campaigning is perhaps 
one of the boldest and strongest the Army 
has taken in decades. The intent has the 
potential to reform and reshape the Army. 
However, the lead document as it currently 
stands will not be enough. Weak concepts do not change or endanger armies when 
fighting conflicts of choice, but they slowly die a natural death. If faced with a 
conflict of necessity though, time and opportunity to develop cohesive adaptation 
from strong concepts may be lost, something that we can ill afford.
While some may say that current operations are forging this adaptability 
already, this can be a two-edged sword. Operational experience can also develop 
a singular focus. The Army has to make a decision as to at what level it wants to 
engender adaptation and how it will achieve this. Additionally, it must recognise 
that bureaucratic and government processes must change if Army wants to foster 
this throughout its structure. It is unlikely that this change can be implemented 
under current operational demands. Training and management systems must always 
provide a ‘brilliant at basics’ framework, but the student must be allowed to experi-
ment; this will take more time and resources than the current training continuum 
allows. We may have to simply invest in the next generation of leaders and ask them 
to carry the flame.
An adaptive organisation, reading between the lines, is one that harnesses 
both the physical and mental abilities of all the personnel within it. The Defence 
… the intent behind Adaptive 
Campaigning is perhaps one of 
the boldest and strongest the 
Army has taken in decades.
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catch cry of ‘people first’ is not just about support and education, it is about 
harnessing human capital. War is a human interaction, and Boyd was primarily 
about understanding how to harness this interaction and create human capital, 
how it operates in the stress of conflict and how to prepare it for success in that 
environment. Other management theorists have stated that there is no such thing 
as a dysfunctional organisation; any organisation produces outcomes they tolerate 
or with which they are comfortable. A study of Boyd forces us not to tolerate this 
status quo.
The ‘Adaption Cycle’ needs to be reassessed against the complete work of John 
Boyd. Adaptive Campaigning itself would benefit from feeling the heat of Boyd’s 
torch and other experts on organisational and military adaptation. A solid military 
concept will stand on its own merit. Those that are easy to comprehend, teach and 
are intellectually and intuitively sound will be enthusiastically adopted. Once this 
has occurred, the staff of Army Headquarters will have far less work pondering the 
future both near and far—the rank and file of the Army will be doing that for them. 
That to me is only the start of the truly Adaptive Army.
There is no absolute knowledge, and those who claim it, whether they are 
scientists or dogmatists, open the door to tragedy.
– J Bronowski as quoted by John Boyd 47
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Abstract
In response to a recent essay in the Australian Army Journal, which continued the current 
debate about ‘Cultural Awareness’, this article examines the place of the Australian soldier 
in the community. 1 It questions whether it is counterproductive to remove the soldier from 
the very community that could teach him the valuable skills in human relations he needs 
on operations. The author draws examples from current recruiting and accommodation 
practices, pre-deployment training, recent operations and current ethical discourse.
With the current thirst for cultural awareness in the operational theatre, and the growing acknowledgment of the gap between that ambition and the reality, the question needs to be asked whether we are doing 
the mission a disservice by increasingly isolating the soldier from the community, 
and thereby diminishing his culture.
Colonel Michael Lehmann’s recent article on the subject 2 makes the point that 
cultural awareness includes ‘…an awareness of one’s own culture and the way this 
influences perceptions of what the “other bloke” is doing’. 3 This point reveals an 
unfortunate fact of the modern soldier—that his culture is manufactured, and 
likely to prevent him from achieving the depth of human engagement required by 
the mission. Moreover, that this awareness of one’s own culture is ‘…the baseline 
against which we often subconsciously consider others’ actions’, 4 could be alarmingly 
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predictive of inappropriate behaviour and possibly poor judgment. This manufac-
tured culture is unlikely to dissipate if we continue to maintain several practices.
Recruiting
The main effort for current Army recruiting campaigns is played to non-captive 
audiences within the community. This is to say the target audience is not, at the time 
of the message broadcast, demonstrating a previous interest towards military life (like 
at a career exposition, for example). This means that the Army is relying on the 
message appealing to the citizen who is otherwise occupied. However, even at this 
early stage of a potential military career, the message seems to portray a slightly 
superior air. 5 While this attracts an ambitious candidate, it starts to alienate the soldier 
from the civilian; but it is those civilian traits that we are now saying we need. We even 
try to give them back to the soldier later in his 
training. It must also be asked whether this 
concept of superiority, rather than elevating 
the position of ‘soldier’ in the community, 
might actually provoke resentment.
Oddly enough Army Reserve recruiting 
messages have always emphasised the 
‘normality’ of military life, making it possible 
for the civilian to slip in and out of the role 
with ease. Both messages claim Army life 
as a profession, but market one as ‘pro 
community’ and the other ‘elite’. The interested candidate may well wonder what, 
other than the environment, makes this job so superior to his own. He may also make 
the decision to sign up for part time service, lest he lose his civilian identity to this 
‘elite’ force. We cannot expect the soldier in theatre to demonstrate any understanding 
of his enemy’s community, if we strip him of his own.
Accommodatng
Current Defence housing policy requires single members to ‘live-in’ barracks for 
the first twelve months, and then offers a choice to most: to continue living in 
the barracks, or to find accommodation in the surrounding community. 6 Rental 
Allowance is generally available to single members if there is no suitable ‘live-in’ 
accommodation, and because many capital cities are currently experiencing low 
rental markets, ‘living-in’ is in demand. Because of this situation, single accommoda-
tion facilities are springing up everywhere, as seen in the three recent latest barracks 
redevelopments. 7 All three projects include concentration of single accommodation 
We cannot expect the soldier 
in theatre to demonstrate 
any understanding of his 
enemy’s community, if we 
strip him of his own.
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built within the perimeter of the barracks. Population concentration of this kind 
is always something of a social experiment, and will have different degrees of 
success depending on the demographic of both the soldiers and the supporting 
community. Previous onsite initiatives include the building of impressive sports 
bars within Lavarack Barracks, to curb soldiers’ constant trips into the city. It was a 
manufactured social scene; the soldiers voted with their feet, and the deserted bars 
were closed down.
The latest accommodation project is nearing completion at Gallipoli Barracks, 
Brisbane. What is most concerning about these rather gloomy monoliths is not that 
they are shut off from the lively, multicultural community right outside the front gate, 
but that they do not offer the soldier any community inside the front gate. An already 
overcrowded barracks will put accommodation where it fits; in Gallipoli Barracks, 
that means near the communal facilities on the main roads. The result is a complete 
lack of privacy for occupants, affording little or no distinction between the end of 
the working day and the beginning of leisure. Now, the soldier, returning ‘home’ 
at the end of the day, has neither retreat from the glare of the barracks population, 
nor opportunity to commune with colleagues, because he has his own bathroom, 
kitchenette and fully wired entertainment hub. He does not have to shop, cook, clean, 
pay bills, walk dogs, or talk to anybody. Thus he withdraws to his virtual life.
This isolation may have worked for the soldier who was sent to ‘seek out and 
close with the enemy’, but this is the ‘Strategic Corporal’. This is the one we send to 
the shura, 8 who negotiates the water contract, who talks to the parent of the son 
killed by a roadside bomb, who questions the 
child who has witnessed atrocities. We are 
putting the soldier in danger, and the mission 
in compromise, when we send this cloistered 
individual to the complex human terrain that 
is today’s battlefield.
Likewise, the married member is not 
immune from the cloister. The ‘married patch’ 
may be further from the barracks perimeter, 
but becomes its own ghetto, with lack of 
individual identity and constant turnover of 
occupants. There is need neither for friendships, nor community responsibility. 
There is certainly no history. Many short moves make community integration 
almost impossible. Families and individuals desiring community integration expend 
much energy, only to be disappointed on both sides. The member is disillusioned 
that they are not accepted, and the community is disrupted by another fly-by-night 
military posting. The familiarity of the barrack room and the ‘married patch’ 
becomes irresistible.
Families and individuals 
desiring community 
integration expend 
much energy, only to be 
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Training
The effect of this isolation has become evident in preparation for deployment. 
Combat Training Team observations of Mission Rehearsal Exercises reveal that 
soldiers arrive at the final preparation stage with little understanding of what 
human interaction skills are required, and scant ability to adapt their style to their 
audience. 9 We sit our soldiers in a classroom and teach them ‘personal liaison skills’, 
while outside the community liaises like mad. Logically, the next step is to adopt a 
simulated liaison training tool, like the one currently on trial with the US Army. 10 
In this type of training, the student plays the part of a US Army officer chairing a 
local meeting with a group of computer simulated local elders.
In one campaign the student is tasked with understanding why a US built marketplace is 
not being used. The student must gather information on the social relationships among 
the characters in the scenario. 11
The student must also establish his or her own relationships with these characters and be 
sensitive to the character’s cultural conventions. 12
The argument for the success of training aids like these is the familiarity the student 
feels for the simulated environment; but the whole point of social relations is that they 
involve real people with unexpected responses. These responses are influenced by more 
factors than just reaction to the other person’s comments. To his detriment the soldier 
will discover that the local elders are flesh and blood. Australian soldiers training for 
meetings and interviews regularly use role players, 13 but too often these come from 
within the uniformed community. We need to keep asking whether this is the most 
robust preparation we can give our soldiers for the human task ahead.
Deploying
The Australian Defence Force deployment now comes in three standard lengths: 
four, six or eight months. 14 It is designed to suit the deployed force, rather than the 
receiving nation. It promotes sustainability, which guarantees a lengthy commitment, 
but not necessarily a successful one. The cultural awareness reached during such a 
deployment is limited by the soldier’s time in theatre, access to the community, rules 
of engagement and location of his accommodation; yet the ‘Adaptive Army’ requires 
him to be a ‘tactical ambassador … achieving the appropriate degree of empathy and 
engagement with the population’. 15 Furthermore, we understand that ‘all personnel in 
theatre (including inter-agency elements and service providers) must be empowered 
with basic cultural, social and language skills…’. 16 Let us address this question of 
language skills first.
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Currently, Operation ASTUTE in Timor-Leste is running out of linguists. Not 
only has the abundance of Tetum speakers seen ten years ago in the Army seemingly 
disappeared, but when a speaker is found for a position, he has often not had the 
required security clearance, specialist training or physical ability for the job. Not 
having a language is a problem, but having the wrong language is another. Despite 
the best efforts of Dili-based staff to communicate to locals in Tetum, everyone 
under 30 years of age (including, importantly, the civilians employed on service 
contracts) wanted to speak Indonesian. Older ADF staff who had come from the era 
when the default second language for ADF was Indonesian, suddenly found them-
selves highly sought after. Moreover, the language that is most needed in Operation 
ASTUTE now is Portuguese. As the mission turns from security to nation-building, 
the language best suited to the mechanism of Timor-Leste governance, the language 
taught to and spoken by Timor-Leste army 
and police officers, the official language of 
the country, and the language of the most 
important bilateral partner—Portugal—is 
not being cultivated with enough vigour. 
Thus the Adaptive Army soldier (who 
teaches himself Pashto while in Timor-Leste) 
is not empowered with these ‘basic cultural, 
social and language skills’. 17
As financial and temporal pressures force 
us to restrict the soldier’s training for the 
war, the cultural awareness gap tends to be 
filled by specialists in civil-military relations (sometimes at great risk), or resident 
diplomatic staff, both of whom are in country for longer than an ADF rotation. The 
approach to deployment may be better served by a custom made length, as it is with 
a custom made force—but how could we do this?
Despite initial statements of intent regarding duration of deployment, it is very 
difficult to project the outcome of a force lodgement. We would like to assume 
that operations such as evacuations, recoveries and disaster relief have an end-state 
sufficiently well defined to plan an exit date. However, this is not the case for stability 
operations, humanitarian assistance and nation-building. These are operations for 
which we are often at the request of a third party, need to plan for long-term sustain-
ment, and need to be prepared to react to an escalation of violence or unforeseen 
event. 18 These are also the operations requiring the deeper level of human engage-
ment we now promote.
What we have found in this long period of high operational tempo is that having 
completed a dozen or so rotations, we find ourselves still there with the same force. 
This has fortified our deployment cycle mastery, but perhaps not achieved the 
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optimum result in theatre. 19 It certainly has required an intense period of lead-up 
training, followed by a standard deployment length, regardless of job. 20
This perhaps does not give the soldier sufficient exposure to the nation’s culture 
to do the tasks we now require of him. On the other hand, there are other 
Australians in theatre who do seem to have a deeper level of human engagement. 
These workers have developed their understanding over longer, less intense, 
sustained periods of time. They are the contractors who work month on / month off; 
and the diplomatic staff and non-govern-
ment organisation representatives who live 
and work in country for a number of years. 
They are certainly reliant on someone else 
for security, but they maintain the duration 
of the mission by deploying accompanied 
by their families, or fly home regularly to 
see them. In Operation ASTUTE, The 
Defence Cooperation Program goes 
someway to solve this problem. The ADF 
members posted to this program live in country longer, are embedded within 
Timor-Leste Defence Force, may in some instances be accompanied by their 
families, and are beginning to address the language gap. Their supporting force, 
however, is isolated from them by a strict rotational model. By designing the 
deployment to fit the mission in the manner of contractors and non-government 
organisations, we depart from the primary function of the armed force and start 
to enter the domain of other agencies; 21 however, the tasks we now ask of ourselves 
must cross those inter-agency boundaries.
Inter-Agency Operations
It is through our relationships with other agencies that we can get a head start on 
understanding more of our own culture, and how to work with others. Working with 
other agencies is a free gift in terms of developing human communication skills, by 
being around people whose jobs exist wholly within the community.
Domestic Event Support Operations (DESO) provide great opportunities to 
practice this. As stated by Brigadier Andrew Smith, the characteristics of DESO 
include the forces being ad hoc, and almost always acting in support of leading civil 
agencies. 22 This means inter-agency standard operating procedures need to be put 
in place quickly. Good standing relationships between key personnel within the 
agencies, a common vocabulary, and a history of working together will assist this. 
National Security Advisor Duncan Lewis suggests making this ad hoc arrangement 
more formal, with inter-agency secondments, and a possible Security Academy. 23
This has fortified our 
deployment cycle mastery, 
but perhaps not achieved the 
optimum result in theatre.
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Despite civil primacy, Army leads the way again and again in DESO because 
of our strength in rapidly effecting operational teams of virtual strangers through 
common language and procedures. During Operation TESTAMENT 24 it was 
immediately apparent that Army’s decision cycle was spinning much faster than 
those of other government agencies which were not used to working in such a 
time critical environment. Army tasks were successfully completed with minimum 
but sufficient planning, effective communications and timely logistics. The reason 
for this success was largely due to the operation’s proximity to the previous DESO, 
Operation DELUGE, 25 and the personnel chosen for the job. In fact, the lead 
security agency for Operation TESTAMENT, the New South Wales Police Service, 
specifically requested Army personnel who 
had worked on Operation DELUGE to work 
in their Joint Operations Centre. Like DESO, 
the success of long-term engagement in 
regional nation-building operations is true 
inter-agency operations coordinated at 
government level.
The second personnel success during 
Operation TESTAMENT was achieved 
through the use of Reservists. The more 
successful Reservists were the ones whose 
civilian roles were associated with one of the 
agencies working on the operation—they could speak both languages. The less 
successful Reservists were the ones who were performing a role foreign to both 
their civilian and Reservist professions—they could speak neither language. Here 
is a situation where the soldier’s experience as a citizen must surely shine; however, 
the least successful regular Army members were those who had no inter-agency 
experience, and very little concept of community events.
Even greater was the Reservist role on Operation ASTUTE. The Combined 
Operations Liaison Team (COLT) was an essential unit within JTF631. These 
ADF Liaison Officers were dispatched to organisations such as UNHQ, UNPOL, 
Timor-Leste Police, Timor-Leste Defence Force, Australian Federal Police and 
international non-government organisations. These officers were mostly Reservists 
on full-time duty, trained in civil-military relations and from a similar civilian 
profession, which gave them a common vocabulary with their host agency. 
The COLT model works well and can teach us lessons in cultural preparation 
and operation.
… the success of long-term 
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The Role
The role of the soldier as citizen is by no means a contemporary or easy issue. 
Classical authors make the important connection between citizen and soldier 
within a democracy. 26 Modern philosophy sustains the dialogue of that relationship 
between Church, State and Military, and since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
there has been constant ethical debate about the moral obligations of the soldier in 
a war among the people.
In defining a ‘good citizen’ today, we would probably echo classical sentiments 
with words like ‘responsible’, ‘ethical’ and ‘just’, and we can probably say that there 
is an expectation from the public that servicemen will uphold these values, as will 
others in public service. Dr Tom Frame sees a distinct difference between the way 
the soldier and the police officer are perceived by the Australian public. 27 These 
reasons revolve around the degree of influence the police, as opposed to the 
soldier, has on their lives. The police officer is visible every day, because his domain 
is local crime, and it is widely agreed that he should fight it. The soldier’s domain 
is, by and large, outside Australia, and it is 
much debated whether he should be fighting 
it or not. The soldier is an instrument of 
government, but also politics, and he is 
certainly not as visible to the community as 
he once was.
The soldier and community need to be, 
in fact, mutually supporting. The presence 
of the soldier promotes the fundamental 
questions of human existence—‘what 
is justice, is anything worth an ultimate 
sacrifice of life, what or whom shall I serve, is killing ever permitted…?’ 28 The 
community, as a voting body, decides on a government which will use the army 
in domestic and foreign policy. The community also ultimately produces the indi-
viduals for the army, and therefore has a responsibility to cultivate the optimum 
candidate. ‘Armies do not provide the main influence on their soldiers,’ says Jim 
Wallace. ‘Society will have had him for at least 16–19 years longer.’ 29 The soldier is 
in some ways their investment.
The problem lies in the separation. Exclusion is necessary for security, safety in 
training and indoctrination, and has been for thousands of years. The soldier has to 
play both roles simultaneously: soldier and citizen. He must live under two sets of 
codes: a military law and the civil law. The Reservist is often touted as the dual 
professional, but the regular soldier is perhaps more so. This is not an easy duality. 
It is why we have a Department of Veteran’s affairs. It is why we have transition 
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seminars for separating personnel. It is why Returned Service League clubs thrive. 
Exclusion is necessary. However, we must now ask if we can breed robust humanity 
in such an environment. With a fairly narrow arc of dissent in the barracks, how well 
can we expect the character of the soldier to develop? The soldier must ultimately 
be prepared to sacrifice his life, but 
without a clear idea of what he is sacri-
ficing it for (that only he can decide), then 
he becomes the extremist form of the 
professional soldier—the mercenary.
Exclusion has revealed only glimpses 
of the soldier to the community. The 
moments are fleeting, ceremonial and 
often tragic. They include ramp ceremo-
nies for the return of bodies, ANZAC 
day parades, brief visits by leaders, 
and sometimes atrocities. The community also witnesses the soldier alleviating a 
natural disaster. For a century, embedded journalists have increasingly enabled the 
community to see the reality of the soldier on operations. The saturation has now 
reached ‘participatory’ level. These images carry the risk of placing the soldier in 
a confusing context. 30 In Tom Frame’s words, ‘Even those who have never worn 
a military uniform are now war veterans … television has made combatants of 
them all.’ 31
The absence of the soldier from the community is having an effect on the way the 
young generation perceives the Profession of Arms. With the recent resurgence of 
interest in Australian military history and ‘battlefield tourism’, and without contem-
porary role models, there is a real fear of creating a ‘digger mythology’ based on 
images of Gallipoli, rather than today’s fight.
The Attitude
At the beginning of the current operational frenzy, the Australian Defence Force 
placed a high regard on understanding other cultures. Being able to speak a 
language, witnessing ceremonies and rituals, and knowing appropriate methods of 
communication enriched your life and gave you an advantage in your career. Sadly 
it has started to be replaced by a disdain, a kind of cynicism, even by persons who 
have not yet deployed. Relying only on the (traumatic) experiences of those who 
have returned, soldiers are deploying with ingrained bias, an Arabic phrase book 
and hoping for the best. What chance does the operation have? And what closed 
camp allowed this before he deployed? If he is the tactical ambassador, then he is 
answerable to his nation and his community.
The absence of the soldier from 
the community is having an 
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generation perceives the 
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If we make small changes to the status of the soldier in society, the performance 
of the soldier will follow. These changes start at recruiting: time to stop elitism. 
Let us allow and enable the soldier to live in the community, in some cases in the 
neighbourhood which raised him. The more he sees of his neighbours, and the 
more they see of him, will make the human aspects of his job easier. It may also 
strengthen his purpose. Let him train with real people of different ages, creeds and 
emotions. Let him live on deployment, amongst the people, for sufficient time to 
understand them. Let him make a comparative and social study of the environ-
ment in which he lives and in which he fights. If he is resolved to fight, he needs 
to know why.
It is a somewhat hardened army, hardened not by horror and atrocity, but 
perhaps by losing itself in a gargantuan coalition force, that returns from the 
battlefield now.
It would be a pity if the spirit of the innovative and cunning Australian soldier 
was suffocated by this disengaged military machine. That spirit needs to be 
supported by both the Australian Defence Force and the community, so that we 
remain the force of choice, rather than just another force. Moreover, we need to 
review our insistence that the soldier, because of the unique nature of his duties, must 
be protected and isolated from the community.
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Notes on Command for 
Commanding Officers
from a Brigade Commander
Major General Stephen Day
Abstract
The article gathers together a collection of thoughts on command from the perspective 
of a brigade commander. Most will not be new. They are aimed at commanding officers, 
though some will resonate with more junior commanders. The article has been derived 
from a speech delivered at the 2008 and 2009 pre-command courses in Canungra by the 
then Brigadier Stephen Day.
I worked with ten different commanding officers while I was a brigade commander. They were the ablest of soldiers. We learnt much in our service together. I have eight thoughts that I have distilled from those experiences, 
coupled with some of my own, for current and prospective commanding officers.
One. As a commander, you need to continually ask yourself: what are we trying 
to achieve? And you need to be able to articulate the answer clearly and concisely. 
This requires personal understanding and effort; something that your staff can help 
with, but not do for you. This is not easy, it takes time and intellect. Command is an 
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intellectual endeavour. And if you cannot answer the question, you will need to go 
back and do some more work.
Some of you will be thinking about a command directive or the like, to issue 
to your new command. Something that outlines the shape you want for your unit. 
If you are about to take up a command appointment and are still thinking about 
a directive, then good. If you have written it, my advice is to think of it as an early 
draft, and put it aside until you arrive in your command. A command directive 
needs to be informed by the realities of the unit today; and you need to see them 
for yourself.
Colonel Harry Summers was a distinguished US Army strategic thinker, though 
was more famous for his conversation with a North Vietnamese officer during 
peace negotiations at the end of the war in Hanoi. Summers pointed out to his 
opponent ‘You know, you have never beaten us on the battlefield’, to which the North 
Vietnamese officer responded, ‘That is true, but also irrelevant’. So my first point is: 
continually ask yourself what you are trying to achieve.
Two. As you go about your business, implementing your plan, making decisions, 
don’t let process or policy dominate your humanity.
The old Greek philosopher, Aristotle, declared that being persuasive required 
you to address three things—logos (reason), pathos (emotion) and ethos (ethics—in 
this case to reflect credibility). The Army does the logos 
bit quite well, the ethos is fine enough, but the pathos 
is often wanting.
When I was a commanding officer in Townsville I 
got it wrong. A married soldier was the only support 
in the world for his long ill sister, who lived in South 
Australia. He was away on military business when he 
received word that his sister’s health had weakened and 
that she might not recover. Unable to return in a timely fashion, he asked that his 
compassionate travel entitlement be transferred to his wife, so that she could be by 
his sister’s side. I asked the chief clerk to check the policy and ‘not allowed’ was the 
advice. The soldier was so informed. He promptly responded that it would not cost 
the Army an additional cent to grant his request, in fact we would benefit, as he 
would still be at work and he asked me to reconsider. As I was doing that his sister 
died, alone. I wish I had that time over again.
The staff will generally give the policy line, the logos. You need to overlay it with 
the pathos and then make your decision. This may involve taking some risk, and I 
will talk about risk later on.
Three. You will need to have courage. Many of us are physically brave but morally 
weak. Yet I have never known a soldier with moral courage who did not own the 
other lesser attribute of physical bravery. Physical courage is important, but moral 
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courage is more challenging and more important. Moral courage demands that you 
do and say what you know to be right, even though you will catch several different 
kinds of hell for doing or saying it. It requires you to take the harder right, not the 
easy wrong. Always act in accordance with what is morally right without fear of the 
consequence for you or your team.
Moral courage is required in ordinary day to day business. And to have it means 
not being afraid to be unpopular. You may have been confronted with some inattention 
from a soldier … he didn’t salute when he should have. And you have been tempted 
to let it pass … ‘perhaps he didn’t see me’, ‘he’s from another unit with low standards’, 
or ‘I will let the RSM deal with it’. Well, each time you let it pass you weaken your own 
moral courage. And each time you fortify 
yourself, and address the inattention, you 
strengthen your moral courage. And if 
you do it properly, you increase the 
respect the soldier has for you.
As a commander you have a duty to 
establish the atmospherics so that a free 
exchange of views can be had—so that 
moral courage can be exhibited. The 
rank you wear and the experience you 
have relative to your subordinates can intimidate, so you need to work at it. The RSM 
should be a reliable source to advise whether your team are telling you what they 
actually think, or whether they are giving you what they think you want to hear.
Four. And so to risk, about which there are three points that I wish to make.
In February 2006 while serving in Iraq we had a problem. The issue centred on 
a place called Spaghetti Junction in Baghdad. Lawlessness was keeping other than 
the unsuspecting away from there. Contractors would not traverse the area. Attacks 
against coalition and Iraqi security forces were launched from there. An Iraqi 
Division commander was killed by a sniper nearby. And a week after the Samara 
Mosque bombing the local population, a mix of Sunni and Shia, started to kill each 
other. The Force Commander, General George Casey, wanted Spaghetti Junction 
made quiescent; he wanted a brigade of tanks to be deployed to the area overnight 
and for operations to commence at dawn.
Now his staff, including me, thought this was unwise. Firstly, the tank 
commanders would not have time to reconnoitre the area properly and would be 
vulnerable to the enemy who had been ensconced there for some time. Secondly, 
we would have to uncover one of our vital supply routes by taking a tank battalion 
from a route security mission. Thirdly, we would be sending confusing messages; we 
had just finished telling governments and the press how well things were going and 
that we were reducing our profile—it is difficult to hide a brigade of tanks. Lastly, it 
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was unnecessary; a combination of ISR, attack helicopters and infantry who knew 
the area were available and could do the job.
I thought we had a good case. The commander accepted our points, and told us to 
get the tanks there anyway. Within 48 hours the enemy had been silenced, the locals 
calmed down and the press were congratulating us. This was a bold and successful 
decision, one that demonstrated the 
commander’s willpower; no one on staff had 
said that his idea was a good one. In fact, all 
of us who spoke suggested it was not.
A week earlier the Golden Mosque 
had been destroyed. This was the most 
confronting and inflammatory attack against 
the Shia since the war started—and we knew 
it. We, the operations staff, recommended 
immediate measures be put in place to 
protect against the likely Shia retaliation. We proposed an immediate vehicle ban, a 
curfew from last light, and increased security forces in mixed areas in Baghdad. A 
decision was taken to move cautiously with any emergency measures. The popula-
tion was tiring of them and we risked losing further popular support. The decision 
was made to wait 24 hours to see how things went. Overnight there were over one 
hundred people killed in reprisals in Baghdad and forty-seven were kidnapped, never 
to be seen again. We had been too cautious, too risk averse.
Now I suppose I could find some examples where being cautious paid off, but I have 
none where we were bold and wish we had not been. My first, and most important 
message about risk is that, in war, if you have a choice, take the bold option.
Point two. When you present your plans for endorsement to your boss you will 
probably include the risks associated with the proposed course of action. This is a 
good thing. But I have found it to be just as necessary to include the risks associated 
with not taking up the proposal; such an inclusion is helpful to keep otherwise 
cautious decision-makers moving forward.
In August 2005, again in Iraq, we prepared a plan, known as the ‘outside Baghdad 
strategy’. It was a good plan. General Casey tasked us with briefing it to senior Iraqi 
generals. The brief was taken by an elegant and well spoken three-star. He had 
served as a major general under Saddam Hussein. Early in the briefing we moved 
onto our assumptions. After the first one was explained he interrupted:
Ah yes, assumptions. It is particularly important to get these correct. I learnt this the 
hard way. When we were planning for the invasion of Kuwait, we established a set of 
assumptions. One of these was that Saudi Arabia would not permit foreign troops to be 
based on their soil … this was not a good assumption!
My first, and most important 
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My final point on risk is to be careful about writing it off in your planning.
I offer these observations because in barracks, back home here, there is pressure 
on us to reduce risk, to be cautious, to be predictable. This is necessary in peace. We 
must always minimise the chance of injury to those whom we have the good fortune 
to command; few soldiers would be happy to follow the lead of a commander who 
did not. But the best way to minimise risk to you and your command when you go 
from peace to war, is to switch from cautious to bold.
Five. Resources are a commander’s business. Ask for what you need with convic-
tion. But you need to do your homework before you put your case. In 2008 the 
commanding officer of the gun regiment, in my brigade, started to realise that if 
APEP went the way he was hearing then he was going to struggle with … well a 
bunch of things. And that was the problem; he had not put sufficient intellectual 
energy into the challenge and so could not clearly explain what he needed addressed 
and why. When he saw that he was not getting any traction, he thought about things 
a bit harder. ‘If you do not give me fifteen more 
gunners, then I can guarantee only one gun next 
year. And if that is all I can provide, then I cannot 
train the JOSC for MRTF3 and will not be able to 
accept Excalibur into the regiment next year.’ Now 
he got attention—and most of the human resources 
he needed.
You also need to get personally involved in 
the allocation of resources to subordinates. There 
is a tendency amongst staff to ‘nickel and dime’ 
resources when there is not enough to go around—you need to place weight on 
the main effort. And you will need to look up as well, to ensure that the higher 
headquarters staff do the same for you.
Six. The higher you get, the more the keys to success lay outside your organisa-
tion. You need to identify these and then get out and meet them. Tell them what 
your plans are, remembering the need to be able to tell it simply and concisely. And 
talk to them, don’t tell them, about how they can assist you.
Some of the key ones for commanding officers will be the Defence Support 
Group—the supporting third line health facility, especially with mental health as an 
increasing challenge for us—the Defence Community Organisation and the Defence 
Housing Authority. You will find these folks very receptive to a visit by you into 
their space early on in your tenure. Do your best to start on a positive note. Even if 
you have had a demoralising experience with Defence Housing Authority during 
your move, keep it separate from your introductory meeting. Identify your point of 
contact in the unit for normal business, but let them know that they can call you if 
the matter warrants it.
Resources are a 
commander’s business. 
Ask for what you need 
with conviction.
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You need also to consider the relationship with your boss. And this is my 
seventh point.
Seven. The more senior you get the more you have to think about your look up 
duties. We are taught, for most of our professional careers, about our responsibilities 
to our soldiers and we receive some very decent education in how to do this. The 
look up piece is usually dealt with by the need to be loyal both ways—up and down. 
For most this is not an issue—you usually work pretty close to your boss and see 
him very regularly; in a unit it is just about every day, so communication is frequent 
and personal. But as a commanding officer things will be quite different. Your 
brigade commander will not be just down the corridor and you will not see him 
daily; once a fortnight is more usual. Much 
happens in two weeks, some of which will be 
important to your boss.
What I suggest you do when you first 
call on your commander is to seek direction 
about his wake-up criteria: what are those 
things that you will need to tell him quickly 
and personally, and what can be left to 
standard reporting. You should also have a 
chat about how you will routinely communicate with each other: by email, SMS, 
phone or in-person meetings. A mix is the most practical, but difficult matters 
should be dealt with in-person or over the phone. And if nothing has happened 
worthy of discussion for a few weeks, then give the boss a call anyway. Tell him 
you are still on the end of the k-phone and all is well—he will appreciate it. I think 
a reasonable rule of thumb for commanding officers is to spend 60 per cent of 
your time looking down in your unit, 30 per cent looking out and across and 10 
per cent looking up.
Eight. Take care of yourself, mentally, physically and emotionally. Read, sleep, 
think and exercise.
I read every night, sometimes not for long. I usually get about ten pages in 
before I doze off. This serves two purposes. It helps build my knowledge; I read 
military history and a little philosophy. And it helps me wind down at the end of 
the day. Reading history can also be consoling.
In the first half of the 1990s there was much melancholy about as Defence 
adopted a policy of reducing numbers in uniform and contracting out services. 
Around this time I read an account of Napoleon’s 1796 invasion of Italy and his 
post operation report. Though the campaign was an extraordinary success, he had 
a complaint. Hitherto, the horses drawing his artillery had been ridden by soldiers, 
but now, on direction from Paris, they were operated by contractors. And these were 
less robust, worked shorter hours and were fussy about their food. So outsourcing 
The more senior you get 
the more you have to think 
about your look up duties.
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and the military is not new; the challenge was, and remains, to outsource the right 
things. I, at least, felt less troubled about the concept.
Sleep depravation is a significant hindrance to effective decision-making. Sleep 
is personal; so if you need four hours then take four, if you need seven hours then 
take seven.
You need to find time to reflect and think as command is an intellectual 
endeavour. Schedule thinking time in your diary for an hour, two or three times 
a week; do it just before lunch so that you can combine both periods to give you a 
couple of hours by yourself.
Of course physical exercise is part of the job. And despite the demands on your 
time you must find time to do it. Apart from the obvious health benefits you will 
find that exercise is a good opportunity to think and reflect. So doing it on your 
own, or with the RSM, is sensible—though physical training tests and combat fitness 
assessments are best done with the soldiers.
However you go about your command, never forget that there is no greater 
privilege than to be given command, lawful authority and responsibility of your 
fellow citizens.
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Military Organisational Change and 
American Counterinsurgency in Iraq
David Kuehn
Abstract
In 2002, John Nagl wrote an influential book titled Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife that 
analysed counterinsurgency attempts in the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War. With 
this book in mind, this article examines some of the counterinsurgency actions taken by US 
General David Petraeus during his tenure in Iraq in 2007 and 2008. It provides a comparison 
of the elements that Nagl details as necessary for an organisation to learn or adapt to new 
and challenging environments.
Introduction
Most organisations are dynamic and complex social systems formed to accomplish goals. Organisational change is a field of study that focuses on the organisation as a system and how the framework of that system 
interfaces and influences the performance of the individual. 1 As military organisa-
tions are inherently hierarchical, bureaucratic and sensitive in nature, the principles 
and practices governing this type of organisation generally devalue the need for 
change, and subsequently, little has been written concerning the necessity of change 
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within the military context. In 2002, John Nagl published a book based upon his 
doctoral thesis, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, which highlighted the funda-
mental importance of organisational change in the military. Nagl’s focus was the 
success of British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya and why, in contrast, 
American efforts failed in Vietnam.
The connection to organisational change is most evident in the chapter ‘Hard 
Lessons’, in which Nagl summarises the elements that the military must embrace to 
‘learn’ or adapt to new and challenging environments. The first is tactical innovation, 
in which the organisation recognises that they are currently not accomplishing their 
goals, and must adopt new methods in order to succeed. The second is strategic vision, 
which, when considered in the context of counterinsurgency, is the ability to recognise 
that the military component forms only one critical aspect of a counterinsurgency 
campaign. The bigger picture view, which is critical for the defeat of insurgents, also 
considers the link with economic and political components. The final element is that 
of The Man: a person with a vision or sufficient charisma who can persuade others to 
believe in his ideas. 2 The inspiration for authoring this article stems from both reading 
Nagl’s interpretation of the ways in which organisational change elements were applied 
to the US presence in Iraq, and also a personal interest in change management.
Background
In his influential 1964 text, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, author David Galula wrote 
that ‘the ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large land-locked country shaped 
like a blunt-tipped star … in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed rural 
population and a primitive economy’, 3 a scenario which is almost perfectly demon-
strated in Iraq. Possessing a hot climate, and home to 24 million people, Iraq is 
largely rural, with a handful of urban centres exceeding populations of one million. 4 
Iraq is a land-locked country, with the 
exception of Umm Qasr, a small port 
located in the south. The country is 
surrounded by six countries, three of which 
are considered hostile to US efforts—
specifically Iran, Jordan and Syria.
The rise of the Iraqi insurgency is 
well documented. The US-led invasion 
occurred in March 2003, yet by May 2003 
a local insurgency (initially perceived 
to be comprised of ‘regime dead-enders’ 5) had suddenly accelerated in strength 
and number. The impetus for this uprising was two decrees, which displaced some 
500,000 Iraqis from their employment. 6 The insurgency was exacerbated by the 
The insurgency was 
exacerbated by the US Army’s 
culture of being unwilling and 
unable to fight a guerrilla war.
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US Army’s culture of being unwilling and unable to fight a guerrilla war. According 
to John Nagl, the US Army ‘was focused from its inception on the idea of fighting 
decisive conventional conflicts’. 7 Locked in a conventional-tactic mindset, the US 
Army commenced building large Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and garrisoning 
large formations.
Although then-Commander General George Casey recognised that Iraq required 
a new way of fighting, he failed to implement his vision during his command. 8 With 
an organisational culture not suited to counterinsurgency, then-President George 
Bush, recognising the need for a fresh approach, appointed General David Petraeus 
as the new commander in Iraq. According to Australian Major General Jim Molan, 
this appointment came at a time marking the start of a fifth phase of the Iraqi 
war. 9 As such, January 2007 represents the turning point at which the United States 
fundamentally changed its methodology and style of fighting within an extremely 
short timeframe.
Tactical Innovation
Yet, before this January 2007 milestone, successful examples of counterinsurgency 
had occurred. After the 2003 invasion, General Petraeus secured the town of Mosul 
and initiated a variety of projects, remaining unhindered by the insurgency. In 2005, 
Colonel H R McMaster led the notable Operation RESTORING RIGHTS in Tal Afar 
(from which the phrase was coined ‘Clear, Hold and Build’). When taking back the 
town of Ramadi in the Anbar province in 2006, Colonel Sean MacFarland cham-
pioned many of the same techniques used by 
Colonel McMaster in helping the Anbar 
awakening. 10 However, these examples were 
the exception. Most units maintained the 
‘kill-capture’ approach, or focused on force-
projection to contain the insurgency, in 
which ‘success was measured in the number 
of insurgents and of top-level Baathists from 
the deck of playing cards who were elimi-
nated’. 11 Naturally, this tactic generated 
inconsistent results. Preceding the first Iraq national election in 2005, Major General 
Molan noted, ‘every time they tried to focus on a particular city, we had to go and 
fight somewhere else’. 12 As recognition increased that the application of conventional 
fighting techniques was failing, a new appreciation for the use of minimum force in 
dealing with the insurgency was reached.
Until 2007, issues with the ‘kill-capture’ approach were augmented by the prefer-
ence to house troops in large FOBs. This tactic gave the insurgency the freedom to 
Most units maintained the 
‘kill-capture’ approach, or 
focused on force-projection 
to contain the insurgency…
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manoeuvre at will, and also allowed them to choose the field of battle, set ambushes 
and deploy Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs). In short, remote living via FOBs 
gave the insurgency the advantage. Most military command courses teach the 
importance of OODA (Orient, Observe, Decide, Act), and the necessity to get inside 
the decision-making cycle of the enemy. The FOB strategy meant that US forces 
were reactive instead of proactive, and could never seriously have an impact on the 
decision-making cycle of the enemy. This was generated by the incorrect assumption 
that US forces were the problem.
Under General Petraeus, and acting upon the advice of advisors like David 
Kilcullen, the FOB strategy was slowly abandoned and US troops began to ‘get out 
and walk’. 13 Outposts were planned across Baghdad, similar to those devised under 
Colonel McMasters’ post-attack plan of Tal Afar in November 2005. To help stem 
the violence, these outposts were traditionally located in abandoned buildings, at 
selected positions in which the majority of hostilities were occurring. 14 As the 
‘surge’ units arrived in theatre and were deployed, they were positioned in these 
outposts around Baghdad, in concentrations ranging from thirty-five to one 
hundred personnel (platoon to company sized). 15 This affirmed Galula’s belief that 
the ‘crux of problems for the counterinsurgent is to keep an area clean’. 16 Practical 
counterinsurgency Key Performance Indicators were introduced to company 
commanders (for example, what percentage of your force is continually operating 
outside the FOB?). This is best illus-
trated in an example cited by Ricks, in 
which the 1st Cavalry unit were told 
that having two-thirds of their strength 
working amongst the population was 
not enough; a goal of 75 per cent was to 
be achieved. 17
The intention of these Key 
Performance Indicators was also to 
achieve more than just the security of 
the population. The medium-term goal 
focused on population control. To prevent sectarian attacks, gated communities 
were established, and thousands of cement barriers erected (the barriers separating 
Adhamiyah from a Shiite area were twelve feet high and three miles long). 18 As 
previously conducted in Tal Afar, a census was taken of residents around the 
outposts in Baghdad, recognising the criticality of comprehending where citizens 
were located. As Iraq entered Spring (March–May 2008), over 15,000 concerned 
Baghdad citizens had volunteered to be registered in a US tracking system. 19 These 
results were not immediate, and required two or three months of constant patrolling 
by the same static units to build a basic level of awareness (that is, knowledge of who 
Following the invasion of Iraq, 
this was the first time that all 
units were operating to the same 
policy as detailed in the new 
counterinsurgency manual…
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was in your area and who belonged there). Following the invasion of Iraq, this was 
the first time that all units were operating to the same policy as detailed in the new 
counterinsurgency manual (issued in December 2006), specifically the population 
protection policy. It was not until June 2007 that all the necessary troops and vital 
population protection mechanisms were established, against a background of insur-
gency attacks, and al-Qaeda began to lose ground, their lines of communication and 
the freedom to manoeuvre. From February 2007 through to July 2007, there was 
a steady increase in American fatalities, but a decrease in Iraqi civilian deaths. 20 
General Petraeus remained firm even as 2007 became the deadliest year for US 
forces. Paradoxically, the final quarter of 2007 represented the lowest three-month 
death toll of the war. Yet under General Petraeus, US forces had more than just 
policy, they also had doctrine and from that, tactics to fight with. They had started 
to regain the strategic initiative.
Strategic Vision
Ricks wrote that good tactics can’t fix a bad 
strategy, but a good strategy tends to fix bad 
tactics. 21 In a 2007 interview, Nagl stated that 
‘the establishment of a legitimate, functioning 
government is the surest means to fostering 
a lasting peace’. 22 From 2003 until 2006, a 
strategy of transition was the only way to 
achieve this goal, with very little time or 
money spent on protecting the population or 
providing security. Key metrics from 2005 and 2006 were focused on the speed with 
which the Americans were handing control of Iraqi provinces to national security. 
A notable statistic included in Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s article ‘Changing the 
Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’ highlights that:
[in] an analysis of 127 US pacification operations in Iraq between May 2003 to May 
2005, most ops were reactive to insurgent activity—seeking to hunt down insurgents. 
It is important to note that only 6% of ops were specifically directed to create a secure 
environment for the population. 23
At first there was a refusal to admit that an insurgency existed. George Packer’s 
anecdote in The Assassins’ Gate discusses a meeting between a retired American 
counterinsurgency expert and a Special Forces colonel, in which the colonel declares 
that there was no insurgency in Iraq, just a high level of domestic violence. 24 
Possibly the best summation of the reluctance of senior American officials is from 
an anonymous officer in Iraq, who said:
Ricks wrote that good 
tactics can’t fix a bad 
strategy, but a good strategy 
tends to fix bad tactics.
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They did not want to say the ‘insurgency’ word, because the next word you say is 
‘quagmire.’ The next thing you say is ‘the only war America has lost.’ And the next thing 
you conclude is that certain people’s vision of war is wrong. 25
How then, did the United States recognise that the strategic vision was wrong, 
that the policy of transition was a failure, and that initiative and focus were required 
to provide security for the general population?
An organisation’s strategy is susceptible to external factors, and the US presence 
in Iraq was no exception. Several incidents occurred that fostered the desire to 
change the strategic focus of Iraq. These included the failure of Operations 
TOGETHER FORWARD I and II in late 2006, the ‘thumping’ of the Republicans in 
the 2006 mid-term election, and importantly, the transition of the role of Defense 
Secretary from Donald Rumsfeld to Robert Gates. These events began to generate 
a strong desire, at the least, among the political leadership of the United States to 
listen to advocates for change and respond in kind. Consequently, President Bush 
and his advisors were now more willing to listen to alternative ideas about Iraq, 
namely for a ‘surge’ of troops.
Yet this wouldn’t be the first time US forces had surged in Iraq; in fact, this was 
actually the third surge. The first surge, between June 2004 and February 2005, 
increased personnel in theatre from 138,000 to 155,000. 26 Major General Molan 
acknowledged that they ‘could not have successfully conducted the first Iraqi election 
in January 2005 without those extra troops’. 27 By June 2005, the first surge had ended 
and service personnel numbers in Iraq fell to 135,000. 28 By December 2005, a second 
surge saw in-theatre personnel increase to 160,000 before falling away to 126,900 
by June 2006. In contrast, the third surge in 
2007 was underpinned by a greater apprecia-
tion of how to deploy, maintain, and use 
these members.
Much of the debate and decision-making 
concerning an increase in the number 
of deployed personnel appears to have 
occurred well before General Petraeus 
assumed command in Iraq, and was driven 
largely behind the scenes by retired General 
Jack Keane. As the notion of a surge found favour, Keane was also responsible for 
recommending and supporting Petraeus as the sole candidate to lead the revised US 
approach. 29 This new approach focused on putting counterinsurgency within the 
economic and political context. Against this, there was still opposition to the surge 
proposal, as the senior leadership believed that the motivation for the insurgency 
was the presence of American soldiers. The proposed ‘surge’ increase was firmly 
… senior leadership believed 
that the motivation for the 
insurgency was the presence 
of American soldiers.
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opposed by General Casey and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous 
compromises sought and suggested.
With this in mind, General Petraeus wanted to ensure that the ‘surge’ personnel 
would be deployed in the most beneficial way and appointed the Joint Strategic 
Assessment Team (JSAT) to create a new campaign plan with a ‘detailed political 
strategy for achieving reconciliation from the bottom up, based on confidence-
building measures and improved security in 2007’. 30 Strategically, it was also 
recognised that the United States faced a Long War, 31 and that the conflict could be 
a protracted and generational fight. The issue had narrowed to the consideration 
of what the United States wanted as the result in Iraq. The focus on democracy and 
transformation in the Middle East was replaced with one of stability, and the desire 
to keep Iraq as one nation with many cultures.
The Man
To quote David Lloyd Owen, in an insurgency, ‘you need a man with a lot of imagi-
nation to run this kind of war, and one with an understanding of the political nature 
of the war’. 32 As discussed earlier, Petraeus’ actions in Mosul in 2003 was one of a 
handful of successful examples of counterinsurgency. Then, General Petraeus arrived 
in theatre with a clear understanding of how to fight with a new direction. Once 
there, General Petraeus immediately adopted a ‘population-orientated approach’, 33 
which highlighted the differences between him and other commanders, a notable 
distinction at the time. While other American units conducted operations in which 
they applied overwhelming force to kill the enemy, General Petraeus conducted 
counterinsurgency aimed at reducing support for the enemy, and fostering relations 
among the community. 34 This point is crucial; Petraeus endeavoured to ‘create 
as many Iraqis as possible who feel they have a stake in the new Iraq’. 35 General 
Petraeus ensured that he controlled 36 all intelligence and operations and strove to 
‘restore economic activity and generate a functioning Iraqi administration’. 37
A second assignment for General Petraeus was rebuilding the Iraqi Security 
Forces, a task to which he was appointed in 2004 after his actions in Mosul. General 
Petraeus quickly recognised that the Iraqi units were being trained to be a mecha-
nised force, and were unsuitable for fighting an insurgency. By April 2005, he had 
raised, trained and overseen the equipping of nearly one hundred Iraqi battalions 
(albeit of mixed quality due to the lack of ‘seasoned’ leaders). In October 2005, one 
month after completing his second tour in Iraq, General Petraeus took up a new post 
at Leavenworth, and was responsible for the first update in nearly twenty years of the 
counterinsurgency manual used by the US Army and Marine Corps. 38 In his role, 
overseeing publication, General Petraeus included lessons learned from Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and stressed ‘cultural awareness, personal contacts, reconstruction 
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strategies and close cooperation with non-military agencies’. 39 All too aware of 
the significance of the manual, General Petraeus stated: ‘This is about institutional 
change, and the whole Army is included. It is a kind of a generational change’. 40
As General Petraeus took command, he endorsed the call for a third surge of 
troops. This included an additional 36,000 soldiers over time, 41 and increased 
personnel numbers in Iraq from 135,000 in February 2007 to 171,000 by 
October 2007. 42 General Casey, along with other detractors, 43 maintained their 
stand against the surge of numbers; the ‘boots on the ground’ strategy, it was 
claimed, would ‘simply force the militias 
into temporary hiding … wasting 
thousands more Americans lives in the 
process’. 44 The pressure on General 
Petraeus was immense, with impatience 
towards Iraq from all sides—even the 
Iraqi Government, it was said, was 
‘lukewarm on the idea’. 45 One US Senator 
stated that ‘this is the last chance for the 
Iraqis’. 46 Such was the pessimism, that the 
chances of success for the ‘surge’ strategy 
were put at one in three. 47 Both supporters and opponents of the surge thought that 
it would create a significant increase in US casualties. General Petraeus understood 
this, and took to his role with ‘a sense of urgency and an understanding that it was 
“now or never” in Iraq’. 48 General Petraeus explained his perspective by saying:
If we fail here nobody will ever care what we did next. If we succeed it won’t matter. So 
we need to act like this is the last job we will ever do. 49
Conclusion
To survive, an organisation must recognise when it is not meeting its objectives, and 
learn from its mistakes, a task made extraordinarily complex in an authoritative and 
hierarchical organisation like the United States Army. In his classic work, On War, 
Clausewitz wrote of coup d’oeil, or flexibility of thought. Yet, flexibility of thought is 
irrelevant if it does not drive the institution to achieve its objectives. In reviewing 
the tactical decisions, shift in strategy, and ‘championing’ by General Petraeus, there 
is little that is revolutionary. Many of the tactics implemented by the surge simply 
demonstrate that General Petraeus did learn from the past. However, when placed in 
context, the three facets as suggested by Nagl (Tactical Innovation, Strategic Vision 
and The Man) are clearly evident.
General Petraeus conducted 
counterinsurgency aimed 
at reducing support for the 
enemy, and fostering relations 
among the community.
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As written in FM 3-24, ‘the primary objective of any [counterinsurgency] 
operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate govern-
ment’. 50 This doctrine has now been adopted via a ‘strategy of protecting the popula-
tion, co-opting and winning over the reconcilables, expanding the “center” of Iraqi 
politics, marginalizing the extremes, and eliminating the irreconcilables’. 51 President 
Barrack Obama’s recent call to revert back to a discredited policy of ‘transition’ 
after only two years of remarkable success, will be tested by whether the Malaki 
Government can successfully remain legitimate, and can govern a cohesive society 
following the pending departure of the Americans.
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and Education
Practice makes perfect
Army Simulation Wing and 
mission-specific training
Major Stan Carnes and Steven Holloway
Abstract
It is recognised that the application of simulation is a key enabler in enhancing the effec-
tiveness and efficiency in the conduct of training, and supports the adaptation required to 
maximise performance on operations. The development of the mission specific training 
program has witnessed the use of live, virtual/hybrid and constructive simulations within 
a single training activity. The aim of this article is to define the mission specific training 
concept and discuss its evolution and methodology, which includes the application of 
deliberate practice. The article will then discuss the rationale behind its development, its 
associated benefits and the way ahead.
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Introduction
The ‘Adaptive Army’ restructure constitutes the most significant change to the Australian Army since the implementation of the Hassett reforms in 1973. Adaptive Army aims to change the Army’s approach to and conduct of its 
core business, seeking to effect profound reform in training, personnel management, 
knowledge management, learning cycles and, eventually, the culture of the Army.
The key feature of the Adaptive Army restructure was the raising of the Land 
Combat Readiness Centre (LCRC) in December 2008. The LCRC’s aim is to realise 
the 1st Division’s force preparation vision of ‘leading edge, mission ready land forces’. 
The LCRC is destined to become the Army’s centre of excellence in preparing forces 
for deployment while also assuming responsibility for supporting post-deployment 
reintegration into Forces Command.
The LCRC’s role is to provide practised, ready and certified forces for operations 
and contingencies. The centre also conducts warfighting training to support achieve-
ment of Army mission essential task requirements. In addition, the LCRC supports 
Commander 1 Division by coordinating higher level training and assessment in order 
to raise training standards across the Army. The centre aims to standardise procedures 
for the mounting, assessment, certification 
and demounting of force elements so as to 
maximise the Army’s success in current and 
future operations. This will inevitably lead to 
further efficiencies in the way the Army 
employs its resources.
The Combat Training Centre is an integral 
element of the LCRC. Throughout 2009 
the Combat Training Centre was primarily 
responsible for the conduct of mission 
rehearsal exercises, while Army Simulation 
Wing provided the opportunity for units 
to undertake mission specific training (MST) as a precursor to mission rehearsal 
exercises. Towards the end of 2009, following a review of the Army Simulation Wing 
MST program by Commander Land Warfare Development Centre, responsibility 
for this training was transferred to the LCRC. The transfer was formalised in a 
Commander’s Directive issued in mid-December 2009, with transition scheduled 
to occur during 2010. 1 The transfer of responsibility for simulation support for all 
pre-deployment training activities from LCRC to Army Simulation Wing will also 
be examined as part of the LCRC establishment review scheduled for the second half 
of 2010. Army Simulation Wing currently supports a number of pre-deployment 
training activities under the direction of the Combat Training Centre.
… Army Simulation Wing 
provided the opportunity for 
units to undertake mission 
specific training (MST) 
as a precursor to mission 
rehearsal exercises.
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This article will describe the origins of the former Army Simulation Wing MST 
program, what the program delivered, and how this training capability will be 
integrated into the LCRC force preparation continuum, otherwise known as the 
‘Road to War’.
WHAT IS MST?
On 17 February 2005 the Australian Government decided to deploy additional 
Australian troops to Iraq, raising the force known as the Al Muthanna Task Group 
(AMTG1). The AMTG1 was based on Headquarters 2 Cavalry Regiment, a cavalry 
squadron and a mechanised infantry company from 5/7 RAR, all located in Darwin. 
The Combat Training Centre was tasked with assisting 1 Brigade in the conduct of 
a mission rehearsal exercise for AMTG1, scheduled for the early part of April 2005 
prior to its deployment to Iraq. The Hamel Battle Simulation Centre in Robertson 
Barracks was directed to provide suitable simulation to support the training that 
underpinned the mission rehearsal exercise.
In concert with the Combat Training Centre’s Battle Command Wing, Army 
Simulation Wing provided a commercial off-the-shelf simulation known as Steel 
Beasts Two (SB2) to meet this training requirement at the Battle Simulation Centre. 
The simulation was used to familiarise AMTG1 soldiers with the area of operations, 
provide troop-level tactical training, and assist Commander AMTG1 and his head-
quarters staff in their operational planning. An additional off-the-shelf simulation, 
Virtual Battle Space One (VBS1), was also deployed to add combined arms elements 
largely absent from SB2, which is vehicle-centric.
The Battle Simulation Centre supported this pre-deployment training, allowing 
soldiers, particularly tactical level commanders, to be exposed to the simulation 
systems. Anecdotal reports from soldiers suggest that they benefitted from exposure 
to simulation; likewise Commander AMTG1 also recognised the value of simulation 
in providing his soldiers an accelerated force preparation.
The inclusion of a ‘virtual’ games-based simulation training package as part of 
the Combat Training Centre mission rehearsal exercise for AMTG1 was a another 
key step in the exploitation of simulation within the Army. The provision of training 
for AMTG1 provided the impetus for the opening of the Land Command Battle 
Laboratory in 2005, which subsequently evolved into the Combined Arms Tactical 
Trainer within the Combat Training Centre.
The Combined Arms Tactical Trainer often provided the first opportunity for units 
to be exposed to simulation-based training at the collective level in a mission specific 
environment. The ‘whole of exercise’ support model was employed using current 
operational experiences and designed by exercise planners familiar with the opera-
tional environment. This was an effective mechanism for training that provided sound 
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preparation for units prior to their participation in mission rehearsal exercises. In 
2007, the Combat Training Centre relinquished responsibility for the Combined Arms 
Tactical Trainer to Army Simulation Wing for the purposes of conducting pre-mission 
rehearsal exercise training. This led to the development of the MST program.
In 2008, Army Simulation Wing undertook a six-month ‘proof of concept’ pilot 
for its support to MST. The pilot was initiated to support Reconstruction Task Force 4 
field training at Wide Bay Training Area over a period of five days. The Army 
Simulation Wing team provided three platoon-level simulation rotations using 
Virtual Battle Space Two (VBS2). Each rotation involved the receipt and issue of 
orders by the platoon commander and the conduct of battle procedure, followed by 
the execution of simulated platoon-level tactics, techniques and procedures in 
response to improvised explosive device, ambush, and other simulated activities over 
a 24 to 36-hour period. An after-action report followed the completion of each 
platoon rotation, covering the full spectrum of learning from orders preparation, 
delivery and conduct of tasks. Other support 
tasks saw the pilot program supporting force 
preparation for deployments to Afghanistan, 
the Middle East and the Solomon Islands.
Following the successful conduct of this 
pilot, additional operational funding was 
secured to initiate a rolling MST program 
available to units over a three-year period. In 
late 2008 and early 2009 a series of unit liaison 
visits and planning conferences established 
MST programs to support selected operational deployments occurring throughout 
2009. During that year, support was provided to units deploying to Afghanistan, 
Iraq, East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Scenarios were designed based on the 
experiences of those recently returned from operational theatres, and from data 
collated by the Centre for Army Lessons. The scenarios were flexible and adjusted to 
meet the unit commanders’ training requirements and applicable directed mission 
essential task lists. By the end of the year Army Simulation Wing had supported over 
thirty discrete training activities, each lasting around a week.
While foundation warfighting training involves preparation for an unspecified 
conflict, MST as defined during the course of the program was unit-led training for 
a defined conflict. MST itself is defined as,
the training for directed tasks that delivers the particular knowledge, skills and attitudes to 
prepare the individual, team, or task force to deploy on operations in a specific theatre, role 
or environment. The content of MST is driven by the mission, environment and threat. 2
The ‘whole of exercise’ 
support model was 
employed using current 
operational experiences …
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Simulation support to MST was developed by Army Simulation Wing to provide 
a flexible capability to unit commanders as part of the force preparation cycle. The 
MST program is principally a technology-based, contractor-supported, unit-led 
preparation for attendance at a mission rehearsal exercise conducted by the Combat 
Training Centre. MST is a component of the initial concentration period for units 
deploying on operations, and focuses on the practice of techniques, procedures and 
drills prior to the mission rehearsal exercise. MST activity development and execution 
is often a collaborative arrangement between Army Simulation Wing and the unit, 
the level and type of training ultimately developed and delivered at the unit 
commander’s discretion and tailored to meet unit training requirements. Consequently 
the focus, level and type of MST varies between units. Its delivery also occurs primarily 
in the respective battle simulation centres of 
each brigade and uses other training facilities 
as dictated by the activity.
A key aspect of MST activity design is the 
application, where practicable, of ‘deliberate 
practice’. The concept of deliberate practice 
has emerged from the work of cognitive 
psychologists who determined that the best 
performers achieved their success through a 
combination of both deliberate and reflec-
tive practice. 3 Practice is generally accepted as a necessary part of the acquisition 
of expertise. Exceptional or expert performance typically results from extended 
periods of intense preparation and training or ‘deliberate practice’:
Deliberate practice occurs when individuals, who are highly motivated to develop 
a skill, engage in a carefully sequenced set of structured practice activities aimed 
at developing a target skill. Optimal learning takes place when a student performs 
a well-defined task, at an appropriate level of difficultly. The student then receives 
informative feedback, and is given opportunities for repetition to correct errors and 
polish the skill before moving to the next task. 4
Deliberate practice therefore promotes adaptive thinking based on the premise 
that practising some skills may ‘free cognitive resources for higher level decision-
making’. 5 Some key characteristics of deliberate practice as applied to MST are 
described in Table 1.
What The Program Delivered
The MST program developed throughout 2009 featured activity design based on 
deliberate practice with repetition in either a lane-based approach or a command 
post exercise. The basic MST activity was usually lane-based with a linkage between 
The MST program is 
principally a technology-
based, contractor-supported, 
unit-led preparation …
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virtual and live lane activities. Training supported by simulation is applied in 
vignette-style lane-based scenarios or supporting command post exercises. All 
training is conducted by the unit against the achievement of training objectives 
through the deliberate practice of techniques, procedures and drills.
Training lanes are provided up to platoon/troop level and can include the 
employment of attachments configured for operations such as a section of armoured 
vehicles. The complexity of lanes depends on the training objectives and level of 
Table 1. Deliberate practice characteristics applied to MST
Character Description
Repetition Task performance occurs repetitively rather than at its naturally 
occurring frequency.
MST provides the opportunity to practise procedures, techniques and 
drills. 
Focused 
feedback 
Task performance is facilitated by the coach and learner during 
performance.
MST includes focused feedback sessions during the activity and formal 
after-action reviews at its conclusion. 
Immediacy of 
performance
After corrective feedback on task performance there is immediate 
repetition so that the task can be performed in accordance with 
expected norms.
MST activity conduct allows repetition as required. Virtual training 
activities also allow training scenarios to be quickly reset and hence 
allow the trainees more exposure.
Emphasis 
on difficult 
aspects
Deliberate practice will focus on more difficult aspects.
MST is dictated by the training objectives determined by the unit 
commander. Simulation allows us to replicate the difficult aspects (e.g. 
air support) that cannot be achieved in traditional ‘live only’ training.
Focus on 
areas of 
weakness 
Deliberate practice can be tailored to the individual and focused on 
areas of weakness.
In MST this is dictated by the training objectives determined by the 
unit commander. Live and virtual ‘lanes’ can target specific areas of 
weakness.
Active 
coaching
Typically, a coach must be very active during deliberate practice, 
monitoring performance, assessing adequacy, and controlling the 
structure of training.
Observer trainers or mentors are employed during MST.
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training. The lanes can be conducted both in a virtual environment using gaming 
simulations such as the Virtual Battlespace Simulation, and the live environ-
ment using the Tactical Engagement Simulation System and aids for simulated 
battlefield effects.
Virtual lane training is an activity designed to train individual soldiers and small 
teams in various techniques, drills and procedures used on operations. Training is 
conducted in the battle simulation centre with computer-aided simulation such as 
Virtual Battlespace Simulation or Steel Beasts Professional. These simulations can 
introduce soldiers to scenarios and the use of 
equipment not normally available in a field 
setting including armoured vehicles 
and helicopters.
While virtual training has its benefits, it is 
usually only employed in scenarios that cannot 
be replicated in a live environment. By using 
virtual simulations as a precursor to live training, 
leaders can train for more complex events 
often neglected due to resource limitations. A 
virtual training environment that allows units to 
exercise and refine standard operating procedures, rehearse reporting procedures 
and ground tactical movement can save unit commanders valuable resources that 
are typically expended during the first thirty-six hours in the field when sections 
and platoons are preparing to conduct training.
Under the MST delivery model, up to two virtual lane training activities are 
conducted at platoon/troop level or below. Each training activity lasts five days and 
can be conducted as a precursor to live lane training. Live lane training, usually 
conducted in the field utilising the Tactical Engagement Simulation System, is 
designed to train individual soldiers and small teams in various techniques, drills 
and procedures to be used on operations. Subject to the availability of equipment, 
the activity can involve the use of armoured vehicles including the ASLAV and 
Bushmaster, and may also include battlefield effects to simulate mines and 
indirect fire.
The MST program involves the conduct of up to two live lane training activities at 
platoon/troop level or below over a five-day period. This training can be conducted 
in conjunction with virtual lane training.
Collective and staff training is undertaken primarily through the conduct of 
command post exercises. A command post exercise is an activity primarily designed 
to train headquarters staff. Ideally, this training should closely replicate the opera-
tional environment, be it an office, tent or command vehicle. Command post 
exercises can be supported by either ‘constructive’ simulations such as the Australian 
Training supported by 
simulation is applied in 
vignette-style lane-based 
scenarios or supporting 
command post exercises.
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Brigade and Battle Simulation (known as AB2S) or scripted events through a master 
event list. The conduct of a command post exercise includes the establishment of an 
exercise control to ensure training is executed as planned and that training objec-
tives are achieved. Where practical, command posts are constructed within the 
battle simulation centres or other training locations to replicate both the layout and 
the command and control systems used in theatre. The training is structured to 
allow the repetition of events so that standard 
operating procedures can be practised until 
perfected. A military appreciation process 
exercise can also be conducted as a staff 
training activity and would normally precede 
the conduct of a command post exercise. 
Both activities are supported through the use 
of observer trainers and mentors for 
commanders and their staff.
Under the MST delivery model, up to 
two command post exercise activities are 
conducted at battle group and/or combat team level. Each command post exercise 
is conducted over a five-day period. A military appreciation exercise for key battle 
group staff may be included in lieu of one command post exercise.
The MST objective is to ensure that units are better prepared for mission rehearsal 
exercises. The various ‘building blocks’ that underpin MST also produce a number 
of key benefits which result from and contribute to the desired end-state. These are 
illustrated in Figure 1.
MST provides commanders and key staff the opportunity to practise and learn 
in the early stages of the force preparation cycle. MST can also be used to provide 
sustainment training, particularly for units with high personnel turnover, in order 
to capture subject matter expertise and experience. Changes to key leadership 
positions in a unit following a deployment tend to erode the experience base of 
the unit. With the current high operational tempo, standard operating procedures, 
reporting procedures, tactics and techniques need to be taught quickly to new 
personnel and rehearsed collectively so that the unit retains its operational effec-
tiveness. This ensures that any weaknesses are identified early and can be addressed 
prior to the unit’s mission rehearsal exercise.
Preparation time immediately prior to a deployment is limited, particularly if 
the unit is being rounded out through attachments from other units. Deploying 
units often do not have sufficient people, time and resources to properly train in 
both individual and collective skills. Resources may also be retained by higher 
headquarters because of tight deployment schedules, land restrictions and 
logistics constraints. Most unit commanders welcome any support that assists 
The training is structured 
to allow the repetition of 
events so that standard 
operating procedures can 
be practised until perfected.
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force preparation programs and provides relief for unit headquarters staff and 
subordinate commanders.
As MST is an activity based on collaboration between the unit and Army 
Simulation Wing, there is a high degree of flexibility in the type of training environ-
ments that can be used. MST is designed to achieve training objectives in the time 
available as part of the unit’s pre-deployment training. During the conduct of MST 
activities there is some scope to adjust the training 
tempo and repeat activities to practise key proce-
dures under varying conditions.
Adaptive thinking is an active process—it is a 
form of behaviour. Repetitive performance allows 
thinking processes to become automatic so that 
they can be performed quickly and accurately 
with less mental effort. As more elements become 
automatic, complex models can be developed 
without a proportionate increase in mental effort. This allows experts to use their 
knowledge flexibly and creatively in complex situations. An increase in automatic 
action and cognitive flexibility is characteristic of expert performance. By providing 
an opportunity for units to conduct repetitive training, MST subjects units to greater 
pressure during the mission rehearsal exercise, allowing a more rigorous application 
of their techniques and procedures.
Adaptive thinking is an 
active process—it is a 
form of behaviour.
Figure 1. MST building blocks and key benefits.
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The Next Steps
Early 2010 has seen the integration of the Combat Training Centre and Army 
Simulation Wing capabilities and led to the adoption of a partnered planning 
approach between the two organisations. This has led to greater recognition of the 
way each organisation can best support unit force preparation. The approach that 
will see the current simulation capabilities within Army combined to deliver the 
optimum effect in terms of replication, instrumentation and training delivery is 
still evolving. Initial discussions between the Combat Training Centre and Army 
Simulation Wing have led to the proposal of a possible model for training within 
the live simulation domain, illustrated in Figure 2.
The integration of virtual and constructive simulations was also tested in MST 
activities in late 2009. Command teams experienced virtual immersion in computer-
aided training scenarios that were linked as part of the command post exercise. 
Those involved in these virtual vignettes regarded this as highly effective training. 
Ideally, the Combat Training Centre’s ‘Road to War’ construct will be characterised 
by further progress in the optimum application of simulation technology.
Figure 2. Combat Training Centre/Army Simulation Wing live training integration.
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Conclusion
The last five years have seen significant development in the application of simula-
tion training within the Army. The former Army Simulation Wing MST program 
has been one of these developments. The program provided commanders with the 
ability to train within their unit location and tailor their training to hone their unit’s 
core skills through the application of deliberate practice.
While the MST program has enjoyed some success, Army Simulation Wing 
still faces a number of challenges before its role in MST and, to a larger extent, 
in simulation itself, are fully embraced by the Army. These challenges primarily 
concern the synchronisation of Army Simulation Wing support to individual and 
collective training activities within the force preparation continuum. Thus far, 
progress towards the integration of Army Simulation Wing into the LCRC ‘Road to 
War’ has been encouraging.
As the Deputy Director of Simulation Development, Robert Carpenter, stated 
in 2005, ‘the challenge is to institutionalise [the] use [of simulation] and continue 
to demonstrate its value’. 6 Likewise, the initiatives of the former MST program, 
particularly its use of simulation, must also be ‘institutionalised’ to ensure that its 
benefits for the Army are maintained and sustained over the foreseeable future.
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Close Combat
Army’s Fundamental Skill
Major James Davis
Abstract
Army’s doctrine is absolutely certain of the importance of close combat. Land Warfare 
Doctrine 1 (LWD–1) in fact describes close combat as Army’s fundamental skill—is this 
true? Is the doctrinal focus of close combat reflected in the training areas and schools of 
the Army? The anecdotal evidence is that it is not. An examination of recent works on 
distributed manoeuvre identifies the essential characteristics of any close combat training 
‘system’. Training close combat is at the forefront of United States Marine Corps thinking, 
and they have institutionalised this as part of Exercise Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). The 
EMV construct is broadly applicable to the Australian Army, and its adoption represents an 
opportunity to align actions with doctrine.
Battles are fought by platoons and squads. Place emphasis on small unit 
combat instruction so that it is conducted with the same precision as 
close-order drill. 1
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If anyone requires convincing that the Australian Army is serious about succeeding in close combat then Land Warfare Doctrine 1 (LWD-1) should be their first stop. In the opening chapter it states:
The Army’s mission is to win the land battle. The Army achieves its mission by providing a 
potent, versatile, adaptable and agile land force that can be applied with discrimination and 
precision to protect and promote Australia’s national interests. Close combat is the Army’s 
fundamental skill. Mastery of close combat underlies the application of land power. 2
The italics are mine, added to highlight the absolute centrality of close combat to 
Army’s capability and mission. If there are still any doubters, LWD-1 continues:
An army adept at close combat possesses the essential foundation for undertaking the full 
range of military operations. The ability to be successful in close combat is imperative to 
the application of manoeuvre theory. Close combat skills are the result of an ethos and 
training regime that emphasises the importance of the fighting soldier, a willingness to 
endure hardship, to apply force appropriately and an ability to function as part of a team 
in lethal circumstances. 3
Following these convincing opening salvos it is probably superfluous to remind 
readers that the Chief of Army’s first core competency is that every Australian 
soldier is an ‘expert in close combat’. 4 Given the absolute importance given to close 
combat in our doctrine we must be thinking and training this stuff furiously, right? 
Right? Alas, the anecdotal evidence is that we are not. There are many combat arms 
officers who have never planned or conducted combined arms live fire breaches at 
any level, and soldiers who have never felt, seen or heard what intimate suppression 
looks like. Other symptoms are Tactical Exercise Without Troops and Command 
Post Exercises conducted without ‘consideration’ for gun target lines and minimum 
safe distances of supporting arms. I acknowledge 
this is anecdotal evidence and it would be foolish 
to assume that excellent close combat training 
hasn’t or isn’t occurring in units. The point I 
make is that there doesn’t appear to be an 
organisational or institutional approach to close 
combat training in the Australian Army.
Why the Australian Army isn’t training close 
combat as well as it potentially could is a difficult 
question to answer. I will only briefly touch on 
this en route to the main objective of this article, 
which is to understand what improved close combat training could look like in the 
Australian Army. This will be examined in two parts: first through an examina-
tion of the characteristics of close combat from a training perspective, and then 
… there doesn’t appear to 
be an organisational or 
institutional approach to 
close combat training in 
the Australian Army.
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briefly constructing a straw man for institutionalised close combat training in the 
Australian Army. Many of the ideas for the straw man come from the United States 
Marine Corps (USMC) exercise Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). EMV is a twenty-
eight day Operation ENDURING FREEDOM pre-deployment training package 
conducted at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in California.
A necessary preliminary to this discussion is to define the term ‘close combat’, 
which has been obscured by a melee of related terms such as ‘close battle’, ‘close 
quarter battle’ and ‘close quarter combat’. The definition of close combat provided 
by Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, and that which is used 
in this discussion is:
Close combat is that carried out with direct fire weapons, against identifiable individuals, 
supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires and nonlethal engagement means. Note: 
Close combat defeats or destroys the enemy forces or seizes and retains ground. 5
This definition implies close combat occurs in offensive and defensive manoeuvres, 
but for the sake of simplicity I will discuss close combat in an offensive context only. 
The exclusion of the defensive phase of war would no doubt please the author of the 
opening quote, General Patton. Patton’s quote is quite explicit as to level of command 
at which close combat training should be conducted and the method used to conduct 
it. However, the absence of any clear instruction on ‘what to train’, delivered with 
similar conviction, is conspicuous and reflective of our own conceptual difficulties.
Understanding which close combat skills to train requires detailed understanding 
of the tactics, techniques and procedures required in close combat. Doctrine is an 
obvious start point for this understanding. Unfortunately the close combat explana-
tions are somewhat simplistic and close combat, ‘closing with the enemy’ and ‘fire 
and manoeuvre’ are treated as largely synonymous. Fire and movement is explained 
in ‘The Rifle Platoon’ as ‘the technique of using fire to cover exposed movement. 
Within the platoon, one or more sections may cover the movement of another.’ 6 
This explanation hardly does justice to the complexities of close combat. Mounted 
Minor Tactics introduces swarming, autonomous teams, the close combat cycle of 
observe–suppress–move–clear–observe and sensor shooting coupling in the opening 
chapter, but then reverts to simplistic examples and descriptions of linear tactics 
in subsequent chapters describing tactics, training and procedures. 7 The effect of 
these simplistic explanations is simplistic understanding and subsequently simplistic 
training. We are all familiar with this type of simplistic training: assaults in extended 
line, movement occurring regardless of the effectiveness of suppression, or suppres-
sion being deemed effective without confirmation of where the rounds are impacting 
or the effects they are having. Other manifestations are: the Tactical Exercise Without 
Troops solution, for which the mortar firing position is not identified; allowing 
the gun target line geometries to be assumed away; or attack aviation fires being 
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employed ‘freestyle’, regardless of direct fire locations and artillery gun target lines. 
These observations lead to a deduction that Army is potentially losing clarity in its 
collective understanding of realities, difficulties and complexities of close combat. 
Not knowing what close combat ‘looks’ like makes it difficult to train.
If our doctrine provides only simplistic explanations of close combat, from where 
might we get a better understanding? David Kilcullen’s analysis of assault tactics in 
his article ‘Combined Arms and the Close Battle in Complex Terrain’ is a useful 
start point for understanding the relationship between fire and manoeuvre in close 
combat and formulating ideas of how to train it. Kilcullen illustrates the passing of 
the simplistic linear assault tactics as follows:
Soldiers in close combat engagements tend to move using covered approaches that are 
often non-linear in character while fighting in a cycle of ‘observe–suppress–move–
clear–observe’. In the close fight, soldiers tend to operate in small, semi-autonomous 
teams that ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’, rather than move forward in large linear-based groups. 
Because of the reality of close combat, it probably makes more sense to consider terrain 
in terms of representing a network of points and nodes, rather than as a sequence of 
lines. Under a point or nodal model of attack, manoeuvre supports fire. In other words, 
troops manoeuvre in order to generate effective fire, and then apply this fire in order to 
neutralise the enemy and achieve victory. 8
Brigadier Justin Kelly and Dr Michael Brennan present similar ideas in their 
working paper on Distributed Manoeuvre as follows: ‘the inter-relationship between 
“lines” and “columns” is the basic mechanism of tactics. It is universal, has been 
continuous since pre-history, and remains evident even on the relatively formless 
battlefields of today.’ Kilcullen’s view is that the 
movement from node to node is performed as a 
column because it presents the smallest face for 
the enemy to engage and allows manoeuvre and 
control through difficult terrain. The column 
becomes a line when the situation requires the 
maximum number of weapons to engage the 
enemy, and the terrain or friendly suppression 
permits this with acceptable risk. In this way, 
movement in columns (node to node) ‘enables the attacker, at least initially, to 
maintain a “limited liability” posture in which the forces gambited are sufficient to 
prompt the defender into a response, but not so large as to allow the attacker to 
become decisively engaged’. 9 This idea is important as in all probability our threat 
will exist below our Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) threshold 10 and it needs to be identified through what Adaptive 
Campaigning calls discovery actions.
Not knowing what close 
combat ‘looks’ like makes 
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The logical follow-on from the identification of the crust of the enemy’s defence is 
the attrition of the strong points. ‘This attrition is fundamental in forcing the defence 
to adapt and thereby creating signatures that the attacking force has postured itself to 
collect.’ 11 The purpose of this collecting of signatures is obviously to then allow the 
destruction or suppression of the newly discovered enemy forces and for the close 
combat cycle to repeat. In summary, ‘close combat’ in the offense generally consists of 
groups of soldiers manoeuvring from point to point. The purpose of this manoeuvre 
is to identify and attrite enemy strong points, as the 
act of doing so forces a response from the defender 
which creates a signature. To respond to the actions 
of the offensive force the assaulting force is then able 
to manoeuvre to apply fire (either directly or through 
a sensor shooter relationship) to the elements of the 
enemy’s system that revealed itself. This completes an 
evolution of the close combat cycle. To design 
training that reflects these characteristics, it should 
be asked what it is in combat that forces soldiers to 
adopt this means of attack as opposed to linear assault 
tactics. The answer, as it is with most innovations in warfare, is the basic human desire 
to avoid effective enemy fire. The obvious deduction is that genuine close combat 
training requires an enemy that can return effective fire (a glimpse of the blindingly 
obvious, I know). This return of fire and other responses is important to replicate the 
‘prod/sense’ dynamic inherent in close combat. Similarly, the terrain cannot allow the 
attacker an information or position advantage such that the enemy can avoid 
Distributed Manoeuvre. Not stated but implied is that the enemy will generally attempt 
to disrupt movement between nodes through the use of obstacles.
Kilcullen’s second major point is that ‘fire’, not manoeuvre, is the thing that leads 
to winning in close combat and manoeuvre is simply a method of getting fire where 
it can kill the enemy. As Patton said,
I think, if we should say ‘Fire is the Queen of Battle’, we should avoid arm arguments and 
come nearer telling the truth. Battles are won by fire and movement. The purpose of the 
movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is 
from the rear or flank. 12
The follow-on is that close combat is a battle to gain support by fire, and attack by 
fire locations (nodes in Kilcullen speak) which enable the suppression or destruction 
of the enemy. In Patton’s view, and intuitively in our own, we know that destruction 
is more likely to result from fire at the enemy’s least protected areas. Supporting the 
idea of fire as the dominant factor in close combat, a 2001 study into attrition and 
suppression in close combat concluded that:
…‘close combat’ in 
the offense generally 
consists of groups of 
soldiers manoeuvring 
from point to point.
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Modelling and historic analysis agree that success in offensive close combat is significantly 
improved by capabilities that: provide intimate support to the assault, and destroy threats 
to the assault group after all remote (from close combat) supporting fire has ceased; 
provide direct fire to support the assault as it finally closes with the defence; and provide 
indirect fire support to suppress the enemy’s defences as the assault closes. 13
It is significant that all three ‘success factors’ relate to fire, not manoeuvre. The 
deduction is that close combat training should focus on the delivery and assessment 
of fires.
Determining where to focus our efforts in training the delivery and assessment 
of fires requires analysis of how fire is arrayed or employed in close combat. I will 
sidestep any examination of the evolutionary trail from single system engagements 
at Agincourt to the multiple system engagements of Fallujah and simply state as an 
assumption that, because the enemy presents himself in different guises (mounted, 
dismounted, dug in, etc) the location from which our fire is delivered will change 
by range, system and nature. These differences 
necessitate the use of an array of weapons to achieve 
suppression and destruction across the geographic 
and material depth and breadth of the enemy. It is 
rare that a single Support By Fire or Attack By Fire 
weapon system will achieve the suppression or 
destruction effectively, though I have trained this 
folly many times at troop/platoon level. Small teams 
using or directing multiple Support By Fire and 
weapons systems require effective sensor shoot 
‘links’ or ‘coupling’ in Adaptive Campaigning terms. Thus for the close combat 
training ‘problem’ to be realistic, the enemy and the terrain should generally not 
allow destruction or suppression by a single weapons system or single firing location. 
The enemy will contribute to this problem through the emplacement of obstacles, 
which the attacking force will be required to reduce if they are to move to positions 
of advantage. The follow-on is the desirability of training that allows employment 
of the maximum number of weapons systems from the widest number of locations 
with the most permissive arcs. These weapons effects should be able to be directed 
or controlled by the soldier best able to observe the target and effects of fire.
The other obvious implication of multiple firing points is the need for an instinc-
tive understanding of the geometries of fire. Only by making ‘safety’ the domain 
of the exercised force do we compel an understanding of minimum safe danger 
distances, gun target line restrictions and minimum engagement ranges at the lowest 
level. Thus the onus for effective and safe employment of weapons systems should 
lie with the exercised force and be executed in the ‘manner expected in combat’. 14 
… destruction is more 
likely to result from 
fire at the enemy’s least 
protected areas.
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In short, if we don’t know what the rules are to begin with it is difficult to assess 
the risk in breaking them. It would be naïve to assume that safety restrictions aren’t 
valid considerations in combat, and as such an understanding of geometries of fire 
is paramount to prevent fratricide. Furthermore there is a requirement of deploying 
forces that intimately understand and feel confident in the balance between the risk 
of fratricide and the risk of exposing friendly forces to an unsuppressed enemy. 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stevenson’s paper Not So Friendly Fire summarises this 
in the chronologically dated but nonetheless relevant comment:
…developing targeted doctrine, hard, realistic training, and appropriate safety procedures 
can also play a role in minimising friendly fire incidents. However, unless the technology 
is underpinned by high-quality education and training, the Army will be left with a 
mismatch between its human and equipment capabilities. This will be the real challenge 
of HNA [Hardened Networked Army], to harness the synergistic effects of combined arms 
and joint operations without exponentially increasing the danger of large-scale fratricide 
incidents. This, unfortunately, can only be achieved by accepting some risk in peacetime 
training. Otherwise, the whole risk will simply be transferred to operations, where the 
threat is higher, the loss of life potentially greater, and the implications more severe. 15
Finally, multiple attack points or nodes implies there is need to plan, control and 
resupply ammunition during the assault. I will not discuss this facet in depth, but 
wonder out loud if we still own or practice this skill?
Thus far this analysis has revealed the following requirements for a ‘close combat 
training system’, complex terrain, and a responsive enemy which forces an adoption 
and practice of Distributed Manoeuvre. Distributed Manoeuvre in turn requires that 
the small teams or nodes are capable of destroying or 
suppressing enemy strong points. For a small team to 
do this successfully they are reliant on a dynamic sensor 
shooter coupling, understanding of geometries of fire, 
in-contact resupply, and an ability to assess the effects 
of fires. Exercising geometries of fire understanding 
and sensor shooter links requires the widest latitude 
possible in the number of weapons employed and the 
locations and circumstances in which they can be 
employed. Close combat training should demonstrate 
a bias to training fire over manoeuvre. Excepting a ‘responsive enemy’, these factors 
point overwhelmingly to live fire as the close combat training system of choice.
So what might such a ‘close combat training system’ look like? Are there systems 
operating in other militaries that might serve as a model for the Australian Army? 
Any training activity that addresses the identified close combat characteristics is likely 
to be complicated and require non-standard safety procedures. Acknowledging this, 
… an understanding 
of geometries of 
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the USMC has outsourced the most realistic of its close combat training to the Tactical 
Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG). The mission of TTECG is to
Conduct block IV (TF LFMX) pre-deployment training and assessment of tactical 
elements of the MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force] in the execution of the core 
competencies of combined arms techniques and procedures during full spectrum 
operations [in order to] prepare units for OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom]. 16
You can imagine TTECG as a Combat Training Centre (CTC) equivalent. 
TTECG performs three functions which allow the conduct of close combat training. 
I will examine each of these with an eye to CTC performing similar training.
Firstly, TTECG provides a safety backstop; this eliminates the need for exercising 
units to devise and develop the range safety architecture. If you want people to do 
something, make it easy. This is not to say that units don’t have the imagination and 
wherewithal to coordinate this training, but a dedicated control group allows 
economies such as standing waivers for reduced safety distances, standing risk assess-
ments and a standing series of instructions. Further enhancing the economy of effort 
is TTECG’s use of gazetted purpose-built ranges. These ranges allow the use of all-
organic infantry and light armour weapons at platoon and company level and have 
been designed to provide complex terrain 
likely to induce Distributed Manoeuvre, and 
mitigate potential risks through intelligent 
development of terrain which supports 
sound geometries of fire.
Using a gazetted purpose-built range 
reduces manoeuvre options for the exercised 
force. This is entirely in keeping with the 
characteristics of close combat training and 
is reflected in the TTECG mission, which 
focuses on ‘techniques and procedures’ only. It may appear that the presence of safety 
staff is contradictory to the idea that the exercised force should be responsible for the 
conduct of safety in the manner they are expected to in combat. In practicality there 
is no such contradiction and the phrase ‘safety backstop’ is an excellent description 
of a covert safety architecture that is there to ‘catch the exercise force if they fall’ and 
nothing else. Our range doctrine permits such an approach, but I am less convinced of 
the supportiveness of our philosophy and outlook. It is conceivable that this expertise 
and these ranges could be developed by CTC to allow the conduct of close combat 
training as part of a warfighter series. A standard company training iteration could 
consist of a live fire attack per platoon and company attack. The weapons support, 
such as mortars and machine guns, should be provided to local high readiness units 
or the parent battalion.
Any training activity that 
addresses the identified close 
combat characteristics is 
likely to be complicated…
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Secondly, TTECG staff brings the range to life by providing feedback to the range 
participants as to the enemy’s actions. This is enabled and controlled through the 
‘corridor’, which ensures the consistency and accuracy of the enemy picture. 
Throughout their training Marines are instilled with three basic ‘paints’: ‘heavy fire’, 
‘effective fire’ and ‘sporadic fire’. The Marines 
understand the implications of these ‘paints’ for 
their movement, and respond by adjusting 
movement techniques or suppression as appro-
priate. ‘Fighting the enemy’ enables the corridor 
to manipulate the range for achievement of 
training objectives and forces the use of 
Distributed Manoeuvre and fires.
Finally, TTECG staff provides assessment. I 
take it as universally agreed that assessment is a 
good thing and is already within the CTC remit, so I won’t laud it here; if, however, 
Army wishes to claim close combat as its fundamental skill it should be assessed 
in detail.
The EMV close combat training model is ‘a way’ of training close combat. On 
the surface it seems feasible to adopt in the Australian Army. The key enablers of 
this training are the gazetted purpose-built ranges, modified safety restrictions and 
dedicated safety staff. Many of these things require effort to develop but once in 
place require little effort to maintain. Conducting this training in a single organisa-
tion removes the burden of reinventing the wheel by units. Only by making this 
training directed and assessed will Army achieve the focus that close combat’s 
importance merits. Without an institutional approach, individual units will be too 
easily consumed by the effort to make EMV-style close combat training work.
In conclusion, the Australian Army’s doctrine leaves no doubt that close combat 
is at the heart of its capability. However, the anecdotal evidence is that this is not 
reflected in training areas and schools across the country. While doctrine is very good 
at identifying the importance of close combat, it is less successful at outlining the 
nuts and bolts of its conduct that might form the baseline of a training methodology. 
Two relatively recent examinations of Distributed Manoeuvre have identified the 
principal characteristics of modern close combat. In broad summary, close combat 
generally consists of the movement of small teams from location to location to attrite 
enemy strong points and elicit a response from the enemy defensive system. Mounted 
Minor Tactics identifies this as the close combat cycle of observe–suppress–move–
clear–observe. 17 From this a training system to support the practice of close combat 
was generically identified as one that had a responsive enemy, used complex terrain, 
allowed the use of the widest array of weapons in the widest range circumstances, 
placed the onus on safety on the exercised force, practiced sensor shooter coupling 
Using a gazetted purpose-
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and had a bias for training in the use of fire as opposed to manoeuvre. A training 
system with these characteristics is used as part of USMC pre-deployment training. 
The system is enabled by gazetted purpose-built ranges, a dedicated safety staff and 
rigorous assessment. Such a training system could be considered by CTC to conduct 
close combat training in the Australian Army. Much of this may seem obvious, but 
it seems to have escaped Army’s collective attention for some time. Institutionalising 
close combat training ensures that it gets done and cannot be postponed, diluted or 
fragmented. Our doctrine makes it clear that compromising close combat training 
undermines achievement of the Army mission.
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War And The strategist of 
the twenty-first century
Brigadier David Coghlan
Abstract
Although fraught with difficulty, predictions of the exercise of power, and therefore the basis 
of the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century, can be found in two general 
schools of thought: those who believe that there has been, in the wake of the end of the 
Cold War, a discontinuity and accompanying paradigm shift in the conduct of international 
relations; and those who believe claims of such a shift are overstated, and that a realist 
approach will remain the dominant paradigm for the foreseeable future. This article will 
assess these schools of thought and then advocate that Carl von Clausewitz is the strategist 
best suited to the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century.
The Future World – Discontinuity versus Continuity
Those who subscribe to the paradigm shift argument contend in an increasingly globalised world that a range of factors (including interna-tional economic interdependence, powerful transnational corporations, 
international crime, terrorism, immigration and environmental issues), most of 
which transcend national borders, are contributing to a significant decline in the 
relevance of the traditional, Westphalian-based state. Predictions of the demise 
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of the state abound 1 with an accompanying belief in the decline of inter-state 
war and the emergence of new types of conflict that will change the nature of 
war in the twenty-first century. To commentators such as Martin Van Creveld, 
‘interstate war as a phenomenon is slowly but surely being squeezed below the 
historical horizon’, 2 while others like John Keegan go further: ‘it is scarcely possible 
anywhere in the world today to raise a body of reasoned support…that war is a 
justifiable activity…it seems just possible to glimpse an emerging outline of a 
world without war.’ 3
Even if there are wars, they will not be between mature democracies. 4 Rather, 
conflicts in the twenty-first century will be ‘new’, ‘uncivil’ or ‘internal’ wars 
between those who are part of the globalised world and those who have been 
excluded from it (the ‘periphery’). 5 Within this periphery new conflicts will 
often be conducted in failed states with little sense of political coherence. 6 Such 
conflicts are unlikely to lend themselves to resolution through the application 
of overwhelming Western firepower. Conversely, because of the technological 
superiority of Western forces, competitors to Western interests in these conflicts 
will be forced to adopt asymmetric strategies.
The realist approach rejects the majority of the discontinuity argument and 
believes that the state will remain the dominant factor in the international system, 
albeit with increasing competition from non-state actors. 7 While not totally 
rejecting the notion of a bifurcated world and the impact this may have on the 
nature and conduct of future war, this school of thought rejects the notion of a 
world without war. Coral Bell suggests three distinct but interrelated stages in 
twenty-first century warfare. The current stage, 
which she describes as a ‘Jihadists’ War’ is an 
attritional-style, asymmetric conflict that will last 
as long as the unipolar world remains. In the 
medium term, perhaps from around the 2040s, 
she sees the emergence of up to twelve great 
powers (although not necessarily mature democ-
racies) that in the long term will develop into a 
serious challenge to the US hegemon. 8 To Bell, 
the transition from a unipolar to multipolar 
world will be a period of increased tension where ‘as in the past, it will make 
conventional war between the great powers much more likely than at present.’ 9 If 
conventional war is possible, realists accept that in the short to medium term 
irregular, asymmetric conflict, labelled by some as fourth and now fifth generation 
warfare, 10 will be the dominant form of conflict for the foreseeable future and that, 
despite the hopes and promises of what Eliot Cohen has labelled the ‘technophiles’, 11 
no technological silver bullet is likely to emerge to decisively win such wars.
… the transition from a 
unipolar to multipolar 
world will be a period of 
increased tension …
Australian Army Journal • Volume VII, Number 1 • page 167
War And The strategist of the twenty-first century
Clausewitz – Strategist of Choice
Despite these competing visions, Clausewitz is the strategist of choice in the 
twenty-first century and in On War he has achieved his ambition to write a book 
‘that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in 
the subject.’ 12 Integral to On War, and a telling discriminator between him and 
other strategists, is the intellectual framework of theory that pervades his work. 
To Clausewitz, theory ‘will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyse 
the constituent elements of war…to define clearly the ends in view’ and that such 
analysis is ‘meant to educate the mind of the future commander…not to accompany 
him on the battlefield.’ 13 Theory is not sacrosanct—it must always be subject to 
critical analysis and re-evaluation. 14
For Clausewitz, war ‘is the continuation of policy by other means’. Therefore, 
warfare cannot be autonomous from policy: ‘the political object is the goal, war is 
the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their 
purpose.’ 15 The nature of war is characterised by factors such as chance and uncer-
tainty, 16 which finds expressions in friction, ‘that force that makes the easy so 
difficult’ 17 and the factor that distinguishes real war from paper war. 18 Friction is 
further compounded by the fog of uncertainty. 19 Such concepts allude to the 
importance Clausewitz placed on the human dimension of war. While war may be 
rational as an instrument of policy, it is the ‘moral elements [that] are among the 
most important in war.’ 20 In turn, this points towards 
Clausewitz’s duality of war consisting of both an eternal 
and universal objective (logic) and an ever-changing 
subjective (grammar). 21
If war at its highest level is an act of policy, the object 
of war is an ‘act of force to compel our enemy to do our 
will’. 22 No one should start a war without understanding 
the political purpose and objective of the war. 23 It was 
the responsibility of the policymakers to set out these 
objectives—the first and foremost act of the statesman is to determine the type 
of war. 24 The clear subjugation of the military to policy explains the difference 
between absolute (theoretical) and real war—absolute war was the ideal form 
of war—total and with no limits on escalation. But as a continuation of policy, 
restricted by the limitations imposed by policy, the conduct of war moved from 
the theoretical absolute to real or limited war. 25
It is the role of the commander to achieve victory. To Clausewitz, this was 
achieved, and wars could be won, through decisive battle. At the tactical level, 
victory in decisive battle is an end in itself. At the policy and strategic level, the 
tactical victory is the means to achieve favourable policy outcomes. Although 
It is the role of the 
commander to 
achieve victory.
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preferred, decisive battle is not essential: favourable outcomes can be achieved, even 
if engagements are not fought. 26 To aid the tactical commander, Clausewitz intro-
duced two concepts that have enduring relevance. The Centre of Gravity, ‘the hub of 
all power and movement, on which everything depends’, 27 is the point at which ‘all 
our energies should be directed’ and could include the enemy army, his capital or a 
stronger ally. 28 The culminating point is the second concept: the position at which 
an attacker can no longer effectively protect himself from counterattack. 29
Criticisms of Clausewitz fall into two areas. Those generally supportive acknowl-
edge that some aspects of his theories fall short. He is land centric, weak on the 
analysis of the enemy, probably more wrong than right in his assessment of intel-
ligence, does not adequately consider the utility of irregular forces or the role of 
technology and, for such a central part of his theory, the concept of policy is not 
well developed. 30 These criticisms are valid, reflect the context of the environment 
within which Clausewitz wrote, and tend to deal more with the grammar than the 
overall logic of his theories.
Other more vocal critics question the validity of Clausewitzian logic. Basil Liddell 
Hart viewed Clausewitz as the ‘mahdi of mass’ and believed him responsible for the 
doctrine of the offensive that produced such mass casualties in the First World War. 31 
More recent critics align themselves with the discontinuity school previously 
discussed. John Keegan contends that war is not the continuation of policy by other 
means. Rather, he advances his argument that war is 
primarily a cultural phenomenon (and therefore not 
necessarily of an enduring nature). 32 Martin Van 
Creveld, an outspoken critic, believes that the 
Clausewitzian understanding of war is obsolete 
(based on his view that Clausewitzian war is exclu-
sively the purview of the state). 33 Mary Kaldor, 
although less strident, has similar criticisms. 34 
However, critics of the critics have not been silent and 
suggest that Keegan, Van Creveld and Kaldor are making their case based on a too 
narrow interpretation of Clausewitz (which was fashionable in the 1970s). 35 Of 
course, Clausewitz believed that theories need to be constantly reviewed: he would 
probably support the criticism of his grammar but would have been far more sceptical 
of those who questioned his logic based on what may happen in the future.
Despite such criticisms, Clausewitz’s theory of war has no credible rival or compet-
itor. Although Martin Van Creveld’s lament of the end of strategy is too strong, no 
other strategist or school of thought has emerged to seriously challenge Clausewitz. 
Reasons for this vary. Van Creveld contends that most twentieth century theorists 
concentrated on the how of war and, while fixated with the application of technology, 
showed inadequate regard for the what and why aspects of strategic thought. 36 Others 
Clausewitz’s theory of 
war has no credible 
rival or competitor.
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believe, as I do, that there has been steady and slow development in strategic thought, 
by a range of theorists. However, progress has only been incremental. Space precludes 
an adequate discussion of such theorists who include, but are not limited to:
•	 Julian	Corbett	and	his	maritime	strategy	of	sea	control,	which	recognises	the	
interdependence of sea and land power as part of a national military strategy
•	 Basil	Liddell	Hart	and	his	concept	of	the	indirect	approach
•	 Edward	Luttwak	and	his	observation	of	the	inherent	paradox	of	strategy	and	
warfare
•	 John	 Boyd’s	 Observe,	 Orient,	 Decide	 and	 Act	 loop,	 which	 seeks,	 through	
temporal dislocation, to impose strategic paralysis on the enemy, and
•	 Admiral	J	C	Wylie	and	his	general	theory	on	war	with	its	emphasis	on	control	
and the utility of cumulative and sequential strategies.
There is a third reason for Clausewitz’s dominance: ‘On War is the gold standard for 
general strategic theory. So intellectually inescapable is Clausewitz that…most strate-
gists are all either neo-Clausewitzian…or self-avowedly post- Clausewitzian.’ 37
Despite this ‘gold standard’ and a lack of serious challenge to his theories, is 
Clausewitz future proof? Of course, the answer to this is impossible to predict with 
certainty. However, the question can be addressed by looking back. Written in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, much of On 
War remained relevant, and was gaining in 
influence, throughout the remainder of that 
century. Throughout the tumultuous 
twentieth century, the relevance and popu-
larity of Clausewitz steadily increased as 
theorists and practitioners of war, even with 
such technologically driven changes to the 
grammar of war as air power, acknowledged 
the value of Clausewitzian logic. That 
Clausewitz’s concepts, more than any other, could survive and even prosper throughout 
a century of such far reaching changes and tragic conflicts, suggests that Clausewitzian 
logic is enduring and will continue to provide a cogent and relevant theory, despite the 
inevitable changes in the grammar of war, for the twenty-first century.
Summary
In predicting the nature and conduct of war in the twenty-first century there is no 
certainty. Of the competing visions presented, there is convergence to the view that 
sovereign states will have a reduced influence in an increasingly bifurcated world. 
However, forecasts of the demise of the state are premature. In the foreseeable future, 
the realist, state-centred approach will remain the paradigm of international relations, 
In the foreseeable future, the 
realist, state-centred approach 
will remain the paradigm of 
international relations …
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albeit with a significant increase in the number of non-state actors. Conflicts will 
range across a wide spectrum, from those irregular and asymmetric in nature, where 
victory is unlikely to be achieved by technological overmatch, up to and including 
conventional inter-state clashes. As such, given the uncertainty of the future, the 
human element of warfare and conflict will remain dominant and, despite the hopes 
of those who believe such conflict is on the wane, war will continue to remain a viable 
instrument of policy in the twenty-first century.
Given this view of the world—of state and non-state multi-spectrum conflict, 
often asymmetric in nature and where clear victory is unlikely to be delivered by 
technology, of uncertainty and the enduring centrality of the human aspects of 
war—Clausewitz remains the strategist of choice for the twenty-first century. Despite 
incremental and gradual, albeit worthy, contributions by a select few to the school 
of strategic thought, there are no rivals to Clausewitz. He is the only theorist that 
provides us with the what, why and, to a lesser extent, the how of war in a comprehen-
sive and cogent general theory. This does not mean that Clausewitz is the one-stop 
shop for strategy for the twenty-first century—the prudent practitioner, for each 
strategic dilemma presented, must weave together threads from throughout the 
school of strategic thought to come up with the best solution. However, Clausewitz 
is an essential part of any such consideration. His critics seem to get bogged down 
into narrow interpretive issues and often forget that Clausewitz, especially in respect 
to the grammar of war, was a product of his times. Tellingly, none of his critics 
have effectively challenged the veracity of his logic. The vision of the world for the 
remainder of this century is of continuity in the essentials of war. So far, Clausewitz’s 
logic transcends time, and despite his contention that ‘in strategy everything has to 
be guessed at and presumed’ 38 there is every likelihood that Clausewitz will be the 
strategist of choice for the twenty-first century and beyond.
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The flight comes into view. Nine machines, enough to lift the whole company. Purple 
smoke marks the landing zone as the helicopters wheel over the jungle perimeter and ease 
themselves fussily onto the ground. The soldiers emerge from the nearby trees and clamber 
aboard, section by section, awkward with their heavy packs and weapons. Together with 
others of the company headquarters group, the captain is assigned to the lead helicopter. 
The flight is airborne again within five minutes. Aloft, the deafening clatter of the rotors 
allows no opportunity for conversation. He uses the time as he usually does, either poring 
over maps of a new operational area if the company is being repositioned, or dreamily 
contemplating a shower and that first beer if the flight is inbound to Nui Dat.
I hear a helicopter landing on the Channel 7 roof nearby and am instantly back in Vietnam. Like Proust and his madeleines, the ‘thoc-thoc-thoc-thoc’ sound of rotor blades brings a whole set of sensations flooding back; less intense these 
days, but still almost tangible. The heat: hot like only the tropics can be, whether it 
be muggy summer when you were almost always wet, or dusty winter when you 
were almost always parched. The smells: rank stink of jungle greens that have been 
sweated in for 24 hours a day for anything up to a fortnight, and the aroma of the 
peasant east—the curiously-not-unpleasant reek of human waste used ubiquitously 
as fertiliser, the wood smoke and cooking smells from the villages. The fatigue: the 
sheer exhaustion at the end of a day’s slog through scrubby jungle, when you still have 
to help to dig a weapon pit and to plot, code and transmit a defensive fire plan; and 
the back-from-the-dead effort of rousing yourself in the early hours of the morning 
to attend to a request over the command net.
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Curious that it is sounds like these that have the greatest power to remind me of what 
it was like to be a foot soldier in Vietnam. Certain songs from the era will do it too—for 
example, ‘Magic Carpet Ride’ by Steppenwolf. I hardly hear it these days but when I do 
I am instantly back in Fire Support Base ‘Helen’, in the sapping heat of the dry season, 
when Armed Forces Radio played it almost every day. Movies and books won’t do it 
for me. It’s not just that there are so few of both, and it’s not just that most of the movies 
are about Americans with perfect teeth winning effortlessly. A real Vietnam evocation 
needs to get into your guts and your soul; to capture the ache of sexual longing of 
young men recently separated from wives, lovers and girlfriends; to bring back the 
perpetual uneasy, queasy sensation in your stomach, the consequence of inevitable 
hygiene inadequacies on operations, the feeling that it was never quite safe to fart. And, 
above all, it would evoke that special kind of tedium: the tedium of a routine where, for 
long stretches of time—for days at a time—nothing really happened but in which you 
had to remain vigilant, because to switch off might have fatal consequences.
****
The other day I saw a picture of Australian soldiers in Vietnam. It’s one of those 
iconic photos that adorn the dust jackets of histories of the event. Soldiers wait beside 
a cleared area in the jungle, half-turned away from the dust kicked up by a light 
helicopter landing fifty metres away. Hatless, scraggy heads leaning slightly forward 
to balance the weight of their packs, jungle-greens stained with the sweat and grime 
of a long patrol. Young faces, grizzled faces—Aussie faces. Enough to make you shout 
for joy, to weep for the costly pointlessness of it all.
Another iconic photo. Four men are in the frame: one, in black pyjamas, sprawled 
and lifeless, the others instantly recognisable as Australian soldiers. A jungle track 
runs up the axis of the image, scrubby trees and undergrowth on each side. The 
trained eye reads the situation at a glance. Plainly there has just been a contact 
and probably the briefest of fire-fights. The rest of the section—perhaps no more 
than the section commander and the two-man machine gun group—are out of the 
picture, but you sense their presence. The man in the foreground is half-crouched, 
facing slightly towards the camera looking upwards, M16 rifle at the ready position. 
Early 20s, eyes wide, mouth half open. Little more than a boy, but the stance shows 
self-confidence and competence. You can almost see his deliberate movement: lower 
body tense, almost still; upper body slowly, carefully and consciously rotating; eyes 
searching for danger. He wears a light webbing belt, to which are attached three large 
water bottles and two small pouches; a machete in its sheath is just visible on his 
off-side; on his head the ubiquitous floppy cotton ‘giggle hat’. His pack and those of 
the others were probably shrugged off at the moment the contact began.
In a fire-fight, officers are usually so busy that they haven’t got time to be scared. 
Soldiers—the ‘diggers’—are usually not so lucky. Lying prone, hearing bullets over 
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your head, praying that the boss will not be panicked into giving unwise orders—
there’s a lot that can pass through a soldier’s head in just a few seconds. Anyone 
would be scared, but you can tell this soldier isn’t. And it’s not just adrenalin and the 
fight-rather-than-flight reaction to danger. That can take you just so far. Reliability 
in a tight situation depends mainly on training and the self-discipline coming from 
the feeling of being a member of a cohesive team. Australian soldiers in Vietnam had 
both factors in spades.
****
Two photos, both evoking the young Australian soldiers with whom I served, and 
their quiet presence, their understated competence. Half were national-servicemen, 
but no less professional. In fact, the only way you could tell the difference between 
them and the regulars was that the national-servicemen were generally better 
soldiers. Brighter, sharper—hard to put your finger on, but you felt it. Two young 
gunners with whom I worked went on to distinguished careers in statistics; one as 
a professor of mathematics, the other as a Tax Office executive. But the three I got 
to know best were just ordinary blokes and, wherever they may be now, chances are 
they still are. Brian, Gubby and Peter.
Memory of Brian:
A fire-fight: the leading section is in contact; cacophony of shouting, rifles and machine 
guns. The captain runs forward, half crouched, to find a spot from which to direct 
artillery fire from the battery that is over seven kilometres to the rear. A swift glance 
backwards confirms that Brian is close behind, pack with radio aerial poking out 
bouncing around the back of his neck, freckled face sweating. They go to ground. ‘Fire 
Mission Battery!’ he yells back over his shoulder. Brian conveys the order and all 
those that follow over the radio net. Brian is all business, despite the dangers not fifty 
metres away, recording the time and the gist of each message, as procedures dictate all 
signallers must, but on the magazine of his rifle with a chinagraph pencil rather than 
on the more usual notebook. Brian will transcribe it later, when he can find a calmer 
and drier situation. He is 22 years old, a national-servicemen, country boy, and headed 
back there on RTA—the epitome of military professionalism in the interim.
Memory of Gubby:
Early morning at the Nui Dat helipad: the company is about to depart for a seven-day 
patrol. Morale is high; the day’s main heat has yet to bite and the company, now four 
months into its tour, is pleased with its performance so far. Gubby fits into this up-beat 
environment perfectly. If Brian is an introvert, Gubby is an out-there-in-your-face 
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extrovert. He seems to have decided that, if he has to play the role of soldier for two 
years, then he might as well do it with style. He has acquired a macho swagger and 
an outrageous Pancho Villa moustache. But the style is matched by the substance. 
Stooped forward under the weight of a huge pack, he carries not only four water 
bottles, rations, light bedding, toilet gear and a handful of personal effects, but also 
a radio set and two spare batteries. As a signaller, his routine load is the heaviest 
in the company. Brian and Peter are similarly affected, but Gubby has gone one 
further. In order to—as he puts it—‘pull my weight with the grunts’, he totes a rifle 
with a long magazine in lieu of the more conventional shorter and lighter version, 
together with an extra 100 rounds of ammunition. This adds several kilos to a load 
that is already considerable—in fact, as revealed by some scales on the helipad, 
his pack weighs as much as he does—but he’d rather sweat than lose face with his 
infantry counterparts.
Memory of Peter:
It is minutes before the company is due to assault a bunker system. For the last two 
hours, through Peter on the radio, the captain has directed a bombardment with every 
artillery battery at the task force’s disposal: all three Australian field batteries and an 
American medium battery. By rights the bunkers and everything in them should be 
pulverised, but he is not optimistic. The soldiers are tense as they wait for the order 
to go in. Amid this, Peter is having a snack. He smears one half of a hard tack biscuit 
with jam from a tube and then tries to break it off; the biscuit shatters and jammy 
bits fall to the ground. ‘Bugger!’ ‘Peter, why not try this? Bite a piece off your biscuit 
then squeeze some jam straight into your mouth.’ Crackle of small arms fire in the 
background. ‘Oh yeah.’ He tries it, and his boyish, grubby, sweaty face creases in a 
grin. ‘Good one, boss’. The captain cannot begrudge the familiarity; they are about to 
go forward together into heaven-knows-what.
****
I never saw better soldiers, and we, their officers, did our best not to let them down. 
We trained them and we trained ourselves. We were diligent in the minutiae of our 
duties, we attended to their needs.
And like generations of officers in Australian units before us, we practiced ‘the 
professionalism of small things’. If you wanted a patrol program to dominate the 
local jungle, if you wanted to lay ambushes to deny the VC easy access to the villages, 
we were your men.
We were good, but not, as I later realised, as good as we thought ourselves. 
Strategically and politically we were naive to the point of being inept.
Take one incident. A minor event, but it sums up a lot:
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June 1968, the peak of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive. It is late afternoon. The company 
has just been dropped off by a swarm of helicopters; they have come from one operation 
to this one. They are tired and somewhat disoriented, they need time to regroup and 
rethink, and in any case last light is little more than an hour off. There is a small 
knoll near the drop zone, and nearby a Vietnamese village; the company commander 
decides they will harbour on the knoll for the night. The company shakes out, trudging 
in extended formation towards the knoll. The villagers in the sodden paddies scarcely 
give them a glance as they go by. The soldiers are edgy; this is a new area. The fighting 
in the region in the last few days has been intense. American artillery is active a few 
kilometres away. Something big is on, and the villagers’ sympathies are unknown. The 
company reaches the knoll, deploys, and the men shed their packs and begin to dig in. 
Then, a few metres from the company headquarters group, a soldier gives a low cry 
of surprise. He emerges from his embryonic weapon pit and presents to the company 
commander, on the blade of his portable spade, a bone. Somehow no-one needs to be 
told it’s human. Now some of the immediate features in the area are making sense: the 
low, bare, gravelly mounds and the orderly white rocks. ‘Faack! We’re in a graveyard’, 
exclaims the CSM, looking to the company commander. The question—‘what now, 
sir?’—hardly needs to be expressed. ‘Bloody irrelevant!’ (it’s the end of a long day). 
‘Bloody inconvenient, but irrelevant. We’re here, it’s too late to move again, and what 
the f**k anyway.’ We return to the preparation of our pits, more careful, apprehensive 
now. A few more bones, even a skull. The artillery continues to thump, reminding them 
that these pits might be needed tonight. So, regardless of sensibilities, dig they must, 
and quickly, because it is almost time for stand-to.
The night passes without incident and at first light the company is on its way. 
Much happens that day, and on those that follow. But a week later, back in base, when 
he casually relates the event in the mess, the Intelligence Officer splutters his beer. 
‘You drongos! The Vietnamese are ancestor worshippers. And you dingalings were 
digging up the local cemetery.’ The IO laughs. ‘Winning hearts and minds, eh?’ The 
feeling of professional shame is so profound that he can’t even call forth the traditional 
soldier’s expletive.
****
A former university colleague once remarked to me that men who had not been to 
war were subconsciously envious of those who had. Well, I don’t know about that, 
although he, as a veteran of sixty missions with RAF Bomber Command in the 
Second World War and with a long post-war career as an historian and philosopher, 
was well credentialed to say so. (He maintained—and in this I do believe him—that 
his experience was the most exciting of his life. ‘You cannot imagine the feeling you 
get when you’ve landed, all the engines are shut down, and you are back! How exhila-
rating, how vital is that feeling. Never since have I felt as alive as in that time!’)
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What I do know is that no man who has been to war is untouched by the experi-
ence. For some, of course, this is fundamentally negative; but for many—maybe 
most—it is curiously fulfilling. Vietnam was tedious, it was uncomfortable and, as 
we ultimately learned, we were had. (The universal lot of the soldier.) But to have 
trained and served with an Australian military unit on operations is to have shared 
an experience rarely paralleled by anything else that you subsequently do in your 
life. I had very little in common with most of the soldiers in the company. I never 
knew, in any meaningful sense, those other than with whom I had daily dealings, 
and I never tried to follow them up once it was all over. But while we marched 
together we were bound together by mutual dependence and respect that was 
stronger than friendship and affection. Imagine the feeling of cohesion in a winning 
sports team, then double that, and then double again. Just as it is with brothers, 
you don’t have to like those with whom you live but you are compelled to mutually 
support each other, if only because to do otherwise risks your survival—even if 
‘survival’ means just seeing it through. Feeling wanted—it’s a heady drug, especially 
for people who may not have had the experience in their life before.
The village graveyard incident described above was the first chink in the armour 
of my belief in Australia’s Vietnam mission. By the end of my tour, the breastplate 
was like a sieve. I doubt, however, that many of my comrades shared my misgivings. 
Australian soldiers, like their compatriots in general, are pragmatic to a fault and 
tend not to think of such things. And, at the soldiers’ level of the war, a strong 
sense of self and collective competence and teamwork sustained their belief in 
themselves and what they were doing. When you are doing what you are trained 
to do, and you are doing it well, and nothing is telling you otherwise, it’s inevitable 
to believe that you are ‘winning’. That’s what it was like for many—maybe most—of 
us in the Australian Army in the 1960s, and that’s why many found their return to 
be so traumatic.
Vietnam—whether we loved the experience, loathed it or just stuck it out, all 
of us who were there felt part of ‘a team’. We may have little in common other than 
that, but the memory of that intense shared experience stays in our souls for a long 
time afterwards.
Peter and the captain, together with the rest of the company, assaulted the bunker 
system that day. And, as he had feared, there were still many very-much-alive VC left 
in there. His bombardment had been pretty well useless, except as a morale booster to 
get the attack going. Nevertheless, within 15 minutes the lead platoons had subdued 
the opposition and it was all over. But at a price. When he came up with the company 
headquarters group, the platoon commander reported seven Australian wounded and 
one dead. The dead soldier lay nearby on his back. Head pillowed by his pack, his face 
covered by his camouflage scarf, he might have been taking a nap. Another soldier, 
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sobbing like a little boy at kindergarten, knelt beside him. The platoon sergeant gently 
led him aside as company headquarters began the tasks of organising a MEDEVAC 
and then preparing to move on to whatever was next.
I sometimes reflect on the strange juxtaposition of my two most vivid memories of 
that eventful day: Peter and his snack, and the dead digger and the disconcerting 
peace of his pose—the essence of ordinary life and the aftermath of violent death. 
It’s those two images, especially the latter, that invariably occupy my thoughts at 
the minute’s-silence moments on Anzac Day and Remembrance Day. But at the 
time I was scarcely moved. Although I had witnessed a human tragedy a short 
time earlier, there was now much to be done. The company needed to regroup, a 
route needed to be plotted to the next destination, and regimental headquarters 
needed a report on the bombardment so that it could piece together some lessons 
for general consumption. So I gave no thought to the dead digger for the next few 
hours, and neither on the next day nor on the successive weary days as they shaded 
into a general memory of the patrol. A day moves on and you have little choice but 
to move on with it. It wasn’t indifference or inhumanity or callousness, and there 
was no reason to think that the others did not feel the same way. I suppose it must 
be a soldier’s protective mechanism: you put it away, no time to think about that 
now. You move on, and your life moves on. It’s only at unguarded moments that the 
memory draws you back.
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This book is a valuable contribution to military studies. Terrorism is a most misunderstood term in both society and academia, and for military practitioners equally so. While the book explores the strategic aspects of 
terrorism in first principles, it is written in a simple clear manner. It unearths a 
number of flawed assumptions in popular understandings and ideas, bringing the 
study of terrorism back on the track of rational inquiry. Terrorism is misunderstood 
because it is a word that is essentially an abstract noun, devoid of actors or materials. 
Within general societal discourse, the word ‘terrorism’ is laden with many implicit 
socio-cultural assumptions. These assumptions need to be understood because they 
affect the critical study of terrorism and its application to domestic policy.
Common Misunderstandings On Terrorism
The first assumption implicit in the popular understanding of terrorism is that 
it automatically uses violent methods. While this is a typical observation, this is 
not necessarily so, as the production of fear can be generated without resort to 
violence (e.g. animal rights activism). It is important to make this point because 
many activities undertaken by terrorist organisations are in fact non-violent. It 
would seem that while violent actions are newsworthy, verbal threats issued by 
terrorist organisations do create fear in the target audience. The second assump-
tion is that terrorism is implicitly immoral. And while many acts of terrorism are 
clearly horrendous, this assumption interferes with understanding the processes of 
strategic formulation within the minds of terrorists. In studying terrorism we are 
not necessarily interested in the moral question itself, but the thinking processes of 
the terrorist in order to apply Sun Tzu’s maxim ‘know thy enemy as well as yourself ’. 
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The third assumption is that terrorists operate in some sort of irrational ethical 
void. While some terrorists may be mentally unstable, it is a leap of reasoning to 
assume all terrorists are mentally unstable. Especially in the context of Western 
militaries where in any case up to 3 per cent of soldiers may be sociopaths. 1 The 
fourth assumption is that terrorism is the ‘weapon of the weak’. While this is a valid 
assumption in some cases, it is not a universal principle, especially since state actors 
as well as non-state actors conduct terrorism.
One flawed approach in studying terrorism is the popular crusade in search of 
the ‘root causes’ of terrorism. These ‘root causes’ have been typically understood as a 
product of environmental factors such as poverty, ethnic suppression and economic 
inequality; resulting in despair and alienation. But of the hundreds of thousands 
of alienated youths that exist in Western countries (a typical terrorist recruitment 
demographic), only a very small minority actually chose terrorism as a mode of 
operation. As an analogy, all terrorists breath oxygen, but that does not mean oxygen 
is the cause of terrorism. Therefore ‘root causes’ are hardly a good starting point for 
research and policy.
Without understanding the limitations of these bias and assumptions, one 
is automatically led to the conclusion that terrorists operate outside the realm 
of rational activity. The problem with using these assumptions is we potentially 
assume terrorism is an irrational response to a rational escalation of problems. The 
assumption that terrorism is the product of irrational people clearly does not fit the 
flawed but rational ‘root cause’ model in any case. How can you declare that the ‘root 
causes’ of terrorism are rational when your assumptions of terrorists imply that they 
are irrational? Hence, all assumptions need clarification in order to avoid category 
mistakes. Assuming terrorism is fundamentally abnormal leads to a skewed research 
agenda. When one assumes that terrorism is irrational then one effectively rules out 
the possibility of understanding the phenomena.
Another issue is the inaccurate fuzzy language many commentators use to commu-
nicate the phenomena of terrorism. The search for the ‘root causes of terrorism’ is 
as flawed as the notion of a ‘war on terror’ … or a ‘war on war’. Abstract nouns have 
no causes. Effectively those who solely argue for a ‘root cause’ of terrorism may miss 
crucial opportunities to objectively evaluate the phenomena of terrorism. Instead 
terror is transvalued to serve the political preferences of state or anti-state agenda 
rather than understanding the issues at hand. In order to bring the study of terrorism 
back on track, a better starting point is to understand terrorism as the use of military 
strategy by actors who believe, rightly or wrongly, that through such means they can 
advance their goals. This unashamedly follows the Clausewitzian dictum that ‘war 
is politics by other means’. In this context, terrorism is an act of force to compel an 
enemy to do our will. This is a better starting point than assuming terrorism as simply 
a product of ‘root causes’ or a nihilistic immoral irrational act that defies enquiry.
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Fear As An Instrument Of Terrorism
Terrorism can be defined as a ‘deliberate creation of a sense of fear, usually by the 
use or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence to influence the political 
behaviour of a given target group’. This highlights some important facets, namely that 
the violent quality of most terror acts focuses on inducement of fear. Also the nature 
of violence is ‘extra-normal’, that is it must go beyond the normal limits of acceptable 
violence in society and communicate the symbolic character of any violent acts. Thus 
the aim of any strategy of terrorism is not to attrite or kill but to break the spirit 
and create a sensation of fear within the target to initiate political change. Terrorism 
is therefore a form of psychological warfare: a battle of wills played out in people’s 
minds. So while third generation warfare (manoeuvre warfare) proponents saw the 
application of strategy to influence and destroy the will of the enemy commander, 
terrorism represents an application of strategy that influences and destroys the will of 
the target audience. Both are contextually different, yet both can be explained within 
the Clausewitzian paradigm.
WHY TERRORISM IS A FLAWED STRATEGIC OPTION
The Strategy of Terrorism discusses research that supports the idea that terrorism is 
generally not a successful strategy for achieving goals. As early as 1991, researcher 
Leonard Weinberg found that of the seventy-five terrorist organisations he studied, 
none stood a decent chance of surviving for more than ten years. The common 
experience for terrorist organisations is not success, but failure and disappearance. 
Recently, Max Abrahms reproduced similar conclusions, stating that only 7 per cent 
of terror groups in history (Irgun and FLN) have achieved their aims, and even then 
the link between the terrorist organisations’ operations and the factors that shaped 
‘success’ remain somewhat doubtful. 2 The obvious idea that drives terrorist organisa-
tions is that overwhelming fear creates desired change within the target audience. 
However, even these ideas are flawed.
The first flawed strategic idea is that terrorism creates stress that undermines 
society. While terrorism in the United States kills less people than lightning strikes or 
allergic reactions to peanut butter, it is the sensationalised fear that creates disorienta-
tion. While fear and mental discomfort is a cost to society, it does not completely 
dislocate the supporting pillars of society, unless that society is already very weak. 
Society does actually manage to continue and PTSD studies conducted after the 
recent London bombings, 11 September 2001, and the Madrid train bombing 
conclude that PTSD effects were surprisingly low. Within days of the event, the 
majority of the population generally recovered their sense of routine. Residual levels 
of disquiet did continue within the minds of the target audience, but overall, people 
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coped fairly well and did not disengage from society or succumb to paranoia. So 
while terrorist organisations aim to achieve complete societal dislocation, at best they 
can only achieve moderate disorientation.
The second flawed strategic idea is misjudging the level of resilience that resides 
in target populations. This idea proceeds on the notion that disorientation is more 
pronounced when terrorist acts are not ‘one-off events’ but are part of an ongoing 
campaign design to wear down the target audience. Terrorist organisations believe that 
ongoing terrorist activities will produce chronic fear that will tip target audiences ‘over 
the edge’. Yet terrorism is shocking and disturbing not because of the violence involved 
but primarily because it is ‘extra-normal’. A degree of violence exists in all societies and 
most people cope with ‘normalised violence’ such as pub brawls. Even in the most crime-
ridden cities, ordinary people manage their fears. So the advent of repetitious terrorist 
acts is likely to create normalising, coping mechanisms rather than disorientation. This 
situation creates a ‘law of diminishing returns’ especially if terrorist attacks occur at 
regular intervals, at similar targets, using recycled modes of operation. Obviously from 
a terrorist point of view, the application of surprise would defeat any onset of normalisa-
tion of the target audience. However, there is doubt that most terrorist organisations have 
the real ability to maintain high tempo operations and the momentum of surprise and 
unpredictability over long periods of time, especially from an organisational resource 
perspective. Any rapid paradigm changes in tactics will increase the likelihood of mission 
failure due to lack of prior experience and learning, imploding internal cohesion and 
further expose terrorist organisations to detection. Extended terror campaigns ranging 
from the Second World War air raid bombings in Europe right through to the extended 
Palestinian terror campaigns have eventually led to numbing and indifference rather 
than disorientation. In fact rather than achieving the terrorist’s aim of instilling chronic 
debilitating fear in large sectors of the target audience, it has produced resilience.
The third flawed strategic idea is propagating the ‘blame game’. It is typical for 
terrorist organisations to target governments in their information operations in order 
to discredit them. Terrorist organisations aim to force governments into over-reaction 
with the hope that target audiences view governments as brutal and oppressive. The 
other course of action is to force governments into under-action, where government 
loses legitimacy because it cannot protect its people. Douhet, the famous Italian air 
power theorist, promoted the idea that massive aerial bombardments of towns would 
cause such fear and dread that target audiences would rise up against their govern-
ment. While Douhet’s theories have been criticised as unethical they are also clearly 
unworkable. The strategic Second World War bombings on London and Germany 
as well as the strategic bombing of North Vietnam did nothing to weaken target 
audience opinion of homeland government. In fact, for the United States in Vietnam 
it was actually part of its strategic undoing. These conventional examples provide 
useful pointers for terrorism. Namely that blame and legitimacy cannot be effectively 
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influenced by terrorist organisations unless government legitimacy is already too low. 
The IRA experienced the ‘blame game’ backfire when they commenced its terrorist 
offensive on the British homeland in the early 1980s. The IRA was aware that the 
British public were uncomfortable with government policy on Northern Ireland. The 
IRA believed that bringing the fight onto British soil would knock Britain out of its 
complacency and force the British Government to reverse their long-standing policy. 
The IRA was completely right in their assessment of the high ambiguous nature of 
British public opinion but completely wrong in assuming terror attacks would align 
British public opinion to the IRA cause. The end result: British public opinion regal-
vanised in support of tougher measures against the IRA.
The fourth flawed strategic idea is that the government in power has a ‘breaking 
point’. A prolonged terrorist campaign against the government will create a situation 
in which governments will dissolve, hand over power or compromise terms to the 
wishes of terrorist organisations. This idea draws its origins from the many examples 
of separatist or anti-colonial campaigns involving indigenous populations against 
colonial governments after the Second World War. While there is great strength in 
the nationalistic causes of indigenous populations against foreign colonial powers, it 
is difficult to transfer that ‘template’ to countries where strongly indigenous, homog-
enously cultural-ethnic, or strongly democratic population exists. Yet this has been 
the thinking of many terrorist organisations such as the IRA, who were captive to 
the ‘template’ of British failure in Aden. Also Fatah (PLO) studied and routinely used 
FLN’s methods used in Algeria. Hence ‘templating’ the methods of Irgun and FLN is 
dangerously flawed as both campaigns were in the context of foreign colonial occupa-
tion where regime legitimacy was already dramatically low and opportunities to fill 
power vacuums were plenty.
The Escalation Paradox
War is a clash of two living organisms each seeking to achieve its aims. Clausewitz 
supported this idea when he stated that ‘if the enemy is to be coerced, you must 
put him in a situation that is more unpleasant than yours’. 3 Because war is a reactive 
environment, the only way to deal with Clausewitz’s maxim is to ‘escalate’. However, 
escalation is a difficult task for terrorist organisations because of the following 
question: if the strategy of terrorism fails to sustain an adequate level of fear, how can it 
escalate that level of fear without further recourse to greater physical destruction? The 
tension existing in any strategy of terrorism is that terrorists aim to wrestle legitimacy 
from governments by maximising the impact of attacks, while minimising death and 
injury to the target population. Yet if a terror campaign is to succeed it must create 
sustained fear and crisis through an information operation supported by continued 
indiscriminate attacks. Hence the impulse for terrorist organisations is to ‘escalate’, 
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otherwise they risk becoming irrelevant. But the paradox working against them is 
the loss of target audience support. The indiscriminate nature of attacks creates more 
anxiety, yet it also potentially erodes target audience support for terrorist organisa-
tions. And herein lies the problem: terrorist organisations can easily create fear, but 
the real problem is sustaining that fear. The Clauswitzian escalation trap is further 
realised when a terror campaign provokes a counter-escalation response from a target 
government. In the case of Uruguay and Argentina, the standing government of the 
day successfully wiped out terrorist organisations despite using brutal widespread 
measures. Even liberal democracies have and are willing to defend their position and 
harshly deal with threats. The escalation paradox is a real issue that any strategy of 
terrorism needs to deal with in order to achieve its aims; however, the historical hit 
rate and the nature of terrorist organisations suggest that mission success is slim.
The Strategy of Terrorism ends with case studies highlighting the flawed strategic ideas 
of two terrorist organisations and why they failed to deal effectively with the Escalation 
Paradox: the Gamaat Islamiya (GI) group of Eygpt in 1992–97 and the IRA in Northern 
Ireland 1972. In both of these situations, the terrorist organisations’ decision to escalate 
violence provided the perfect excuse for government security forces to increase security 
measures and operational tempo. The end result: repressive government measures 
countering the threat received support from a wide cross section of society.
Concluding Remarks
Although some conclusions on specific terrorist organisations and outcomes 
may invoke disagreement or debate, the military strategy aspects of this book are 
immense. A strategy of terrorism is not about trying to neutralise the power of a 
stronger opponent, but about influencing its behaviour in a manner that favours the 
goals and interests of the terrorists. However, time and time again, those who have 
sought to implement a strategy of terrorism have chosen to ignore the fundamental 
power correlations that exist between the target and the terrorist, leaving them prone 
to ill-considered acts of escalation. The most frequent outcome being political and 
military failure—or disappearing into irrelevance.
Endnotes
1 ‘An Anatomy of Killing – Aggressive Predisposition of the Killer’ in D A Grossman, 
On Killing – The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, Back Bay 
Books, Boston, 1996, p. 182.
2 Peter R Neumann and Michael L R Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism – How it Works 
and Why it Fails, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 56.
3 Ibid., p. 78.
Australian Army Journal • Volume VII, Number 1 • page 187
Book Review
David W Cameron, ‘Sorry, lads, but the order is to go’ – The August 
Offensive, Gallipoli: 1915, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009.
Reviewed by Rhys Crawley
After the months of stalemate that followed the failed Gallipoli landings, the Allied high command began to look for new options. They decided to mount a breakout manoeuvre from the Anzac sector to seize the northern 
heights and eventually cross the peninsula. At the same time there was a new landing 
at Suvla Bay which aimed to both support the Anzac left flank and provide a logis-
tical base for the subsequent phases of the offensive. This was the August Offensive, 
and it was the largest and last major effort to defeat the Ottomans at Gallipoli.
It is this offensive that forms the subject of David Cameron’s second book on the 
Gallipoli campaign. Like his previous foray into the first 24 hours of battle, Cameron 
successfully focuses his narrative on the individuals who took part in the actions 
of August 1915. He provides an evocative and emotional read throughout and is 
able to successfully convey the confusion of battle, while at the same time telling an 
interesting and historically correct story.
Despite this, Cameron provides little more than was previously known about 
the August Offensive. He relies heavily on secondary sources, especially the works 
of Charles Bean, to construct his narrative. Where primary materials are used, 
Cameron has largely drawn from previously published accounts. Some unseen 
records do appear, but these are in the minority. One must, however, be conscious 
of the audience for whom Cameron was writing. The book was never intended to be 
an academic text, nor an educational tool for the professional soldier. Rather, it was 
written for the general reader, and therefore strove to introduce those with little or 
no prior knowledge of the August Offensive to this important period of Australia’s 
military history.
There can be no doubt that the author has an extraordinary grasp of the various 
battles that constituted the August Offensive. He presents a succinct, yet detailed and 
accurate understanding of the plans and objectives, followed by an impeccable blow-
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by-blow account of what, how and when units fought. By examining the Ottoman 
story, Cameron also presents his audience the bloody reality of war on both sides of 
no-man’s land. Cameron’s real strength, however, is his ability to accurately describe 
the landscape, constantly reminding the reader of its key features and the difficulties 
these posed for the planners and troops. 
That said, there are aspects of Cameron’s approach and content that let him down. 
His focus on the soldiers’ war is at the expense of the operational and strategic levels 
of the war. Similarly, his reliance on narrative is at the expense of an analysis of the 
reasons for failure. One of the major shortcomings of this book is that like many 
authors before him, Cameron briefly succumbs to the age-old myth that the Anzacs 
‘almost managed to pull it off ’ (p. xiii). This is not only incorrect; it is ignorant of 
the inherent impossibility of the task. The principal drawback, though, is the scant 
attention paid to the equally chilling and pointless saga of the British at Suvla Bay. 
By focusing almost entirely on the fighting at Anzac, Cameron tells only a portion 
of the story. As such, the book sits as just another volume of Anzac-centric rhetoric 
in the historiography of this failed campaign.
The book is also let down in its presentation. While sufficient for someone with 
an avid knowledge of the Gallipoli campaign, and given its intended general reader 
audience, its maps are merely adaptations of the thumbnail sketches used by Bean 
in 1924, and offer nothing for those who want to understand the particularities and 
peculiarities of the terrain. The endnotes are also brief, confusing and inconsistent. 
On a positive note though, the author should be congratulated for his selection of 
interesting, and not often seen photographs.
Despite being an amalgamation of previously seen material, this was a long 
overdue book about the August Offensive. It does not provide many educational 
lessons for the professional soldier, but it does remind one of the importance of 
adequate command and practical planning. If you are after a captivating story, then 
Cameron’s narrative is for you. But be warned, it is not the full story.
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Jean Bou, Light Horse: A History of Australia’s Mounted Arm, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2009.
Reviewed by John Donovan
Jean Bou has written a useful institutional history, which focuses on the roles, development and eventual decline of the Australian mounted arm from colonial times until the last horsed regiment was disbanded. Descriptions of battles are used 
to illustrate points in the discussion, not as the principal focus of the narrative.
Dr Bou explores why the Australian colonies were increasingly willing to 
maintain forces beyond a particular crisis after the Sudan expedition. Support 
for mounted militia forces was strengthened by Canadian-based theorist George 
Denison, whose writings influenced Edward Hutton. Hutton commanded the New 
South Wales military forces, and then a mounted infantry brigade during the Boer 
War. After Federation, he commanded the Commonwealth forces. Hutton’s pivotal 
role in the development of the light horse is a major element of the book. He wanted 
a focus on dismounted action, and generally got his way.
Many books on Australian military history criticise the concept of the ‘natural 
Australian soldier’. Dr Bou puts this criticism into a broader context, recording that 
this belief was held both by political/journalistic elements (as could be expected) and 
by experienced British regular officers like Hutton. He notes that, ‘like all good myths, 
[it] had some basis in fact’, and that in South Africa ‘the supposed strength of Australia’s 
mounted men … was [not] completely mythological’, but lack of training remained a 
limitation. Most contingents took about a year to ‘become genuinely efficient’.
Dr Bou records that this mythology was maintained alongside a strong emphasis 
on training, suggesting that, regardless of public pronouncements, those responsible 
for developing the Australian forces recognised that training was necessary to build 
on a good foundation. He notes that the mythology of the frontiersman as natural 
soldier also existed in other English speaking nations. One wonders whether this was 
a recruiting device to appeal to the self-image of citizens in nations with voluntary 
military service!
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The belief in the potential effectiveness of part-time militias also focused on 
‘irregular’ warfare, or theatres where defences were less developed. Indeed, the 
battlefield success of mounted forces during the First World War was principally in 
secondary theatres, where the development of defensive systems was less extensive 
than on the Western Front.
Dr Bou discusses in detail the role of the light horse, concluding that for much of 
its existence it operated as mounted rifles, but that there was a change to an emphasis 
on the cavalry role from about the time of Beersheba. His differentiation between 
the mounted infantry and mounted rifles roles, however, sometimes involves hair 
splitting on functions like outpost duties and skirmishing.
Dr Bou sees mounted infantry as a mobile form of traditional infantry, with its 
principal role as dismounted attack and defence while sometimes also undertaking 
outpost and reconnaissance duties. Mounted rifles undertook the duties of cavalry, 
but using a firearm. Hutton, however, wanted his mounted rifles to be ‘capable of 
dealing in dismounted action with an enemy’s infantry’, which is a broader mandate, 
more appropriate to Dr Bou’s definition of mounted infantry. The difference seems 
to pivot on the capability to attack or defend dismounted, largely a function of 
dismounted strength (a dismounted light horse brigade was ‘barely equivalent in 
strength to an infantry battalion’).
The difference became a problem in the Sinai and Gaza operations, when limited 
dismounted numbers and firepower reduced the effectiveness of the light horse. 
The mounted rifles concept seemed to fit more into irregular warfare, and was not 
as effective as was hoped. Some arme blanche or ‘cavalry spirit’ mythology seems to 
creep into the book, and the examples of successful mounted charges often stand 
out as opportunistic occasions providing the exceptions that prove a rule. However, 
when the militia light horse regiments were reorganised after the war to continue 
the traditions of the wartime units and reflect wartime experience, all were ‘trained 
as cavalry’.
Dr Bou follows the decline of the light horse, which started in the home-based 
militia regiments during the First World War. Financial reality in the 1920s cut 
training time, and reduced numbers of suitable horses. This ultimately finished 
the mounted troops. Unfortunately, the Army neglected mechanisation during 
the 1930s. Raising two armoured car regiments, incorporating light car elements 
in selected regiments, and converting six light horse regiments to machine gun 
units were the principal efforts made to mechanise the light horse during the 1930s. 
Dr Bou concludes that the military authorities between the wars ‘abrogated their 
responsibilities in regard to the development of the mounted arm’.
By 1939 the importance of mounted units had waned. The remaining mounted 
units were intended to operate as irregulars in country not suitable for mechanised 
operations. Their final days were spent patrolling.
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Dr Bou, in an appendix, analyses a photograph claimed to be of the charge 
at Beersheba. The evidence is summarised well, and he is probably right that the 
photograph was not taken there. Whatever photograph Eric Elliott took that day, it 
does not seem to have been this one.
It would have been useful had this book included lists of light horse units at 
selected times to enable the reader to follow organisational changes and changes in 
numbering systems. It is, however, overall a valuable book.
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Paul Ham (ed), Captain Bullen’s War: The Vietnam War Diary of 
Captain John Bullen, Harper Collins, Pymble, 2009.
Reviewed by Bob Hall
Captain John Bullen was posted to Vietnam as the OC of the 1st Topographical Survey Troop, part of the 1st Australian Task Force at Nui Dat. To brief his successor on developments, and to inform his family of his activities there, 
he kept a diary. The diaries were edited by Paul Ham into a lively account of Bullen’s 
Vietnam tour. Ham’s editorial hand was light. Bullen displays a keen writer’s eye for 
an illuminating detail, a wry observation or a description of the underlying tension 
of combat operations.
Bullen’s diaries begin on 17 January 1968 when he boards HMAS SYDNEY 
bound for Vietnam. He arrives at Vung Tau on 3 February 1968 just days after the 
Tet Offensive erupted, with provincial cities, towns and military bases under heavy 
attack by the Viet Cong and the People’s Army of Vietnam. Together with 350 other 
Army personnel—a mixed bag of all corps—Bullen disembarks on a shingle beach 
somewhere in Vietnam. No one is there to meet them. They have one rifle between 
them—but no ammunition. A US Army jeep screeches to a halt and a US Military 
Policeman tells Bullen and his fellow Australians, ‘There’s VC coming this way! Take 
cover and prepare to defend yourselves!’ 1 So begins Captain Bullen’s War.
It ends thirteen and a half months later with Bullen, exhausted after an ‘often 
desperately demanding’ year, boarding HMAS SYDNEY for the return cruise to 
Australia. Between these dates Bullen treats us to an often wittily observed picture 
of the day-to-day workings of an Australian Task Force at war.
In addition to his job as OC of the Survey Troop, as a ‘spare’ captain within the 
Task Force Headquarters, Bullen does regular stints as duty officer in the Task Force 
command post, dealing with a host of tactical problems such as casualty evacuations, 
enemy probes of the defensive perimeter, and granting clearances to fire artillery and 
contacts. He also acts as a board member or defending officer in a number of courts 
martial. He records in his diary the details of production of maps, the conduct of 
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survey and the administration and leadership of his small unit. But interspersed 
within this story are the highlights of Task Force operations through one of the most 
hectic periods of the war and Bullen’s wry observations of the Army disciplinary 
system going inexorably about its business. Bullen’s job also takes him regularly to 
Saigon, Baria, Vung Tau and the US Army base at Long Binh. He records an acutely 
observed wartime travelogue of the bases, bars, beaches and brothels he encounters. 
Punctuating the story are Bullen’s sharply observed snapshots of the sometimes 
hilarious, sometimes dramatic, incidents that war brings forth.
A wonderful cast of characters pass through the spotlight of Bullen’s attention. 
There are the men of his unit, particularly Grant Small who emerges as competent, 
energetic and a natural leader, but is denied his opportunity for promotion by the 
powers that be. There are the various Task Force and US Army officers Bullen meets 
in the course of his work. There is the laundry proprietor, the Vietnamese Major 
and the shoeshine boy, along with a bevy of finely observed bar girls, prostitutes 
and madams.
I enjoyed the story of ‘Gazza’, the Task Force Officers’ Mess steward with a 
larrikin streak who tipped a bowl of soup over an unpopular officer and was charged 
and fined $10 for the offence. It later emerges that the offence was premeditated. 
Gazza picks up $25 in bets, making his soup spilling offence a tidy earner. Gazza, 
presumably seeking further supplementation to his Army pay, later invites Bullen 
and others to nominate targets for similar treatment.
In another Python-esque interlude, Bullen, who speaks fluent French and 
German, is on duty in the Task Force command post. Two visiting American 
Colonels are ushered in by another German-speaking Australian officer. For the 
benefit of their American audience the two Australians begin an argument. The 
German-speaking Australian demands to know if this is the Australian Task Force 
command post, to which Bullen replies in fluent French that it is not; it is, he says, 
the last French Resistance command post operating against the Viet Minh.
But more serious episodes are never far away. Mine incidents, friendly fire 
episodes, contacts, air strikes and other combat events pepper the diary.
Bullen acknowledges that his diary records only what he saw or heard at the time, 
and the field of view for junior officers and soldiers in war is severely limited. Thus, 
there is no sense here of the broader impact of the Tet Offensive or the ‘mini-Tet’ 
Offensive of May 1968, the beginning of the Paris peace talks, or world events 
having an impact upon the Vietnam War, such as the 1968 US Presidential election 
campaign bringing Richard Nixon, who promised the phased withdrawal of US 
forces, to the Presidency in January 1969. The book, in other words, is impres-
sionistic. And some of Bullen’s impressions of 1ATF operations need to be treated 
cautiously. For example, he asserts that ‘outside major battles … SAS patrols… kill 
more [enemy] than the rest of the … Task Force put together’. 2 This is incorrect. 
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Excluding major battles, during calendar year 1968 the SAS killed 175 of the enemy, 
whereas Infantry killed 646. 3 He also overstates the effectiveness of helicopter 
gunship support. But many of the details of combat operations he records in his 
diary are accurate and add depth to the colourless accounts to be found in official 
Task Force Headquarters war diaries.
This is an easy and enjoyable read. It shows Bullen to be a man sensitive to the 
violence and suffering of the war, caring of his men and the units doing battle with 
the enemy, but equally alert to the ironies, human foibles and the comic always 
present in war. The soldiers of the 1st Topographical Survey Troop could have done 
much worse than to have Bullen as their commander. Captain Bullen’s War gives a 
vivid impression of the Australian Task Force in wartime Vietnam.
Endnotes
1 Paul Ham (ed), Captain Bullen’s War: The Vietnam War Diary of Captain John Bullen, 
Harper Collins, Pymble, 2009, p. 23.
2 Ibid., p. 199.
3 Analysis of the Vietnam Combat Database created by Dr AT Ross. But SAS loss ratio 
was far better than that of Infantry (1:19.8 for SAS compared with 1:3.8 for infantry). 
However, Infantry loss ratio improves substantially relative to SAS loss ratio when 
Infantry performance in major battles (of which there were several in 1968) is included.
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Jim Storr, The Human Face of War, Continuum International 
Publishing, London, 2009.
Reviewed by Justin Kelly
Many readers will be aware of Jim Storr through his contributions to various British journals over the last twenty years. A retired Infantry officer, he is a forensic thinker with a strong empiricist bent—one who 
works from the observed facts towards a theory rather than the other way round. In 
the latter stages of his military career he was deeply involved in operational analysis, 
doctrine production and the analysis of lessons. The Human Face of War is his first 
book and is very reflective of the author’s professional experience.
This is an important book, albeit one with an audience that is probably limited 
to specialists. It opens with a review of the sources and character of military theory. 
By investigating the distinctions between arts and sciences it discloses the uncertain 
foundations on which many of our presuppositions are based and, convincingly, 
argues that we are whistling in the dark. On the way to this conclusion, in a wonder-
fully grumpy first chapter, Storr disposes of Fuller’s principles of war, dismisses 
Boyd’s OODA loop, aims some passing blows at Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and 
derides most of the key ideas that have shaped the military debate since the end 
of the Cold War. For anybody involved in doctrine or concept development this 
chapter alone is worth the price of the book.
Storr, does not, however, propose a theory himself. This is refreshing in an era 
in which anybody with a computer seems to deem themselves qualified to have a 
view on a unified theory of war. Rather, Storr argues that warfare is so chaotic, so 
fundamentally human, so replete with exceptions, that attempts to encase it in some 
theoretical framework are bound to fail. So instead of a theory of war, Storr proposes 
that, as true empiricists, we approach each situation with perfect openness of mind 
and, by making better decisions faster, win.
To support this line of argument he leads the reader through an examination of 
a number of ideas that are important to understanding combat: shock, attrition, the 
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structure of tactical organisations, command and the role of leaders. In this, Storr 
focuses clearly on conventional combat, which is presently unfashionable, but if 
the reader looks beyond the specific examples to the techniques of analysis being 
used there is much that can be learnt along the way. This is a good book because it 
demonstrates the utility of combining experience, either actual or vicarious, with 
critical thinking to arrive at conclusions that are independent of fashion, and which 
avoid defaulting to the latest buzzwords. As a book on the methodology of military 
theorising, at least about combat, it is probably unique.
The Human Face of War is not, however, perfect. Although Storr is clearly erudite 
he is equally impatient with abstractions and so he tends to be dismissive of things 
that can’t be measured. For example, he discounts Luttwak’s propositions about the 
paradoxical logic of war portraying them as theoretical weaknesses. Yet his central 
thesis is based on the same precept—that real enemies will constantly avoid your 
strengths and circumvent your preparations, and that therefore speed and agility 
are crucial. There is a related reluctance to draw from his stated examples those 
generalities that are the first step towards the development of coherent theory. To 
this reviewer, if Storr went up a couple of layers of abstraction he would find that he 
is strongly Clausewitzian. Instead, by rejecting abstractions, Storr’s empiricist bent 
leads him to argue that the exceptions invalidate the derivation of rules and, mostly, 
the book discounts rather than proposes solutions other than ‘select and prepare 
your people well and hope for the best’. The book is also wrongly titled. It is not a 
book about war, but one about combat, and these two subjects, although closely 
related, are not the same.
This is a valuable and important book for the specialist reader and one that is 
chock-full of fascinating insights, examples and analysis. Although, to this reviewer, 
it occasionally draws premature and incomplete conclusions, these do not overly 
detract from its very useful methodology and confronting propositions. Storr is a 
good writer and the voice of the book is strongly reminiscent of the late Richard 
Simpkin, rich in conviction and, surprisingly given the nature of the subject, compel-
ling. It is recommended for anyone with an interest in the theory of combat.
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Book Review
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 
2009.
Reviewed by Major Andrew Shum
David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers is raw, confronting and more than a timely reminder of the lessons learnt, hardships faced and indelible physical and emotional scars that are left on those engaged in close counterinsurgency 
fighting in the modern era. As the current focus of the Coalition and its political 
masters remains firmly entrenched in the ongoing Afghanistan fight and surge, 
Finkel recounts the fifteen month tour of the soldiers of 2-16 Battalion, 4th Infantry 
Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division during the Iraq surge in 2006/2007.
Finkel, a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist who was embedded with 2-16 for most 
of its tour, doesn’t target the strategic or operational levels of the surge and provide 
a sugar-coated summary of a resounding success born from a remarkable strategy. 
Finkel has instead produced an insight of the surge at the tactical level, and in doing 
so tells its true story from the perspective of the man on the ground—achieving 
powerful and unforgettable results. The men of 2-16 were like many others in the 
Iraq surge. They were deployed at short notice and allocated a section of Baghdad, 
thrown a copy of the newly published FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency manual and given 
an intent echoed all the way down from their Commander-in-Chief President: ‘Our 
troops will have a well defined mission: to help the Iraqis clear and secure neigh-
bourhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to ensure that the Iraqi 
forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs’.
The 2-16 sets out true to the mission, the manual and the population. Guided 
by the battalion commanding officer, the men of 2-16 look to embrace counterin-
surgency basic principles and from the first days begin expanding their footprint 
within the population, embracing and mentoring the local security forces, and 
taking every opportunity to reaffirm to the public that they are working towards 
a safe and secure environment for them. Over the ensuing fifteen months, 2-16 is 
tested to beyond personal and professional limits at each and every rank level in 
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attaining these goals. Finkel presents this friction candidly and to great effect. The 
reader is not spared the horrors of explosively formed penetrator IED blasts and 
their resulting effect inside a Humvee, the lingering thoughts in the mind of soldiers 
in the hours and days after such events, the frustrations of dealing with questionable 
loyalties in local counterparts, and the emotional rollercoaster for the families left 
to care for the shattered minds and bodies of those wounded and returned home. 
By presenting each chapter as a new month in the surge and introducing it with a 
‘same-time’ quote from the strategic leadership, Finkel subtly allows readers to make 
up their own minds regarding realities of the surge and its successes and failures. 
This masterful presentation contrasting the commentary that helped shape public 
opinion of the day, emphasising the success of the surge with the harsh realities 
endured by the soldier on the ground, reinforces Finkel’s own intent of documenting 
the 2-16’s corner of the war, unshaded and without agenda.
This book is a must-read not only for the junior leaders within our ranks, but all 
the way up to and beyond uniformed decision-makers at the highest levels. There 
is no glorification within Finkel’s account of 2-16’s part in the surge, instead an 
honest, compelling and powerful story of what it is truly like to fight in the modern 
battlespace. While The Good Soldiers is focused on the Iraq War surge of 2006/2007, 
it would be both disrespectful and dangerous to relegate it to history. The Good 
Soldiers is a remarkable, warts and all story that presents lessons, dilemmas and 
undeniable truths that will outlast the fighting in all current theatres. Just as it was 
for all those who have been on the ground in Iraq, this story does not have a happy 
ending. It is far more appropriate, and very simply implies the emotional impact on 
all those involved, that the final pages present a roll call of all the members of the 
2-16 who fought in the surge, including the seventy-seven recipients of the Purple 
Heart, and the faces and names of their fourteen killed in action. The Good Soldiers 
is a great read.
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Book Review
Garth Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World 
War, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2009.
Reviewed by Craig Stockings
Despite its rather uninspiring title, and the fact that it began life as a PhD thesis—and at times reads as such—Garth Pratten’s book, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, is an important contribu-
tion in an under-represented area of Australian military historiography. Over the 
decades the acolytes of Charles Bean have done a comprehensive job at idolising the 
heroic deed and sacrifice of Australian ‘diggers’ at war. So too, a healthy tradition 
of military biography has ensured that our generals have had their time in the sun. 
But what of that vital link in between? What about the ‘Old Man’? What about the 
commanding officers that ran the war at a unit level? It is at this historical ‘gap’ that 
Pratten’s book is aimed—and where it squarely hits its target. Key issues such as the 
background, role, influence and conduct of Australian commanding officers are all 
examined in this book—most for the first time.
In its overall form, style and subject matter, Pratten’s work is unique. In a field 
too often clogged with repetitious narratives and ‘ripping yarns’, Pratten’s analytical 
approach to the issue of unit command in the Second World War is refreshing. So 
too, his willingness to move past commemoration or hero worship of the deeds of 
past servicemen into the realm of real critique and judgment is a healthy contribu-
tion. Alongside accounts of successful command relationships and decision-making 
at a unit level, he is unafraid to call poor leadership by its true name—and describe 
its consequences. Pratten does not pull his punches. This is not a popular or 
dominant tradition within Australian military history, but it is a key strength of 
his book.
The second factor that sets Pratten’s work apart, and which should earn it a place 
on military reading lists and on the bookshelf of anyone interested in military history 
rather than military myth, is the breadth and scope of the research that underpins 
it. Pratten’s judgments of various commanders, command institutions, practices 
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and performances are based on a balanced reading (and understanding) of a wide 
range of sources. His personal opinions surely shine through—but they are opinions 
based on careful analysis, not private fancy. His arguments are logical and insightful. 
His points are well made. The rather scathing appraisals of unit commanders in 8 
Division during the Malayan Campaign, or the (in)actions of certain commanders a 
little earlier in North Africa and Greece, are cases in point in this regard. So too, his 
careful statistical arguments that demonstrate that Australian commanding officers 
during this conflict were not necessarily the democratic, representative cross-section 
of Australian society that Anzac imagery might have us believe.
Given the numbers of Australian commanding officers that fought, the wide vari-
ations in combat circumstances for Australian Infantry units in battle from 1941–45, 
and the enormous variations in character and leadership styles on display, it is no 
small achievement to have put together a coherent work on the issue of battalion 
‘command’ in the Second World War. Pratten, however, has succeeded— and with 
considerable aplomb.
Those with a passion for military history—I recommend you buy this book. 
Those more comfortable with new versions of the same old Anzac fables, however, 
may perhaps be better served sticking to the bestsellers.
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The editors of the Australian Army Journal welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article’s standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession 
of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, e-mails and 
contributions to the Point Blank and Insights sections. As a general guide on length, 
letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 
3000 and 6000 words; and contributions to the Insights section should be no more 
than 1500 words. The Insights section provides authors with the opportunity to write 
brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should 
note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not 
generally suitable for publication.
Each manuscript should be sent by e-mail to <army.journal@defence.gov.au>, or 
sent printed in duplicate together with a disk to the editors. Articles should be 
written in Microsoft Word, be one-and-a-half spaced, use 12-point font in Times 
New Roman and have a 2.5 cm margin on all sides. Submissions should include the 
author’s full name and title; current posting, position or institutional affiliation; full 
address and contact information (preferably including an e-mail address); and a 
brief, one-paragraph biographical description.
The Australian Army Journal reserves the right to edit contributions in order to 
meet space limitations and to conform to the journal’s style and format.
General style
All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes 
(not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author’s name, the title, the publisher, 
the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This issue of the journal 
contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.
When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the 
source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, 
with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations 
of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without 
quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as 
authoritative statements.
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Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, 
where arabic numerals should be used (and per cent should always be spelt out). 
All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and 
jargon kept to a minimum.
Biographies
Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current 
biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not 
exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor’s full name and title, 
a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details 
of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the 
institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, 
source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should 
also be included.
